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
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ALLAHABAD UNIVERSITY STUDIES

HISTORY SECTION

The British Government and the Kingdom of Oudh 1764-1835



SENATE HOUSE

ALLAHABAD

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The British Government and the
Kingdom of Oudh
1764-1835

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INTRODUCTION.

An important problem for Anglo-Indian statesmen was how to adjust the existence of Indian states with the growing supremacy of the British East India Company. There were some states which were ready to contest the supremacy of the Company, while, even at an early stage, others realising their position of dependence submitted to a condition of subordinate alliance. The Company's Governors developed a method of political dealings with the latter. From the beginning of British rule in India, Oudh played an important role in the evolution of that political practice. Its relations with the Company, though the product of peculiar circumstances of that state, indicated the direction of political usage to which other states were subjected; even its annexation was a pointer and but for the Mutiny other Indian states would have met the same fate.

The first contact between the East India Company and the state of Oudh synchronised with the acquisition of the Diwani of Bengal and the establishment of British rule in the eastern provinces. Shujaudaulah, the Nawab of Oudh, had been defeated by the English army and his dominions lay at the mercy of the victor. There was a proposal to hand over Oudh to the fugitive Emperor of Delhi, but Clive intending to form a barrier against the Marathas and Afghans decided to maintain the state. The treaty of 3 August 1765 provided for mutual assistance in case "the territory of either was invaded." The Nawab received the gift of his dominions from the Company and was further

promised protection against all enemies. The Nawab agreed to pay the expenses of such military support. The relations between the two governments, however, became intimate in the days of Warren Hastings who helped Shujauddaulah in "exterminating" the Rohelas and encouraged his son Asafuddaulah to resume the jagirs of the Begams and extort money from them for the repayment of the heavy debt which he owed to the Company. The treaties made by Warren Hastings defined the conditions of military aid. A brigade sent at the time of the Rohela War to Oudh soon came to be permanently established there, to which were added temporary brigades whenever necessary. The subsidy of Rs. 25,20,000 fixed for the expenses of the original force was in 1781 raised to 34 lacs of rupees even when some temporary brigades were to be withdrawn. The subsidy was increased by Cornwallis and Shore and ultimately it reached the high figure of 76 lacs in 1798.

The rapidly rising subsidy and the fast deteriorating administration of Asafuddaulah combined to burden the state with an enormous debt and the consequent interference by the Governor-General in the administration of the Nawab. Even without the sanction of any treaty stipulation Warren Hastings instructed the British Resident to exercise "the most vigilant control over the government and in reality to exercise the powers of sovereignty through the minister Hyder Beg". The Nawab was reduced to the position of a mere non-entity, a pliant tool in the hands of his minister who was in his turn, "at the absolute devotion of the Resident",

a mere "creature of the British Government". Warren Hastings desired that "nothing is done", by the Minister "in his official character" without the knowledge and participation of the Resident who was to be the virtual super-despot. The instructions of the Governor-General to the Resident, dated 23rd October 1782, related to limiting and separating the personal disbursements of the Nawab from the public accounts, reforming the military establishment, controlling the appointment of officers, more particularly the Aumils and bettering the administration of justice. Thus even in the eighteenth century Oudh had come to be wholly a dependent state, paying subsidy for British troops stationed there, and subject to the minutest interference in the internal administration by the Resident and his employer, the Governor-General in Council. The superior authority had not only acquired by usage the right of controlling the details of administration, but had also asserted the exclusive right of appointing the Diwan, of settling the succession, of deposing a prince and of placing another on the throne. Sir John Shore's interposition to oust Wazir Ali and raise Saadat Ali to the throne leading to the treaty of 1798 marks the culminating point of the growth of defacto paramountcy before the commencement of the period of Wellesley's subsidiary alliances.

The treaty of 1798 made with Saadat Ali was the price of his elevation to the throne of Oudh. That apostle of non-intervention imposed an increasing burden of subsidiary troops on the state in order to ward off the apprehended danger of an

invasion by Zaman Shah, the King of Kabul. "Continued protection" of Oudh was guaranteed in return for an enhanced subsidy of Rupees seventy-six lacs a year, and the cession of the fort of Allahabad and a large sum of money towards the cost of its repairs and the "expense of placing him on the throne". The new Nawab also engaged not to employ Europeans in his service or "hold communication with other political states without British sanction." Even the easy acquiescence of Saadat Ali could not shield him from the threatening demands of Lord Wellesley for a fresh revision of the treaty. The entreaties, protestations and lamentations of the Nawab were unavailing before the unbending might of the new Governor-General, and the consequence was the treaty of 10th November 1801 which remained the basis of Anglo-Oudh relations in the nineteenth century. As subsequent developments depended upon the interpretation of the scope and content of this treaty, it may not be improper here to examine its provisions and their implications.

Sir John Shore's treaty was strictly subsidiary in so far as it placed the Nawab in "entire dependence upon the British Government for protection against both external and internal danger," and secured the relinquishment of "his right to treat with other powers except in concurrence with the will of the protecting state." In lieu of a fixed subsidy the Company engaged to maintain a definite number of troops in the state and the Indian ruler relinquished his liberty to determine his external relations. Lord Wellesley adopted

this treaty as a model and entered into similar engagements with some other major states of India. In the case of Oudh, however, a fresh revision became necessary for two reasons, firstly, the need of guaranteeing regular payment of the enhanced subsidy without depending upon the vagaries of an inefficient administration, and secondly, the absolute urgency of increasing the subsidiary force, while disbanding the "useless" and "dangerous" rabble, the Nawab's army. The Nawab was first persuaded, then compelled to submit to an increase of subsidiary troops and the dissolution of his own army beyond a fixed number. This was followed by a cession of territory amounting to about one half of his dominions yielding an income of one crore and thirty five lacs of rupees in commutation of the annual subsidy and all other expenses on account of the defence, external or internal, of the Nawab's remaining territories. This cession of territory was incorporated in the treaty of 1801 which in every respect was to supplement the stipulations of the treaty of 1798, as was clearly expressed in Article IX of the new treaty in the words "all the articles of the treaty concluded by Sir John Shore,....not annulled by this treaty are to remain in force, and continue binding upon both contracting parties." The Company had now engaged to defend the Nawab's territories "against all foreign and domestic enemies" and to attach a "detachment of British troops" to "His Excellency's person." Control over external policy had been secured by the earlier treaties. But in view of the peculiar position of Oudh a clause was introduced

into the treaty which invested the Company's Government with the right of interfering in the internal administration of Oudh for the purpose of preventing misrule. Article VI of the treaty ran thus "The Hon'ble East India Company hereby guarantee to his Excellency the Vizier, and to his heirs and their successors the possession of the territories which will remain to His Excellency after the territorial cession, together with the exercise of his and their authority within the said dominions. His Excellency engages that he will establish in his reserved dominions such a system of administration (to be carried into effect by his own officers) as shall be conducive to the prosperity of his subjects, and be calculated to secure the lives and property of the inhabitants; and His Excellency will always advise with and act in conformity to the council of the officers of the said Hon'ble Company". This clause subsequently became the lever for depriving the rulers of Oudh of their free exercise of internal sovereignty.

Two other articles of this treaty deserve mention. Article V definitely stated that as the cession of territory was "in lieu of the subsidy and of all expenses on account of the Company's defensive engagements with" the Nawab Vazir, no demand would be made on him for any expenses which might be incurred either in repelling attack from outside or repressing internal "rebellions or disorders". The Nawab had been compelled to disband his own forces, consequently the duty of maintaining peace and order in the state devolved upon the East India Company and the Nawab "was released

from the obligation of defraying the expenses" on the protection of his territories. This clause made it possible for the Nawab to reckon on the services of the Company's troops in any exigency, whether arising out of the recalcitrance of some local chief or the oppressions committed by his own officers, without being required to pay for such help.

Further, Article VIII provided for the framing of a "separate commercial treaty". But provisionally it was agreed that the navigation of the Ganga and all other rivers forming the boundary of the two states "shall be free and uninterrupted." Duty could be realised on export and import of goods into the territories of the contracting parties, but no duty could be levied on boats in transit.

In addition to the formal treaty, the Governor-General incorporated in a memorandum "the general principles which in his Lordship's judgment should regulate the connection and intercourse between the two states, as resulting from the treaty concluded on 10th November 1801. The memorandum contained the results of the conference between the Nawab and Lord Wellesley held on 24th February 1802, and is in the form of answers given by the Governor-General to certain propositions put forward by the Nawab. All these matters relate to article VI of the treaty, and were intended to prevent clash between the Nawab and the Resident. The Governor-General also defined the scope and character of the "advice" and "counsel" referred to in the same article. The Nawab's first proposition was to the effect : "Let no one, as has hitherto been the practice as to countenance and support any

person, impede the recovery of just balances from Aumils and others ; on the contrary, let him (meaning the Resident) afford assistance to the sircar in the recovery of those balances. If the Resident is desirous of withholding me from the prosecution of any particular measure, let him state his sentiments to me in private ; in which case (as I am far from being disposed to act unjustly) either I will prove to the Resident, the equity of the proceeding, or the Resident will set me right, and in the latter event I will, in conformity to his desire, abandon such proposed measure, and no one will be apprized of any disagreement subsisting between us." The Governor-General's answer to this was : "Unobjectionable and this proposal shall be observed. The Resident shall be furnished by His Excellency the Nawab Vizier with all the information necessary to establish the justice of the proceeding, by vouchers and proofs."

By another proposition, which was deemed "perfectly wise and proper" by the Governor-General, the Nawab wished to establish regular tribunals for providing justice according to Mohamadan Law to all persons, and desired the Company's officers to "assist in enforcing obedience to them" in case any person "refused to acknowledge the jurisdiction, or oppose the authority of those tribunals." Subsequent propositions related to the affairs of the Begams and their relations with the Nawab, extradition of criminals, and the claims and interests of the Nawab in the ceded districts. The Governor-General had suggested that the Nawab "should appoint some person to conduct,

in the quality of minister, the ordinary details of public affairs." The Nawab, therefore, proposed that his second son "Mirza Ahmad Ali Khan be appointed to the situation of minister for the affairs of Government." The Governor-General agreed to it. The last proposition put forward by the Nawab was "that His Lordship will explain all the foregoing points to the Resident, and direct him to act in conformity to them, and that His Lordship will also enjoin the Resident, after His Lordship's departure, to occasion no delay or impediment in my departure, whenever I may choose to set out, and assist me in the preparations for my journey".

The Governor-General, at the end, explained the content of article VI and the character of the advice to be offered by the Resident. He wrote that "the Nawab's authority is to be completely established within his reserved dominions, and be exercised through His Excellency's own officers and servants: the British Government having engaged to guarantee the establishment and exercise of His Excellency's authority within his reserved dominions, and the Governor-General will never depart from this engagement. His Excellency has engaged to establish within his reserved dominions such a system of administration as shall be conducive to the prosperity of his subjects and be calculated to secure the lives and property of the inhabitants. This system of administration is to be carried into effect by His Excellency's own officers and servants, and by his own authority." Further adverting to the engagement that the Nawab would "advise with and act in conformity to the counsel of the

officers of the Hon'ble Company" in "all affairs connected with the ordinary Government of those dominions and with the usual exercise of His Excellency's established authority," the Governor-General stated that "those counsels will always be offered in the form of friendly advice, and in the spirit of reciprocal confidence, and of mutual regard and respect." This advice was to be given either by the Governor-General "by a direct communication in person or by letter," or by the Resident in the name of the Governor-General, in which case it was "to be received as proceeding immediately from the Governor-General." He further laid down, "such advice will be offered by the Resident, in all practicable cases, under the general or specific powers of the Governor-General. The Resident must advise the Nawab with perfect cordiality, and must employ every endeavour to coincide with His Excellency, in an uniform course of measures, and to unite sincerely with His Excellency in carrying into effect, exclusively under His Excellency's authority and through His Excellency's officers, those measures which shall be determined upon, in conformity to the counsels of the British Government. In cases requiring the aid of the British Government the assistance of the British troops shall be employed according to the exigency of the occasion." The Resident was required to "conduct himself towards the Nawab Vizier, on all occasions, with the utmost degree of respect, conciliation and attention." He must not "proceed to act in the affairs of the reserved dominions without previous consultation with His Excellency or

with his ministers." And with these limitations the Nawab was required to "act in conformity to the advice and representations of the Resident."

This memorandum is important as it clearly explains the intention of the Governor-General in incorporating clause VI in the treaty. Whereas the treaty merely states that the Nawab had agreed to maintain good government in his dominions and to act in conformity to the advice of the Company's officers, the memorandum unequivocally desires the Resident to offer advice "in all practicable cases", and also to supervise the execution of the measures which may be decided upon in consequence of such advice. Of course all action had to be taken through the agency of the Nawab's officers, and the Resident was also enjoined to maintain strict secrecy as to his advice before any measure had been determined upon. But the fact that his advice was to be deemed as emanating from the Governor-General, and that he had the power to see that the advice was acted upon, and that the advice was to comprehend every aspect of Oudh administration, made the Resident's position such as would affect adversely the sovereignty of the Nawab. The ruler had engaged to maintain order and good government in his state, but he was dependent entirely on the British Government both for the counsel which was to determine his policy and for the force which was requisite for the enforcement of his authority. In the circumstances, it may not be an unreasonable inference that the new treaty, and explanation thereof, transferred, though indirectly and indeterminately,

the sovereignty of Oudh to the British Government while retaining the show of sovereignty in the person of the Nawab.

This view is strengthened by a review of the manner in which this treaty was extorted from the Nawab. The Governor-General was, as he wrote to the Resident on 27th May 1801, not prepared to "permit the Vizier to maintain an independent power, with a considerable force within the territories remaining to His Excellency's possession." He was emphatic that the Nawab's independent military power must be broken. He was eager to relieve the Company's finances from any augmentation of military strength on the north-west frontier. He had even planned for the delivery of "the kingdom to the British Government," but the refusal of the Nawab to sign away his doom and that of his successors greatly chagrined and disappointed him, and in the alternative he resorted to the subterfuge of the treaty by which without the formal extinction of the Indian rulership defacto sovereignty was to shift to Calcutta and its agent the Resident at Lucknow. At the same time Lord Wellesley was convinced of the utter venality and tyrannous inefficiency of Oudh Government and was equally convinced, as Lord Bentinck rightly inferred, that "until the exclusive management of the civil and military government of the country should be transferred to the Company" no "effectual security could be provided against ruin of the province of Oudh". Failing to secure the whole of it, he seized about one half of the territory and inserted in the treaty the stipulation about good government and advice

which, according to Bentinck, was "properly considered to be tantamount to it (cession) in effect." Mill wrote "No dominion can be more complete than that which provides for a perpetual conformity to one's council, that is, one's will." It was this dominion which was sought by authorising the Resident to interpose his "counsel". Lord Bentinck in his minute correctly interpreted this clause "that the whole power of the state was to be transferred to the Resident, the nominal sovereignty only being left with the Vizier." It will be difficult to agree with Mehta's view, therefore, that "complete subordination of the Nawab" was not "intended." The clause regarding "good government" and "advice" was deliberately introduced to secure the purpose which was thwarted by the obstinacy of Saadat Ali. That "advice" gave "the Company power to direct and control his government at pleasure" without the responsibilities of sovereignty, was fully appreciated by the British Government for we find a similar provision in the treaties made with Travancore and other states subsequently.

The treaty of 1801 assured the Nawab of British military support in the exercise of his despotic government. He was precluded from maintaining any force except that of peons for collecting revenues. All internal revolts were to be suppressed by the British military force and the Nawab was fully justified in demanding such aid even when a Taluqadar or Aumil refused to pay up his dues. The Nawab's power was thus reinforced to oppress his subjects. The Resident had both the law and the will to intervene in the administration of the

state, the Nawab was still the nominal head of the government. The new arrangement therefore sanctioned duality which was bound to lead to further misgovernment.

Paton remarks that the treaty "from that day to this has been the fruitful source of perplexity." It could not be otherwise. On the retirement of Lord Wellesley there was once more a drift towards non-intervention in higher quarters. The Residents, however, were for rigorous interference. The result was a contradiction between practice and policy, between reality and the statements of the Governors-General. The rulers also were not equally of the same character. Whereas Saadat Ali was keen on augmenting his revenues and centralising his authority, his successors were prone to let matters drift lest there should be interference in the uninterrupted course of their revelry, license and luxurious obliviousness. While Saadat Ali was anxious to retain sovereignty, his son Ghaziuddin, the first king, seemed "desirous of making your Lordship's representative at his court the organ as well as the adviser of all the public measures of his administration." He invariably sought the advice and assistance of his "uncle and protector," the Resident. The new king gratified the wishes of the new Governor-General by making a reluctant loan of more than two crores to the British Government, and purchased for some time immunity from the pressing demands for reform of his administration. The second king had no taste for government, but was content to cater to the whims of his European servants and display

his anglophilism to every European visitor by strutting in English clothes and giving English breakfasts at his table. Nawab Saadat Ali had ruled effectively, but in the days of his successors all power passed into the hands of the Prime Ministers, who were appointed in consultation with the British Government, and were with few exceptions venal and corrupt. Misgovernment persisted, while all proposals for reform, for one cause or other, remained abortive. Saadat Ali had amassed a huge treasure which was unhesitatingly squandered by his immediate successors. The treaty of 1801 provided for disbandment of Nawab's troops, yet in the course of a few years by gradual augmentations the irregular force of the king exceeded 60,000 men. And rackrenting grew into a regular feature of revenue collection, leading to excessive assessment on the one side and evasions on the other, calling for constant employment of military force, either the Nawab's or of the British, for the collection of revenues. Such was the story of Oudh after the signing of 1801 treaty, vividly exemplifying the effects of the subsidiary alliance system.

Wellesley's intentions do not seem to have been honoured by his successors. For some years without examining the justice of the occasion, British troops were despatched against every defaulting Taluqadar whenever requisitioned by the Nawab or his Aumils. At first no attempt seems to have been made for intruding reforms; and it must be admitted that Saadat Ali's administration called for no intervention. His centralising activities, however, soon alarmed Col. Baillie, the

Resident, and the English Commanders of troops, who watched with suspicion and jealousy the gradual extinction of contumacious landlordism in the state. Remonstrances by European officers met with a spirited protest from the Nawab, and for some time "the authority of the Government" was maintained. But the Resident and Lord Minto were not quite satisfied with the shape of things, and a scheme of reform of revenue administration was proposed to the Nawab, who did not countenance it. The British Government once again emphasised the meaning of 1801 treaty and even threatened him with "the performance of its duty, however painful it may be to discharge it." Yet no reforms were forthcoming, and ultimately the Calcutta Government ordered on 2nd August 1811 that "our troops could only be lent to aid him (Nawab) against his subjects after a full investigation on our part into the justice of the Viziers complaints and the insurance of the guilt of his subjects." Lord Minto failed to secure compliance with his wishes and Lord Hastings while lamenting the "perverse and unenlightened policy" of the Nawab, came to the conclusion that "the specific plan of reform proposed to the Vizier by Lord Minto must be relinquished or insisted on as the alternative of a resolution on our part which would amount to a dissolution of the existing relations between the two states. The principles of justice and good faith, as well as of political expediency, appear to the Governor-General in Council to forbid the adoption of the latter course, and thus to impose on the British Government the necessity of desist-

ing from the further prosecution of the object." The tenor of his policy was to leave the Nawab "free to exercise his independent rights over his subjects and servants." His policy is best expressed in a letter to the Resident on 12th November 1814, that "The Nawab is consequently to be treated in all public observance as an independent prince. Essentially he must be subservient to the British Government." To a large extent non-interference was determined by the loans which Ghaziuddin was compelled to make to relieve the financial distress of the Company at the time of the Nepal War. Lord Hastings, however, had, as in the case of Hyderabad or other subsidiary states, prohibited meddling in the details of state administration and had tried to uphold the ruler's dignity and authority by endeavouring to keep the Resident under proper restraint. This policy was continued by his successor, Lord Amherst, and was supported by the Court of Directors, who while disapproving the use of British troops for what they called "supporting oppression," did not recommend "the hazard and odium of a rupture with the King of Oudh", and suggested "acquiescing in his propositions, however defective, and trust to the zeal of the Agent to point out any evils apparent in the practical application of the King's plan." They desired reform; they deprecated the constant employment of their troops for the realisation of revenues, yet they were not prepared to apply effectively the provisions of the treaty of 1801. This attitude of helplessness resulted firstly from the absence of any definite sanctions in the treaty,

in case advice was not acted upon, and secondly from the prevailing notion that the subsidiary states were independent territories which could be dealt with only by International Law. Lord Bentinck, however, was not content to let matters rest, and in his time we find a fresh attempt to restate the British policy towards Oudh.

During these years constant reports of growing misgovernment, misery and oppression emanated from the Residents and were easily believed in by their employers. Misgovernment cannot be denied, yet it is difficult always to reconcile facts with the exaggerated accounts rendered by the interested Residents. Saadat Ali was a wise and capable administrator, who introduced *amani* system of revenue collection and compelled many corrupt revenue farmers of the earlier regime to disgorge their ill-gotten wealth. His assessment was low and collection high. This accounted for the accumulation of a huge treasure which he left to be mercilessly squandered by his son and grandson. Saadat Ali's rule was harsh on bigger landholders, but it afforded protection to the lesser lords and introduced a mild regime for the cultivator, who was comparatively prosperous under him. Yet his rule was made to appear tyrannous. As Sleeman writes "acts of just severity were made to appear to be acts of wanton oppression, and such as were really oppressive were exaggerated into unheard of atrocities." Situation, however, deteriorated under Ghaziuddin, who was led to dismiss Hakim Mehdi, the competent revenue minister, as he refused to submit to the wishes of the Resident, and

appoint Agha Mir, whose venality was proverbial, but who had the support of the British Government. He reverted to the farming system, a system, pregnant with misery, whose evils have been so vividly depicted by Paton in the Narrative. The minister, aumils, and the farmers, all now fattened themselves on the toil of the cultivator and soon lesser landlords ceased to flourish.

Secure in the confidence of the British Resident Agha Mir brought the state to the brink of ruin.¹ However, Nasiruddin had courage to dismiss him and press him to disgorge his gains. Soon after Hakim Mehdi came to power, with reversion to amani system. This led to improvement again, but intrigues made his continuance impossible. Under Roshanuddaulah the situation once again deteriorated, because he could not suppress speculation with a strong hand. Thus from the death of Saadat Ali, the state was heading towards anarchy, owing to the existence of corrupt officers, dishonest ministers, indolent rulers and constant interference of the British Resident. Nevertheless, it may be stated that the condition of the peasantry in Oudh was not very different from that in the Company's territories. The accounts of Bishop Heber, Dr. Butler and Mr. John Shore, though conflicting, yet fail to substantiate the highly exaggerated reports of maladministration by the Residents, who were

¹The minister earned money, unmindful of the interest of his master or of the people. He was the instrument of British Government in negotiating loans, which left him a secure income of Rs. 25,000 a year out of the interest on the loan of 1825.

itching for the transfer of Oudh to British rule. Shore considered Oudh government better for the people than that of the Company, and others also pointed to lower taxation and greater wealth in Oudh than in the Company's dominions.

Mention may be made here of the elevation of the Nawab to kingship. The measure was designed to be little the prestige and influence of the Mughal Emperor of Delhi. Paton thus describes the affair; "the Governor-General's reasons for this increase of dignity were various, but chiefly to separate the interests of the two great Mohammadan Courts in the quarter of Hindostan namely, the Imperial House of Delhi, and the Court of Oudh for the descendant of Timour upon the Throne of Delhi having nothing but the name of Royalty left, could not be expected to see with complacency his prosperous "Vizier" assume a crown and ascend the throne of Oudh. The event was supposed by the Marquis of Hastings to be likely to create a division of interests, and an exigency can well be imagined when it would prove of the deepest advantage thus to lessen by one half any continuation of the leading members of the Muslim population unfavourable to British interest." The crown was considered to be an apt gift for the docility of Ghaziduddin Hyder who had yielded to British demands on points on which his father had shown resistance. The title, which according to Irwin, had no effect outside Oudh, was the price of the loan he had advanced to the Company. The docility and servility of the King was a guarantee that the Muslims of Northern India would remain

loyal to the British. But the Oudh state could not divert the allegiance of the Muslims from the Shahanshah of Delhi.

The position of the Resident also calls for comment. As has been mentioned earlier, even in the eighteenth century the Resident, such as Middleton, had developed into a super-despot who controlled the government through the minister and exercised interference even in the pettiest details of administration. After 1801, he had obtained sanction for his dictatorial behaviour. The Oudh government then existed "merely at the pleasure of the British power", "and the Resident was the sole organ of this stupendous power which has from time to time wrought such changes in Oudh." He administered advice for the guidance of the King's government, and very often this advice was communicated in a formal manner in the shape of a letter from the Resident to the King, a procedure highly insulting and bitterly irksome to the latter. The Resident, besides, afforded protection to "guaranteed persons" against the King and his government, held his saturday darbars attended by the vakils of princesses, nobles, Taluquaders and guaranteed persons, interfered on behalf of the British sepoys residents of Oudh, and exercised jurisdiction and control over European subjects of the King. He was also empowered to scrutinise every case in which aid of British troops was required. All these made his influence and power really formidable. No Prime Minister could hope to be successful if he lost the confidence of the Resident. Paton remarks that "no minister in Oudh can expect to

rule the state with efficiency unless he is supposed to have the goodwill of the Resident." For, when the minister enjoyed the favour of the Resident, "petty chieftains of the interior are found to pay their revenue, to yield obedience to the Firmauns of the King and even to attend at Court when summoned, but when their Agents inform them that the Minister's power is tottering and the British Resident looks coldly towards him, or perhaps has quarrelled with him in vain are his orders sent to the interior." Generally the Residents interfered too much and particularly in petty details. Lord Bentinck thus states the position: "The errors of our policy in this respect seem to have been twofold, first, to interfere a great deal too much in all the petty details of the administration, and in the private and personal arrangements of the sovereign, making in fact the Resident more than the King, clothing him with a degree of state equal to that of royalty itself, and allowing him to act the part rather of a school master and dictator than of the Minister of a friendly power professing to recognise the independence of its ally. The immense extent of jurisdiction exercised by the Resident at Lucknow within the town itself, the actual residence of the sovereign, is totally incompatible with the Royal dignity, and secondly, not to interfere with sufficient promptitude and decision, as the paramount power when the vital interests of both states, the cause of good government and of humanity imperatively demanded it." Further he added, "it is to the first description of meddling and interference that I feel so much averse. If the political

agents for the most part were altogether removed I believe it would be for the comfort of the sovereign, for the advantage of good government and for the real interest of both states. It is impossible that this imperium in imperio can ever be successful, it is directly opposed to every feeling and passion of human nature." Sir Thomas Munro's misgivings were fully realised in the case of Oudh, where "an administration offensive to the people" drew "a sanction to its proceedings from the support of the British authority." Agha Mir's corrupt government had the support of Baillie, who was always hostile to Saadat Ali's strong but beneficial rule. One Resident made impossible the tenure of Hakim Mehdi, another imprisoned Agha Mir, though at the desire of the King, and in 1830 reduced Ram Dial "from his elevation to imprisonment." Such was the position of the British Resident and it will not be an exaggeration to suggest that for much of misgovernment he was directly or indirectly responsible. And yet Resident after Resident magnified the extent of misrule and demanded active interposition of the British Government to set aside the titular authority of the King.

On the report of Major Low, that disorder prevailed in every aspect of Oudh administration, Lord Bentinck paid a visit to the King in 1831. The Resident was not well disposed towards the minister, and gave an easy ear to "every complaint and representation that his numerous enemies would eagerly pour into the ear of a hostile British functionary." The Governor-General, however, received confirmation of the "desperate condition of

the people" from other sources and himself saw the evil effects of subsidiary alliance. He was of the view that the existing situation had developed owing to an inadequate realisation of the responsibility imposed upon the paramount power by the treaty of 1801. He felt that clause VI, relating to advice, had not been fully acted upon, and that "advice, remonstrances and measures merely negative will avail nothing, and that the arm of power forcibly interposed will alone effect this object." In his interview with the King, of which Paton has given a full account, he remonstrated with him and warned him "that unless a decided reform in the administration should take place there would be no other remedy left except in the direct assumption of the management of the Oudh territories by the British Government." He made the same recommendation to the Directors, but unlike Mysore, he suggested a further continuance of the Indian government, as he had trust in the capacity of Hakim Mehdi to effect reform. This hope was soon frustrated because that capable minister was set aside as he had offended many in the Court, and in his place the well meaning but weak Roshanuddaulah was appointed as prime minister. The administration reverted to its original oppressive inefficiency. The Directors had authorised assumption of Oudh Government but no action was taken on it. In 1835 and 1836, when Nasiruddin's end was fast approaching, the problem of adopting a fresh policy towards Oudh was agitating the Calcutta Council. It was then that Paton wrote his Narrative to enlighten his employers

about the course of events and the existing condition of the state.

The treaty of 1801 had established a subsidiary administration in Oudh. The guarantee of protection against external foes and internal insurrection, coupled with the too easy employment of British troops at the wish of the Nawab or his minister and the constant and close interference by the British Resident in the pettiest details of government, led to the rapid decline of Oudh state and the perpetuation of corruption, oppression and misrule. Wellesley's measures had tended to this state of affairs in every subsidised state. Oudh was an apt illustration of the consequences of Paramountcy. The treaty of 1801 was however found wanting in effecting any improvement as it did not provide for the mode of operation in case advice was not acted upon. Hence Bentinck's remedy, which for the time became a settled policy of action towards the Indian states till the Mutiny.

II

The miscellaneous records of the Foreign and Political Department of the Government of India in the Imperial Record Department contain a manuscript volume entitled "An Abstract of the Political intercourse between the British Government and the Kingdom of Oudh". In the Handbook to the Records (Miscellaneous Foreign Department No. 136) it is described as follows: "Abstract of information regarding the political intercourse of the British Government with the Kingdom of Oudh 1764-1836, compiled under the direction of the Government of India from the Residency records by

Captain J. Paton, First Assistant to the Resident, Lucknow." Its number is 7. It is also noted by J. T. Wheeler in his "Memoranda on the records in the Home and Foreign Departments" in 3 volumes. It is a folio volume and covers 398 pages (folio) of which pages 391 to 398 have been cut out; and to it are appended (i) the treaty with Nawab Saadut Allee, (ii) the minute by Lord William Bentinck and (iii) the minute by Sir Charles Metcalfe, covering another hundred pages. It is written in a distinct hand and seems to be a copy from the autograph. This narrative seems to have been written in the latter half of the year 1835 as is evident from two notes dated 8th September 1835 and a reference in the last chapter to the establishments of the Oudh Government "at this moment, November 1835". But certain marginal postscripts or footnotes are dated June, July and August 1836. It may be presumed that this paper was submitted to the Government of India sometime in 1836.

The author of this narrative is Captain J. Paton, who was the First Assistant to the Resident of Oudh for a number of years. Probably he held the charge of the residency also for sometime in 1834 and possibly in 1835 as may be inferred from his reference to performing "the duties of Resident at Lucknow" and also to his being the first Resident to allow the prime minister of Oudh to smoke hukka in his presence. Captain Paton is mentioned in the despatches as having taken a prominent part as First Assistant in quelling the rising of Munna Jan and Padshah Begam on the death of King Nasiruddin Shah. By virtue of his long

stay in Oudh and of holding an important position in the residency, he was best suited to prepare a report on the working of the relationship between Oudh and the British Government at a time when the problem of adopting a fresh policy towards Oudh was under discussion.

Captain Paton did not indulge in the luxury of writing this paper for mere self-satisfaction or for exhibiting his literary accomplishments to the English public. The paper was not meant for publication. It was written under the orders of the Government of India who, it may be presumed, desired to possess a full and frank statement of the relations between the Calcutta and Lucknow governments and of the working of the residency at Lucknow. The author mentions that "For drawing out this paper, the instructions of Government are, that it should point out the good or bad consequences of our measures" (Chapter 17, para 2). It may be inferred from the arrangement of the chapters that the purpose of this paper was to throw light on the working of the 1801 settlement made by Lord Wellesley, at a time when the British Government was contemplating a revision of the existing political relationship. This report may have been called for by the Government of India in connection with their recommendations about Oudh which culminated in the abortive treaty of 1837.

This volume is divided into 19 chapters. The narrative commences with "the first contact of the British with the Oudh dominions" when in pursuit of Mir Kasim the British forces were brought face to face with Shujaudaulah and his ally the Emperor.

Chapters one to five bring the story of British relations with Oudh to the period of Sir John Shore when he dethroned Wazir Ali and a treaty was made with the new ruler Saadat Ali. To a large extent this part is based on Mill's History of India, extracts from which are quoted frequently. Paton is highly critical of British policy particularly in respect of the Rohela War, Warren Hastings's dealings with Begams of Oudh and the highhandedness of the Resident at the Oudh Court. Chapters six and seven are devoted to the measures adopted by Lord Wellesley in reducing and disbanding Oudh battalions and superimposing a subsidiary force there and the consequent cession of territory. At the end of chapter seven the author gives his reflections on the treaty of 1801, which may be said to be the main thesis of this work.

Later chapters are devoted to an exposition of the consequences of the 1801 arrangements both as regards the Company and the state of Oudh. In chapter eight are found instances of the use of British troops for the support of oppressive and corrupt administration of the amils. Chapter ten describes the raising of the Wazir to kingship, ostensibly with the purpose of creating "a division of interests between the two chief Musalman courts in Upper India." In chapter eleven the author gives an account of the loans advanced by the King of Oudh to the East India Company to enable the latter to tide over the serious financial stringency which it then faced. Paton quotes some official and demi-official letters extracted from published Oudh Papers (1808-15) which most unequivocally

explode the myth of voluntary contribution by the King to his benign protector, the Company. No less than four crores of rupees were given by the King to the Company on two occasions, "but to obtain it was no easy matter". "It must have been a most ungracious and difficult task. The second and third crores could not be secured without the aid of the Chief Minister whose co-operation seems to have been purchased.

Chapter thirteen is another important chapter as it gives us an insight into the policy of Lord William Bentinck towards Oudh, as well as into the misgovernment which prompted the orders of the Court of Directors in 1835 "to assume charge of Oudh if no ameliorations have taken place". The author quotes "extracts from note of the conference between the Governor-General and the King of Oudh at the Lucknow Residency on the 20th January 1831", when Lord Bentinck exhorted the King to "introduce a general system of reform of his administration." There is also reference to the dismissal of Nawab Mehdi Ali Khan the minister, and a quotation from description of a conference between himself, the King and the minister by Major Low, the Resident. There is also quoted Lord Bentinck's letter of warning to the King of 5th February 1835.

Chapters 12, 14, 15, and 16 throw considerable light on the system of government in Oudh and the working of the residency and its interference in the affairs of that government either on behalf of the sepoys, or the European residents or the British guarantees. Chapter 17 reports the working

of the commercial treaty and disregard of its stipulations by the state authorities. Chapter 18 is both interesting and important in so far as a Resident or the Assistant, who had an inner knowledge of the working of the system gives an account of the "deportment" of the British Resident towards the King and the authorities of the state to which he was accredited. As an introduction to this chapter the author writes, "As the instructions of the Government for the preparing of this narration of British intercourse with Oudh directs that the effects of our measures may be pointed out, it is necessary to offer some observations upon a main cause of many effects good and evil, the Deportment of the Resident". And with perfect candour the author describes people's impression of the immensity of influence and power to do injury which Resident wielded. At the Resident's darbar was paid homage by the high and the low, and his approbation was sought for even by the prime minister of the King. The author points out in a footnote that even the prime minister had not the privilege of smoking a hookah in the presence of the Resident, and Capt. Paton was the first officer who allowed the minister to smoke.

The last chapter gives a resume of the position in 1835 and discusses the various projects which had been suggested to the Paramount Power for the amelioration of the kingdom of Oudh. He is of opinion that "the King has broken this treaty (1801)" and "the British Government is therefore absolved from adhering to the treaty as it originally stood". About Oudh government he writes, it "is

unequivocally bad depending more upon accident than upon any satisfactory cause." The pity is that the King knew "nothing of the state of his kingdom", and it was heading towards bankruptcy. The author discusses various alternative proposals then put forward and inclines to the view that either the British should withdraw and leave the King to his fate or that he be deposed or that his state taken over for some time for purposes of administration. The paper is concluded by an estimate of the King's treasure which had melted away by the year 1836.

The author has based his narrative on the official records and has given long extracts from official correspondence, most of which has been published by the Government (or as Parliamentary Papers). Nevertheless there are some letters and reports which have so far remained secret. Most valuable is the information contained in the later chapters for it relates to the affairs which the Resident had to deal with and about which no authentic version is available in the published papers and accounts. This "abstract" is a critical and judicious commentary on the policy of the British Government in its operation in Oudh. It is a successful endeavour to paint in their true colours the policy and the achievements of Lord Wellesley.

From the text of the 'Abstract' a few passages from the earlier chapters have been taken out as they were lengthy quotations from Mill's History of India or Malcolm's Political History of India or Oudh Papers 1808-1815. I have, however, not

omitted any passage which, though an extract from these works, throws light on British Government's policy or contains important information. In every case of omission I have given reference to the original work in the footnotes. I have also given a few footnotes, either for reference to original printed sources or in respect of place and proper names. I have given the text as it is without endeavouring to modernise the spelling of names, or punctuation and formation of sentences. The appendices containing the treaty of 1801 and the minutes of Lord Bentinck and Sir Charles Metcalfe have been omitted.

I have to express my thanks to Dr. S. N. Sen, Director of Archives of the Government of India for permission to get the manuscript published. I am deeply grateful to Dr. Amaranatha Jha, Vice-Chancellor of the Allahabad University, for undertaking to publish it as a University publication in these days of scarcity of paper. My thanks are also due to my research student Mr. Raja Ram Rastogi who first drew my attention to this work in 1941.

BISHESHWAR PRASAD .

AN ABSTRACT OF THE POLITICAL INTERCOURSE

between

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE KINGDOM OF OUDH

CHAPTER I

BEGINNINGS OF BRITISH CONTACT WITH OUDH

1. On the 22nd of October 1764 the army of Oude was defeated by that of the British Government in the battle of Buxar. The cause which led to the war was, the flight of Meer Causum Subadar or Ruler of the Provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orisa, after his defeat by the British in order to take refuge under the protection of the Vizier Sujaoodowlah, the Nabob of Oude, who had bound himself by his oath on the Koran to support him, even before the latter had entered the Oude Dominions.¹

*
7th. A native historian describes the camp of the Chiefs as not being an army "but rather a moving nation" and it is easy to believe that in the camp of the Vizier of Oude, alone, there could not have been less than one hundred thousand men, including the Troops and followers, perhaps two hundred thousand souls would be a more correct estimate when the multitude of followers in an Indian camp is considered.

8th. The Residency Vakeel of his present Majesty the King of Oude, a well read man in Oude history, gives this as the then strength of the Vizier's army though it is probably much over estimated.

Fighting men chiefly Cavalry in the Viziers' own army	70,000
The army of Bulwunt Singh Raja of Benares, the Vizier's tributary	18,000

1. *Mill* Vol. III p. 309.

* *Extracts from Mill's History of India* Vol. III pp. 309-11 have been omitted.

The force under the Rohilla leader, the Vizier

Ally	12,000
Total fighting men estimated by the Vakeel	1,00000

9th. Native historians relate that before the battle, the anxious Vizier's counsellors were divided some urging caution, whilst the warlike party spoke with contempt of the British troops as a mere handful who would be buried beneath the load were each of the Vizier's soldiers but to throw a clod at them; that the troops of the Vizier's cavalry would suffice to tread them to the earth.

10th. On the 22nd of October Major Sir Hector Munro moved on to the attack, and "encamped within shot of the Vizier's camp, (entrenched) with the Ganges on his left, and the Fort of Buxar in the rear."² The British army of 856 Europeans and about 6000 sepoys were a mere handful when compared with the hosts of the united chieftains whose dense masses of cavalry and Infantry covered the plain, the whole being estimated at some 40,000 Men.

†
 19th. "The Vizier at length impelled on one side by the desperate state of his affairs and on the other by the hopes of moderate treatment from the English, resolved to throw himself entirely upon their generosity, by placing his person in their hand."

Vizier surrenders;
 Oudh restored to him.

20th. "On the 19th May 1765 General Carnac received, written partly by the Nabob with his own hand, a letter in which he informed that officer that he was on his way to meet him. The General received him with the highest marks of distinction. The final settlement of the terms of pacification was reserved for the presence of Lord Clive, the Governor-General."³

21st. Here then by the usage of war was a Kingdom at the disposal of the British Government, by the defeat of its army after a pitched battle in the field, and the surrender of its ruler.

2. *Mill*, Vol. III p 818.

† *Extracts from Mill* Vol III pp. 314-15, and pp. 358-9 have been omitted.

3. *Mill* Vol. III p. 860.

22nd. The present Ruler of Oude is indebted for his crown and Kingdom to the circumstance that it was then "unanimously agreed by the Governor-General in Council, that it would cost the company more to defend the country of the Vizier, than it would yield in revenue, that Sujaoodowlah was more capable of defending it than the Emperor, to whom it had been formerly promised, or than any other Chief who could be set up: and that in the hands of the Vizier, it might form a barrier against the Mahrattas and Afghans; it was therefore determined to restore to him the whole of his dominions, with the exception of Allahabad and Corah, which were to be reserved for the Emperor."⁴

...

CHAPTER II

THE ROHILLA WAR

1. It is painful to dwell upon the events of this war; and it is to be feared that nothing can be urged to justify the unworthy and prominent part which the British Government took in its prosecution.

Its great injustice.

2nd. Truth and impartiality require that historical events should be clearly stated though it may involve the painful necessity of giving evidence against the British authorities. There are however few Governments better able to bear the exposure of their errors than the British Government in India, seeing that in the general tenor of its sway, the aim has been the just and honorable exercise of its power. The Rohilla war is an exception to this general view and it must be related in all its deformity without colouring. Nothing shews more forcibly the uprightness of a Government than a willingness thus to expose to view its past errors, and it would be unworthy, and in vain to gloss over those errors, seeing that they must be known to every person acquainted with British Indian History. Should further information be required it is amply to be found in the pages of the able historian Mill. In order to

4. *Mill* Vol. III p. 361.

† *Extracts from Mill* Vol. III pp. 361-3 have been omitted.

understand the causes of the war it is necessary to advert to the position of the parties at the time of this memorable event.

3rd. The unhappy Rohilla war was concerted in 1771 between Mr. Hastings, the Governor-General, and the Nowab Vizier of Oude who met at Chupprah¹.
 The genesis of the War.

The Governor-General encompassed by pressing difficulties required money for the exigencies of Government, the Vizier desired to exterminate the Rohillas as an independent power, to add their territories to his own, and for forty lacs of Rupees the British troops were to be lent to the Vizier for this purpose. The Rohillas about this time were thrown into the most perilous situation. The warlike hordes of the unprincipled Mahratta Nation accompanied by the Emperor of Delhi who was then an instrument in their hands and headed his Mogul forces in person, invaded a portion of the Rohilla Territories and were met in battle by the brave Rohillas under their leader Zabita Khan² who was overpowered by the united strength of the invading armies. His troops gave way and fled. Their leader escaped to the Camp of Sujaooodowlah Vizier of Oude.³

4th. The Vizier became alarmed lest to save themselves from either destruction the Rohilla should make terms and league with the Mahrattas and both turn the strength of their armies against himself. He moved his army to the confines of his Kingdom and entered into a negotiation with the Rohillas the terms of which were not brought about without the intervention of the British.

5th. The Chief stipulation entered into between the contracting parties (the Rohillas and the Vizier) and out of which sprung the melancholy Rohilla war, was the *promise of the Rohillas to pay to the Vizier 40 lacs of Rupees on condition that he should repel the Mahrattas from the Rohilla Territories*; ten of these Lacs to be furnished on the performance of the Service. the rest in the space of three years.⁴

6th. The Vizier made no effort whatever to expel the Mahrattas though bound to do so by this agreement; but shortly

1. A town on the Ganga in Bihar.

2. Rohilla Chief, son of Najibuddaulah.

3. *Mill* Vol. III p. 487.

4. *Mill* Vol. III pp. 498-4.

returned to his capital leaving the Mahrattas to ravage the country, after which when the rains set in, they recrossed the Ganges of their own accord. They encamped however between the Ganges and Jumna with too evident an intention of returning to the field of their spoil, so soon as the favourable season should return. The Rohillas seeing their hostile position, importuned the Vizier to make such agreements with the Mahrattas and Emperor as might prevent their recrossing the Ganges or re-entering the Rohilla country any more. But the Vizier made no attempts to effect such arrangement, and after the rainy season had ceased the swarming hordes of the plundering Mahrattas approached near to the Ganges and threatened the Rohillas, demanding a sum of money of which a portion was reluctantly paid by Hafiz Ruhmut Khan,⁵ then the head of the Rohilla Nation.⁶

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13th. It had been arranged between the Governor-General and the Vizier that the 40 Laos of Rupees promised by the Rohillas to the Vizier on condition that he would expell the Mahrattas and give protection against them should be demanded. But having allowed the Rohillas to be plundered by the Mahrattas and having taken no effective steps to expell them this demand of 40 Laos was unjust, still the Governor-General encouraged the Vizier in his design against the Rohillas and promised him the aid of the British troops in its enforcements. The Vizier's desire was the extirpation of the Rohillas as an independent power and the Governor-General pressed by financial embarrassments was anxious to gain possession of a large sum of money by aiding the Vizier in the overthrow of this unoffending people.

14th. The combined armies of the Vizier and the British approached and entered his devoted country on the 17th April, 1774.

15th. Backed by British bayonets the unpriniopled Vizier rose in his demands. Colonel Champion the Commander in

5. The Rohela Chief of Rohelkhand 1748-1774.

6. Mill Vol. III p. 494, a paraphrase, of the para in Mill.

• Extracts from Mill Vol III pp. 494-498 have been omitted.

Chief, leading the army in person, wrote to the presidency two days after the combined forces had entered the Rohilla territory that the Rohilla leader had by letter expressed earnest inclinations to come to an understanding with the Vizier but that the Nabob claimed no less than *two crores* of Rupees.⁷

16th. The brave Rohillas driven to despair arrayed themselves in order of battle under their gallant Chief-tain Hafiz Ruhmut Khan. We read with a feeling of deep sorrow and compunction that the British troops advanced and bore down the unhappy Rohillas leaving their gallant leader Hafiz and 2000 of his brave troops dead upon the plain.⁸ Nor was this all a most disgraceful scene of extermination now commenced by the Vizier's rabble army which had carefully kept out of the engagement, they overran the country in all directions. The Commander of the British forces Colonel Champion himself upon the spot, reported the dreadful cruelties of the Vizier in the letter from which the following extracts are taken.

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20th Extermination was the Vizier's object, and it is impossible to read without a feeling of indignation that from the love of gain, the British army should have been given to him and have enabled him to accomplish so diabolical a purpose !

21st. It is proper to mention here that the Rohilla War was one of the charges brought against the Governor-General Warren Hastings before the house of Commons but that a majority of that Tribunal of 119 to 67 voted that no impeachable matter was contained in the charge.

22. In the Government of India the members of the supreme council had been changed during the progress of these events and the Rohilla war was viewed with no favourable eyes by the new members but notwithstanding this no reparation was made to the Rohillas, and orders were sent to demand from the Vizier the 40 Laos he had promised for British aid in the extirpation of the Rohilla power.

7. *Mill* Vol. III p. 507.

8. *Ibid* p. 508.

† Extracts from *Mill* Vol. III pp. 509-19 and 524 have been omitted.

CHAPTER III

THE EPISODE OF THE BEGAM OF OUDH

1st. On the 21st May 1775 a treaty was concluded with Asuphooh Dowlah guaranteeing to him the protection of his Kingdom of Oude, and of the provinces of Corah and Allahabad which had been sold to his Father for 50 Lacs of Rupees, and the Nabob in return was bound to cede to the Company the territory of Rajah Cheyt Singh¹ Zumeendar of Benares, yielding a revenue of 22,10,000 Rupees (and embracing the Sircar of Benares Do-Chumah Sukleesghur—The District of Jaunpore Beshenpore Bahdoie Mulhas Kauss—The Sirkar of Ghazeepore The Pergunnas of Sekundapore, Iemde Sheeraqabad, Topa Surchur &c., and the mint and Outwally of Benares),² and the Vizier engaged to raise the allowance for the service of the Company's Brigade to 2,60,000 Rupees per month and to pay as they fell due the balances upon the engagements of the late Vizier.³

2nd. The Vizier engaged not to employ any Europeans in his service without the sanction of the Company.

3rd. The next events of note in our relationship with Oude were the seizure of the Treasures of the Fyzabad Princesses, and relieving the Vizier from a portion of the British Army paid by him under the denomination of the temporary Brigade.

1. Succeeded to the Zamindari of Benares in 1770 on the death of Raja Balwant Singh. He revolted against Warren Hastings in 1781 and died in 1810 at Gwallior.

2. Do-chumah (Dehma), Pergana in Tahsil Mahmudabad District Ghazipur, Gazetteer p. 187.

Sukleesghur (Saktesgarh) Pergana in Tahsil Chunar, District Mirzapur Jaunpore (Jaunpur) Pergana in Jaunpur district.

Bahdoie (Bhadohi) Pergana and part of the family domains of the Maharaja of Benares in Mirzapur district.

Ghazeepur (Ghazipur) Pergana in Ghazipur district

Sekunderpore. Headquarters of a pargana in Raja Balwant Singh's time. Now in Tahsil Chakie, District Mirzapur.

(I have not been able to trace other places in the Gazetteers.)

3. *Mill* Vol. III p. 524.

4th. The Vizier had fallen greatly into arrears in the payment of his pecuniary engagements with the Company and the disorders of his Country and the poverty of his treasury presented serious obstacles to the realization of the money.

5th. Before the connection between the Governments of the Company, and Oude, the Revenues of the latter are stated by Mill the Historian to have exceeded three millions sterling and the country whilst paying that, to have been in a flourishing condition, but in 1779 it did not exceed one half of that sum, and in subsequent years fell far below it, whilst the Country exhibited every mark of oppressive exaction.⁴ The Governor-General, Mr. Hastings, was pressed by the pecuniary embarrassments of the British Government, and the payment of the Vizier's arrears were most urgently required. The Treasures of the Fyzabad Princesses were doomed to relieve this combination of difficulties.

6th. It is necessary here briefly to review the mutual position of the Vizier and the Company.

7th. At the termination of the Rohilla war a treaty provided that a regular Brigade of the Company's Troops should be kept within and guard the dominions of Oude at the expense of the Vizier. The court of Directors sanctioned this burthen provided it was done with the free consent of the Soubah and by no means without it.⁵

8th. But in 1777 to this Brigade was *added a second* called the temporary Brigade because of the express stipulation that the expense of it should be charged to the Vizier for so long a time only as he should require the corps for his service.⁶

9th. The court of Directors were still more anxious on this occasion than on the former, that the burthen should not be fastened on the Vizier contrary to his will. Their pointed language to the Governor-General was "If you intend to exert your influence, first, to induce the Vizier to acquiesce in your proposal; and afterwards to compel him to keep the Troops

4. *Ibid.* Vol. IV, p 365.

5. *Ibid* p. 365.

6. *Ibid* p. 365.

in his pay during your pleasure, your intents are unjust, and a corresponding conduct would reflect great dishonor on the Company."⁷

10. Nor was this all, in addition to the permanent and temporary Brigades the Nabob was induced to pay several detached corps of the Company's army and several of his own native troops were put under British officers⁸.

11th. The Nabob's arrears were running on, in 1779 the expense of the temporary Brigade, and that of the country troops increased the debt, the one to the amount of more than 80 the other of more than forty-thousand pounds above the estimate, and in addition to all this there was the expense of the establishment under the Resident which had swelled to a great amount. ⁹.

12th. In the same year 1779 the Vizier wrote bitter complaints of the ruinous state of his finances, that these burthens were more than he could bear, and that the support of those British Establishments had thrown the attendants, writers and servants &ca. of his court into arrears, they having received no pay for two years. That he had no funds to meet the just demands of his late father's creditors who pressed him for payment. The Vizier solicited that he might be relieved from the expense of the temporary Brigade and other detached troops, declaring that they were not only useless to his Government but that those bodies of troops commanded by European officers brought nothing but confusion into the affairs of his Government. His letter complaining of these real and heavy grievances and soliciting to be relieved from them was couched in the most respectful language but was received by the Governor-Genéral with expressions of high indignation.¹⁰

13th. These demands, he said, the tone in which they are asserted and the season in which they are made were all

7. *Mill* IV p. 366.

8. *Ibid* p. 366.

9. *Ibid* p. 366.

10. *Ibid* pp. 366-8.

equally alarming, the just grounds on which the Vizier prayed for relief were treated as totally inadmissible.¹¹

14th. The forcing upon the Vizier the maintainance of those temporary troops the express terms of their support being "so long only as the Nabob pleased" appears to have been an act of great injustice.

15th. In 1780 the Vizier stood charged by the English with the enormous sum of £14,00,000, the supreme Government continued pressing their demand; the Vizier protesting that he had yielded up every thing that "in the country no further resource remained and that he was without a subsistence."¹²

16th. It was full time however to make new arrangements with the Vizier, and for this purpose the Governor-General proceeded in person and between him and the Vizier the treaty of 1781 was concluded.

17th. The Vizier was relieved from the expense of the temporary Brigade and of all other English troops except the single Brigade left with Soojahoodowlah and a Regiment of sepoys for the Resident's guard and protection of the Treasury &c. The Vizier was allowed to resume all Jagheers and for those guaranteed by the company he was to give a money payment.¹³

18th. In this treaty there appeared nothing advantageous to the British Government. But a very important understanding was entered upon between the Governor-General and the Vizier, namely that the latter was to proceed and seize the Treasure of the Fyzabad Princesses and with the money so obtained to pay the arrears due to the Company.

19th. These two princesses were the mother of the late Vizier Soojahoodowlah and the other his widow, the mother of the present Vizier Asuphoodowlah. To these princesses the late Vizier had left immense wealth and Jagheers or portions of territory were left

11. *Mill* IV p. 668.

12. *Ibid* p. 372,

13. *Ibid* p. 374.

for the support of their expensive establishments and for the maintainance of the numerous families intrusted to their care by the deceased Nabob.

20th. The youngest of these Begums was guaranteed by the British Government in possession of her rights but notwithstanding this it was now determined to deprive them both of their Jagheers and Treasure.¹⁴

21st. It is painful to peruse the whole of these extraordinary transactions and instead of entering into the details of them it may suffice to say that without trial upon suspicion of the Princesses having endeavoured to raise an insurrection in Oude,¹⁵ a suspicion quite unsupported by facts or probability, they were dispossessed by force and by the imprisonment and flogging of the Chief Eunuchs, of their Treasures and stripped of their Jagheers by British troops under the injunction of the Governor-General and entirely against the wishes of the Vizier, and the treasure thus it seems not too harsh to say unwarrantably seized and appropriated by the British Government in part liquidation of the Vizier's arrears.¹⁶

22nd. By the 23rd February 1783 upwards of 50 Lacs of Rupees (50,00,000) was received by the British Resident for the use of the company, and there remained still large balance due upon a Bond extorted from the Eunuchs.¹⁷

23rd. The current annual claim of the Company varied from Seventy to 130 Lacs per annum. Previous to 1781 the receipts of the Resident varied from 60 to 80 Lacs per annum whence the balance of debt perpetually increased. When the treaty between the Vizier and the Governor-General was concluded at Chunar¹⁸ the balance appears to have stood at 44 Lacs. The Resident instead of 80 Lacs which was the Maximum receipt received 1,45,00,000. The ultimate demand

14. This was done in 1775 after she had paid 30 lacs to Asafuddowlah

15. In favour of Chet Singh.

16. *Mill* IV, pp. 393-399. for details.

17. *Mill* IV, p. 396.

18. Town on the Ganga in Mirzapur district.

for arrears however by various additions swelled out to upwards of $2\frac{1}{2}$ crores of Rupees being equal to twice the annual Revenue of the whole Kingdom.¹⁹

CHAPTER IV

WARREN HASTINGS AND OUDH

1. The enormous debt due by the Vizier to the Company and the disordered state of the Oudh Government led the Governor-General Mr. Hastings to interfere substantially in the Vizier's administration as the only means of realizing the money, and though there was no provision in the treaty for such measures the instructions of Mr. Hastings to the Resident¹ at the Vizier's court virtually directed him to assume the most vigilant control over the Government, and in reality to exercise the powers of Sovereignty through the minister who was the virtual ruler, by name Hyder Beg Khan.² As far the Vizier himself, he was considered as a "Cypher" and Mr. Hastings thus writes of letters which the Vizier had written treating them as the letters of the minister "He (the minister has) dared to use both the Nabob's name and even his seal affixed to letters either dictated to the Nabob or written from him without his knowledge." Thus representing the Vizier as the mere tool of the minister in the Government of the country.³

2nd. Mr. Hastings devised that the minister, in his turn should become a subservient instrument of the Resident in the administration of affairs. "I cannot omit" says Mr. Hasting's letter "to report the sentiments which I expressed in the verbal instructions which I gave you at your departure that there can be no

The Resident directed to control Oudh Government.

Minister to be a tool in the hands of the Resident.

19. *Mill* IV pp. 403-4.

1. *Mill* IV pp. 403-4.

2. Prime Minister of Oudh from the days of Warren Hastings to 1795 when he died. See Irwin, *Garden of India*, pp. 90-98.

3. *Mill* IV p. 425.

medium in the relation between the Resident and the Minister, but either the Resident must be the slave or vassal of the Minister or the Minister at the absolute devotion of the Resident."⁴ And to leave no doubt as to the position the minister was intended to hold in whose hands the Ruler was represented as a mere instrument, Mr. Hastings proceeds to shew how he was to become a creature of the British Government. "He (the Minister) exists by his dependance on the influence of our Government; and if he will submit to hold his office on such conditions as I require I would prefer him to any other. At the same time it will be necessary to declare to him in the plainest terms, the footing and conditions on which he shall be permitted to retain his place, with the alternative of dismissal and a scrutiny into his past conduct if he refuses."⁵

3rd. This power of dismissing the Minister assumed by the Governor-General was virtually assuming the Prerogative of the Sovereign. The Governor-General continues his instruction to the Resident in detailing the extraordinary conditions of the minister's remaining in office "In the first place I will not receive from the Nabob, as his, letters dictated by the spirit of opposition but shall consider every such attempt as the minister's, and as an insult to our Government. In the 2nd place I shall expect that nothing is done, in his official character, but with your knowledge and participation; at the same time the first share of the responsibility will rest with you: the other conditions will follow distinctly in their places because I consider you responsible for them."⁶

4th. It is clear that these instructions extend to the assumption of the Government by the Resident, he being held responsible for the official acts of the Minister who was to do nothing without his consent and moreover that any complaint coming from the Vizier was to be considered an insult to the British Government.

4. Letter to Mr. Bristow Oct. 1782. *Mill* IV p. 425.

5. *Ibid.*

6. *Ibid* pp. 425-26.

5th. The instructions of the Governor-General to the Resident dated 23rd of October 1783 were these
 Warren Hastings, Instructions. 1st. to limit and separate the personal disbursements of the Vizier from the public accounts &c., 2nd. to reform the Military establishment reducing the troops of the Vizier to one uniform corps, and of the description, if possible, most useful to the Company, that of Cavalry; controuling even the appointment of officers, nay "peremptorily opposing it" as often as the choice appeared objectionable." 3rd. to controul the appointment of Aumils, the Resident's concurrence being necessary to their appointment 4th. to endeavour to reform the disgraceful state of the administration of justice.⁷

6th. For all the assumption of the Vizier's authority there was no treaty but he was greatly in debt to our Government and the Governor-General assumed the right of interference.

7th. When the Governor-General had made up his mind to interfere to this extraordinary extent, against the treaty, to assume the powers of Government, it would surely have been better instead of this most unsatisfactory mixed administration where neither party, the Vizier nor the Resident, could be held fully responsible for any one act of Government to have assumed complete possession of Territory sufficient to pay the amount due by the Vizier to the Company leaving the Vizier complete power over the rest. It is out of the nature of things that a mixed Government such as here described could flourish. The executive power being still in native hands, an unseen counter-current of caprice intrigue bribery, and corruption, will ever counteract the best schemes, unless indeed where the Resident *were in reality Supreme* in all things to appoint punish and dismiss and to have charge of the public treasure.

8th. The obedient Sovereign and his minister in some respects fell in with the Governor-General's pleasure and as far as regards writing letters to the British Government appear

to have been held in vassalage. As shewn in Mill's history, taken from the public records, the Vizier and Minister actually employed a private Agent to ascertain what sort of letters they should write to the British Government. Regarding the Resident and his proceedings, Mr. Mill in his most interesting account of these proceedings observes with reference to the subserviency of the Vizier in writing his letters. "It was the ordinary mode of procedure established between Mr. Hastings and the Nabob. There was it appears a regular consent that the Nabob should never write a public letter respecting the Residents or their proceedings till he had first learned privately what Mr. Hastings wished that he should express and that he then wrote accordingly."⁸

9th. But notwithstanding all this interference, it appears but too evident that the system was altogether inadequate to produce a good Government. In all our interference with Oude *there has never been any decided penalty attached to infringement of our advice*; as for instance, the certain seizure of the mismanaged Territory in case of failure such a penalty might have had a good effect.

CHAPTER V

'NON-INTERVENTION' AND OUDH

1. In 1787 it was mutually agreed between the Governor-General Marquis Cornwallis and Asuphoodowlah the Vizier that the annual subsidy payable by the Vizier should be fifty lacs of Rupees, that the British Government should refrain from all interference in the Government of the country, and that the Vizier's power should be unshackled and supreme.

2nd. The Kingdom of Oude has throughout our alliance with it rendered essential service to the British Government and in 1797 there is another instance of its accommodation disposing by agreeing by

8. *Mill* IV, p. 435. Major Palmer was the agent referred to.

treaty to defray the cost of a Regiment of British Dragoons and one of native Cavalry provided it did not exceed 5½ Laos of Rupees yearly. This requisition on the Vizier arose from the decision of the Court of Directors to increase their native cavalry from two Regiments to four and from the instructions contained in their dispatch dated 22nd April 1797, namely "in order to relieve the Company from a considerable part of the expense they directed that every possible effort should be made to induce the Vizier to disband his own useless cavalry" and to take into his pay a portion of ours. The Vizier at first naturally objected to this additional expense, but in 1797 the Governor-General in person visited the capital of Oude with the recorded object "of inducing the Vizier to establish a reform in his administration and to pay part of the new cavalry establishment which he had already peremptorily refused."¹

3rd. The Governor-General in person urging the objects of the Court of Directors did not sue in vain. This accommodating Ally agreed to pay for two more cavalry Regiments.

4th. The Governor-General's visit was likewise marked by the appointment as Minister of Tuhfuzul Hoosain Khan² whose talents and character he held in high estimation.³

5th. In a few months after, Asuphoddowlah the Vizier died and in 1798 Vizier Allee his supposed son was elevated to the throne of Oude and recognized as its ruler by the British Government.⁴

6th. The Governor-General Lord Teignmouth had scarcely recognized Vizier Allee as the ruler of Oude, ere claims to the throne were preferred by Saadut Allee Khan, the eldest brother of the deceased Vizier Asuphoddowlah, upon the plea that Vizier Allee was not the real but a spurious son of the Vizier. The

1. *Mill VI*, p. 42. Parliamentary Paper 18.6 p. 28.

2. Appointed Minister in 1797 by Sir John Shore. He had been Nawab's Wakil at Calcutta before that date. He was responsible for the deposition of Wazir Ali.

3. *Mill VI*, p. 42.

4. *Ibid* p. 43.

Governor-General came in person to Lucknow to decide this important question between these two claimants for the Kingdom. After an investigation which the Governor-General declared had opened to him a scene of the most extraordinary profligacy and intrigues he had ever witnessed, he decided against the young Monarch who was pronounced of spurious origin, and after the short reign of a few months was dethroned and in his stead Saadut Allee, the Eldest Brother of the late Vizier, was raised to the throne.⁵

7th. When it was decided to exalt Saadut Allee he was residing at Benares, thither a dispatch was sent offering to him the Kingdom of Oude; but with this splendid offer a treaty was sent to which his unqualified assent was immediately required. Should he sign the treaty he was to proceed at once in progress to assume his Sovereignty. He deemed this offer of a Kingdom no time for cavilling about terms. He signed the treaty and set out to Cawnpore, from whence he was escorted to his capital by British troops and on the 21st January 1798 amidst all the pomp and state of an eastern court was seated on the throne of Oude.⁶

8th. The deposed Vizier Allie was helpless to resist the efficient troops being all English and the power and influence of the British irresistible, he proceeded to Benares on a pension of one lac and fifty thousand rupees per annum.⁷

9th. This unhappy man brooding over his misfortunes murdered Mr. Cherry⁸ at Benares, whilst on a visit to him, and was ever after justly imprisoned for life under sentinels at Fort William where he died.⁹

10th. The Court of Directors entirely approved of all these measures of deposing Vizier Allie and raising up Saadut Allie

5. *Mill VI*, pp. 44-47.

6. *Mill VI*, pp. 47-8.

7. *Mill VI*, p. 48.

8. Political Resident of Benares, murdered by Wazir Ali, on 14 January 1799.

9. For details see *Mill VI* pp. 164-166.

as being accordant with justice and bringing great benefit to the Company.¹⁰

11th. The treaty dictated to, and concluded with, Saadut Allie was important. It is dated A.D. 1798. It stipulates the continued protection and guarantee of the Oude Dominions to him.

12th. He agreed to increase the price of this protection by paying the additional yearly sum of 19,22,362 Rupees to the former subsidy of 56,77,638 Rupees raising the subsidy altogether to 76 Lac of Rupees annually. Immediately to pay up all arrears and to pay a pension of 1,50,000 Rupees annually to the deposed Nawab Vizier Allie.

13th. That the English forces maintained in the Oude Dominions for its defence should never consist of less than 10,000 men of all arms including natives, that if should it become necessary to augment them above 13,000, the Vizier agreed to pay the actual difference of the excess, that if the troops fell below 8,000 men a deduction should be made from the subsidy in proportion to the number below the specified force.

14th. The 8th article is important. It resigns over to the British Government the magnificent and ancient fortress of Allahabad situated at the junction of the two rivers Ganges and Jumna, and the Vizier grants 8 lacs of Rupees to repair the fortifications, 3 Lacs of Rupees were in like manner stipulated to repair the fort of Futty Ghur.

15th. The Vizier agreed to pay 12 Lacs of Rupees to meet the expense of placing him on the throne and to reduce his troops in consultation with British Government.

16th. That he would employ no European in his service without the sanction of the British Government, that he would hold no communication with other political states without British sanction.¹¹

10. *Mill* VI. p. 48.

11. *Mill* VI p. 48. *Treaty of 1798 Aitchison*, Vol. I. p. 118.

18th. There seems to be evident injustice towards the people in this system of guaranteeing to Native Princes *the full exercise of despotic power over their subjects* and the secure possession of their dominions against external enemies or internal discontrol without taking from the rulers *security* that the despotic power shall be exercised *with wisdom and moderation*. It destroys the necessary balance of power between the Ruler and his people. It prostrates the inhabitants at the feet of despotism and too often is it found in practice to arm a low and profligate despot with the whole power of the state to oppress his helpless subjects. The salutary remedy of revolt against wrongs and oppression is prevented by the British Government, who thus become in some degree morally responsible for the misgovernment and the implications of tyranny which their overwhelming power has guaranteed.

19th. The Government became aware of this, and in the subsequent treaty of 1801 with the Vizier Saadut Allie Khan a clause was inserted which it was supposed would be highly useful, binding the Vizier to be guided in the administration of his country, in the exercise of his guaranteed power by the counsels of the British Government, but it is now necessary to consider the decided and important steps leading to this treaty.

CHAPTER VI

WELLESLEY AND OUDH

1st. The very unsatisfactory nature of the Oude administration, the great pecuniary interests at stake in the payments of the monthly subsidy, and the intimate alliance between the British and the Oude Government led the Governor-General ardently to desire a radical change in the administration of Oude, involving no less than the discharge of the Vizier's own army, and the substitution of British troops in its place. The British troops to be paid by the Vizier but to remain

Wellesley desired disbandment of Oudh troops and increase of British troops there

essentially under the controul of the British; the same as the rest of our army. The Governor-General in his instructions to the Resident observes "The great and immediate object of my solicitude is to accomplish the reform of His Excellency's Military Establishment."¹

2nd. It is impossible to read of this sweeping measure contemplated without feeling that the discharge of his army would have been a more appropriate expression than its reform, and it is not to be wondered at that the Vizier's mind revolted from a measure so humiliating to himself as that of being forced to pay for additional British troops and the annihilation of his own Battalions.

3rd. The discharge of the army of the state involved the most serious consequences, for it ever after gave the native Government a sort of right to call for British Troops in coercing its subjects, and to place British cannon and bayonets at the beck of a native despot were iniquitous. Yet either this must be done in justice to the Vizier, or the British Government must investigate the merits of every case wherever British troops were required, yet to do so involved the necessity of setting aside the Vizier's independent authority and of bringing the disputes between him and his subjects before a British tribunal.

4th. Speedly after these reductions the applications for British troops in various quarters were made. Colonel Scott the Resident expressed his embarrassment lest from the impossibility of obtaining correct information the Troops should be employed "*in improper and odious service.*"

5th. This decided measure of discharging the Vizier's Troops and substituting ours at his expense has the appearance of being, if not a clear violation of the treaty, at least of torturing its meaning to its utmost stretch.

6th. The 7th article of the treaty of 1798 certainly did provide that if at any time it should be necessary to increase the British Troops above 13,000 men the Vizier should pay for them, but the necessity

Afghan danger
examined.

in the present instance seems doubtful. The Governor-General justified the measure to the Vizier, amongst other reasons, by the argument that as the British Government was bound to protect the Oude Dominions from external foes, and as they were threatened by Zemaun Shah, King of the Afghans, the Governor-General thought that the immediate augmentation of the British force in Oude was the only security against such a danger.

7th. The justice or otherwise of this vast increase to the Vizier's establishment of British troops rests upon the necessity or otherwise of providing against an invasion from the Afghans and the records of Government only can exhibit the real extent of danger to be apprehended from that quarter. If real danger existed the British Government was undoubtedly justified in increasing the Vizier's subsidiary English force, but then ought not the Vizier to have been released from the burthen when the danger was past.

8th. The Afghan invasion did engage the serious attention of Government. Mill, the historian, relates that the Commander in Chief was directed in the month of October 1799 to prepare such a disposition of the Troops in the Upper Provinces and such Military operations in general as would most effectually secure that part of the British frontier against an attack from the Afghans. The proposition of the Commander in Chief was approved for adding to the Army two Regiments of Native Infantry &c. and for assembling a force to cover the city of Benares.²

9th. And a letter from the Afghan Vizier himself to Shah Allum, the King of Delhi, appears to have been received. Mill says, adverting to this letter, after producing all this preparation and expense (on the part of the English) the (Afghan) Shah who it seems had advanced as far as Lahore began his retreat on the 4th of January and Shah Allum, the King of Delhi, was informed by a letter from the Afghan Vizier that no intention remained of that year prosecuting the expedition into Hindos-

2. *Mut* VI, p. 158.

tan but the helpless Mogul might look forward to a more prosperous issue at some future period."³

10th. It is satisfactory to collect every argument tending to exculpate the British Government from injustice, and to bear it out, in the extreme measure of forcing an enlarged army on the Vizier and compelling the reduction of his own, and though the following paper is of some length its insertion here seems proper. Sir John Malcolm in his political sketch of India having entered into the subject the following extract has been taken from his book.⁴

*

11th. The reasons which weighed upon the mind of Government in the decision to reform the Vizier's Military establishment will best be given in the letter of the Governor-General, Lord Mornington himself to the address of Mr. Lumsden, the Resident, dated 25th January 1799.⁵

Wellesley demands disbandment of Oudh troops.

From,

The Governor-General Lord Mornignton,

To,

John Lumsden Esqr.,

Resident at Lucknow,

Sir,

No 42, 6th
January, 1799.

I have received your letter of the date and number annexed in the Margin.

If your intelligence from Chundralah should prove correct it appears probable that the retrograde movements of Zemaun Shah, King of the Afghans, is the first step towards his return to his own dominions. This event may I trust be attended with most beneficial consequences to the British interests and no time should be lost in endeavouring to avail ourselves of the

8. *Mill* VI, p. 160.

4. Malcolm : *Political History of India*, pp 210-18. The extract has been omitted

5 *Mill* Vol. VI, pp. 167 169 gives a general summary of this letter. Three paras are also quoted therein—See Parliamentary Paper 1806 for the text of the letter.

favourable opportunity which it presents for the improvement of our security on the frontier of Oude.

"If the Shah should now return within the limits of his own Territories a period of at least nine months must elapse before he can resume a position to menace the Territories of the Nabob Vizier.

"The alarm which has been occasioned by the approach of the Shah should operate as a lesson to the Vizier to employ the ensuing season in providing such effectual means of resistance, as may exempt his Excellency from all future apprehension of the same danger. I therefore desire that you will without delay recall to His Excellency's recollection the nature and causes of his recent apprehensions, that you will propose to him in my name the immediate adoption of that reasonable system of precaution and defence which alone appears to me to be calculated to remove the evils of which he has himself repeatedly complained during the exigency of the late crisis.

"You will remind His Excellency that his military establishment was represented by himself to be not only inadequate to contribute any assistance towards the defence of his dominions but that at the moment when the services of the British Army were most urgently demanded on his Frontier, he required the presence of a part of that force in his capital for the express purpose of protecting his person and authority against the excesses of his own disaffected and disorderly Troops. The inference to be drawn from these events is obviously that the defence of His Excellency's dominions against foreign attack as well as their internal tranquility can only be secured by a reduction of his own useless, if not dangerous troops and by a proportionate augmentation of the British Force in his pay. I am convinced that this measure might be effected with a degree of advantage to His Excellency's finances, little inferior to that which it promises to his Military Establishments; and that His Excellency might obtain from the Company a force of real efficiency at an expense far below that which he now (incurs) in maintaining his own army in its present defective condition."

"My object is that the Vizier should disband as speedily as possible the whole of his Military Force with the exception of that part of it which he may deem necessary to maintain for purposes of state or for the collection of his Revenues."

"I am aware of the difficulties which may occur in accomplishing this object to the full extent of my wishes within a short space of time, but the necessity of strengthening the Vizier's Military force, before the return of a crisis similar to that which has just now passed away requires that we should determine to encounter every obstacle which it may be possible to surmount.

"During the apprehension of Zemaun Shah's approach it would have been imprudent to have attempted any reform in the Vizier's army which might have hazarded a temporary commotion in his dominions, but the retreat of the Shah and the presence of so large a British force in Oude render the present moment peculiarly favorable to such an attempt, while on the other hand a variety of considerations concur to urge the necessity of every practicable degree of dispatch in this most essential improvement of our defences on the frontier of Oude.

"It is not my intention that the British force to be furnished to his Excellency under the new arrangement should become a part of his own Army, but it will be reasonable that His Excellency should pay the expense of raising any new Regiments which may be or which have been formed with the view to this particular object. The British force to be substituted in place of that part of his Excellency's Army which shall be reduced will be in every respect the same as the remainder of the Company's troops, and will be relieved from time to time according to the orders of the Governor-General in Council.

"I have transmitted a copy of this letter to His Excellency Sir Alured Clarke who will enter more fully into details of this most desirable reform. As I am aware that you will require the Assistance of some able military Officers in the execution of the arrangement proposed, I have requested Sir Alured Clarke to

dispense with the services of Lieutt.-Colonel Scott, the Adjutant General, who will be directed to proceed to Lucknow immediately and to remain there for as long a period of time as may appear necessary to the accomplishment of the objects which I have in view. I enclose a letter for His Excellency the Nabob Vizier for the purpose of recommending the subject of this dispatch to his early and attentive consideration."

I am &c.,

Sd/- MORNINGTON.

From the Governor-General to the Vizier, 5th November 1799. The Governor-General in the following letter to the Vizier gives his reasons more fully.⁶

"The Company are bound by existing Treaties to defend the Dominions of your Excellency against all Enemies, but the number of the British troops ordinarily stationed, in your Excellency's Dominions not exceeding 13,000 men, would not, it is obvious be adequate to that purpose in the event of an invasion of those Dominions, while, on the other hand it must be evident to your Excellency, that various circumstances in such an event, might render it impossible for the Company's Government to augment the ordinary force either to the extent, or within the time required by the emergency. The probable result of such a situation of things requires no explanation to a person of your Excellency's penetration."

"If this danger were even remote and doubtful it would behave a prudent Government to guard against it by seasonable precautions. What then must be your Excellency's duty and mine, when that danger constantly menaces your Dominions. Of the hostile intentions of Zemaun Shah against your Excellency's possessions no doubt can be entertained since the discoveries made at Seringapatam. Whether those intentions will be carried into effect at a more early or more distant day may be a question, but it is the part of wisdom to preclude the possibility of their success. But Zemaun Shah is not perhaps

6. *Mss* VI pp. 178-175 for a general summary; Wellesley's Despatches Vol. II No. XL, pp. 182-185; for the full letter Parliamentary Paper 1806 pp. 24-25.

the only power against whose restless and unprincipled ambition, Your Excellency should be protected, other enemies may arise in other quarter, and it becomes you to provide against every contingency."

"It might not be in the power of the British Government on a sudden emergency to reinforce Troops in your Excellency's country with sufficient expedition. My firm opinion therefore is that the Company can in no other manner effectually fulfill their engagements to defend the dominions of your Excellency against all enemies than by maintaining constantly in those dominions such a force as shall at all times be adequate to your effectual protection, independently of any reinforcements, which the exigency might otherwise require but what might not be disposeable in proper season."

"The seventh article of the Treaty concluded with your Excellency by Sir John Shore provides for the occasional augmentation of the Company's Troops in your Excellency's Dominions, in terms which evidently render the Company's Government competent to decide at all times on the requisite amount of such augmentation. The same article binds your Excellency to defray the expense of any force, which shall be deemed necessary by the Company for your defence &ca.,

5th November, 1799.

Sd/- MORNINGTON.

12th. The Vizier either to procrastinate or indirectly to shew how deeply he felt the startling proposition to annihilate his army and to have imposed upon him the payment of an additional English force which he did not require expressed to the Resident his desire to retire from the cares of Government and to leave his Kingdom to his son.

Wellesley
eager for
Vizier's abdi-
cation.

13th. The Governor-General on the intelligence of this, anxious to secure great advantages to the people of Oude and to the Company wrote with eagerness to the Resident proposing, that by a Secret treaty with the Vizier Saadut Allee setting aside the legitimate heirs to the throne, his own sons, should make over his Government and Kingdom to the Company. That henceforth the entire civil and criminal administration, the

revenues and Dominions of Oude should be annexed to the Territories of the British Government.⁷

14th. It may be imagined with what surprise the Vizier who appears never to have had any serious intention of resigning received this startling proposition. He well concealed his feelings however and calmly declined to disinherit his children to bestow his Kingdom upon the British Government. So high and eager were the expectations of the Governor-General that the draft of the treaty of abdication was actually sent to the Resident and read to the Vizier and a Memo: was drawn out by the commander of the forces, entitled 'a memo: of the precautionary movement and distribution of the Company's troops for the purpose of establishing the exclusive controul and authority of the Company over the dominions of Oude.'⁸

15th. The Governor-General was greatly displeased at the disappointment of the vast hopes which he had cherished, and reported to the Home Authorities his belief that the abdication had been a mere subterfuge to avoid the question of the "Military Reform."⁹ The disappointment lent vigour to the purpose of immediately marching the augmentation of troops into Oude and before the Vizier's consent had been obtained and against his strong remonstrances the supplementary British Battalions had entered his Kingdom. He appealed to the Resident against the measure but was told that the decision was taken and the troops were en route to their destinations.¹⁰ The Vizier then wrote to the Governor-General an earnest but respectful appeal basing his arguments on the stipulations of the Treaty.¹¹ From some informality in the mode of the appeal, it being in the shape of a memorandum sent through the Resident, the Governor-General would not receive it but returned it to the Resident with a resentful letter part of which held out a threat sufficient to silence a timid ally from

7 For the text of the Resident's letter and Governor-General's reply see *Mill* VI pp. 176-180.

8. *Mill* VI pp. 180-183 ; Parliamentary Paper 1806.

9. G. G.'s letter to Directors, 25 January 1800. Parl. Paper 1806.

10. *Mill* VI pp. 185-186.

11. For the Memo. see *Mill*, V, pp. 185-189 ; Parl. Papers 1806.

the utterance of his sentiments however just, and plainly by its tenor pointed out that obedience and not argument was expected. The Governor-General in reply to reasonable and respectful objections of the Vizier said "If, in formally answering His Lordships letter His Excellency should think proper to impeach the honor and justice of the British Government in similar terms to those in the paper delivered to you on the 11th Instant, the Governor-General will then consider how such unfounded calumnies and gross representations both of facts and arguments deserve to be noticed."¹² This threatening tone of indignation on the part of the paramount power placed the dependant ally in a painful situation. The march of the British Battalions into Oude in despite of all remonstrances shewed the stern bent of the British Ruler's mind and the avowed determination to treat a respectful appeal against the measure as a calumny and impeachment of British honour and to be treated accordingly was almost equivalent to coercion.

15th. The latter part of the Governor-General's letter to the Resident breathes out a threatening spirit with reference to the supposed subterfuge of the Vizier, the abdication as being merely to deceive the British Government. His Lordship says, "In all the transactions of His Lordship's Government since his arrival in India he has pursued a plain and direct course and he is determined to adhere to the same invariable system of just and honorable policy ; nor will he be diverted from the system by any machination of artifice, duplicity, or treachery, which may be opposed to him. He has already found the advantage of this course in frustrating the projects of the enemies of Great Britain to injure the most important interests of the company to such a degree as may be deemed nearly equivalent to positive hostility on your part." "The conduct of your Excellency in this instance is of a nature so unequivocally hostile and may prove so injurious to every interest both of your Excellency and the Company that your perseverance in so dangerous a course will leave me no other alternative than that of considering all

Wellesley threatens Vizier.

12. Letter of G-G to Resident. *Mill*, VI, pp. 190-191. Parl. Papers 1806.

amicable engagements between the Company and your Excellency to be dissolved." The Governor-General in his letter informed the Vizier that "after full deliberations he (the Vizier) expressed his entire approbation" to the reduction of his army and increase of the British troops ; but it would appear that the Governor-General's over-powering anxiety to accomplish these measures had led him to assume this account of the Vizier without any very solid reasons.¹³

19th. The Vizier feeling that he could no longer resist this alarming displeasure and energy of the Governor-General reluctantly yielded. Indeed the Resident in a private letter from the Secy. to the Governor-General, dated 4th February 1800 was directed "to remonstrate in the Governor-General's name in the strongest terms against the Vizier's refusal to issue the Purwannahs and also to signify plainly to him that if he delays them an hour after such notice from you, His Lordship will consider the Treaty between the Company and His Excellency to be at an end." And these instructions are repeated yet more strongly in the Secys. public letter dated 9th February 1800.

20th. The money for the payment of the additional troops was paid and the very arduous task at all times dangerous in a native state of discharging his own Battalions was entered upon and ultimately effected with considerable difficulty and great good management.

21st. The very formidable extent of these reductions in the Vizier's army will be best seen from the following Extract of the Report upon the subject.

22nd. Report (by Coll. Scott the Resident) upon the progress hitherto made in the reduction of His Excellency the Vizier's irregular troops, dated December 5th, 1800.

23rd. "On the commencement of the Reform the number of irregular troops employed in the collections of the Revenues according to a statement furnished to me by order of the Vizier

13. *Mill*, VI, pp. 192-194 for extracts. *Parl. Papers* 1806.

stood as follows "Horsemen ten thousand, Eight Hundred, and fifty nine the annual expense of whom amounted to Rs. Twenty three Lacs, forty two thousand one hundred and one."

"Thirty three battalions of Sepoys at the annual expense of Rupees Nineteen lacs fifty-five thousand, five hundred and forty two."

"Seventy two Battalions of Nujeebs at the annual expense of Ten Lacs Ninety one thousand six Hundred and forty one."

"Artillery three lacs fifty four thousand four hundred and thirty four."

"Armed Peons Ten thousand three hundred and forty six at the annual expense of three Lacs Ninety seven thousand and four hundred and twenty".

"Making the aggregate sum of Sixty one Lac forty one thousand and one hundred and thirty eight Rupees."

"The reductions which have taken place consist of twelve hundred and seventy one Horsemen amounting annually to two lacs fifty Eight thousand and sixteen Rupees."

"Twenty three Battalions of Sepoys amounting to thirteen lacs ninety seven thousand nine hundred and twenty four."

"Making the total amount of the reductions sixteen lacs fifty Six thousand, five hundred and forty."

"Leaving the expense after the above reductions at forty four lacs eighty four thousand five hundred and ninety eight."

24th. The whole of the above written detail will be seen at one view in a figured abstract annexed.

25th. Surprise at these enormous reductions is not diminished by contemplating the immense increase to the British Army now to be supported by the Vizier, namely twelve Battalions of native infantry and 4 Regiments of Native cavalry beside artillery.

The Resident's report continues.

"The following portion of the proposed augmentation detailed in the Secretary's letter of the 5th of November is now in the Vizier's Dominions vizt. Two Regiments of native cavalry, seven Battalions of native Infantry and a small part

Immense
increase of Bri-
tish forces
there.

of the Artillery the exact number of which I am not precisely acquainted with."

"Remaining to be sent into Oude of the proposed augmentations. Two Regiments of native cavalry, Two Battalions of Native infantry, the residue of the artillery."

"When the Troops destined for these Provinces by the orders of the Relief shall arrive which may be expected in March, the proposed augmentation of Native Infantry vizt, twelve Battalions will then be completed."

"The reform upon the only principles on which it could have been undertaken with any prospect of applying a remedy to the evils inherent in the Military Establishment of Oude having been engaged in without the cordial concurrence of the Vizier which he was at no pains to conceal, tho' I absolve him from all Secret attempts to excite disturbances, it might reasonably be expected that all other persons interested in averting the execution of the measure would to the utmost of their ability start objections, endeavour to procrastinate and ultimately throw impediments in the way of the proposed reductions."

"The measure would affect the Aumils in their emoluments their external consequence and by the immediate abridgement and eventual extinction of the power which they possessed not only of exacting unjust and oppressive demands against the Zemindars and land-holders but even of disputing the orders of the Vizier himself by a Body of Troops at their absolute disposal, considered as their immediate dependants instead of the servants of the state."

"The ordinary steps taken by the Aumils in prosecution of their desires to delay the execution of the measure consisted in reiterated protests against the reduction depriving them of the means of enforcing the payment of the collections, in requests to postpone them to a more convenient season, in endeavouring to confuse the accounts of arrears and not infrequently in withholding funds for the payment of them."

"To effect the reductions of Battalions against such combination of interests it was indispensable that a force of the

Company's troops should be at hand to check disorderly behaviour and ultimately to enforce obedience should they have the temerity to proceed to open opposition and tho' frequent attempts were made to excite the sepoys to resistance by instilling in their minds apprehensions of fraud in the payment of their arrears, yet the scrupulous care and unwearied pains taken by Mirza Jaffur under my instructions to adjust the accounts of Arrears in the fairest manner and to see that the balance to the last farthing up to the day of dismissal was faithfully disbursed to each man (as soon as it became well understood that, that important business was not intrusted to the Aumils or Commandants) commonly reconciled the sepoys and inferior officers to the dismissal, and they generally quitted the service with acknowledgements of gratitude and praise of British Justice."

"The Aumils have neither decency nor moderation in their demands for Troops and the Vizier well knowing the reluctance with which the Company's Troops are dispersed in detachments and afforded for the purposes of realizing the collections with a view to embarrass and if possible to shew that the change in the Military Establishment is prejudicial to his Revenues obtrudes every application of the Aumils upon me without reflecting on the necessity for, or on the means of complying with it and I have reason to suspect that in some instances he has even invited demands, for a letter which he sent for my perusal from the Aumil of Allahabad, after the dismissal of a Battalion there, commenced with the acknowledgment of a letter from His Excellency requiring to be informed whether he stood in need of more Troops to preserve the tranquility of the country. To refuse the assistance of the Company's Troops on all occasions would strengthen his arguments, to grant them indiscriminately would be making them the instrument of oppression, and render them in a short time as abnoxious to the inhabitants as the Troops whom they have replaced."

Statement exhibiting the numbers and expence of the Muttayench [retrenched] Troops (as delivered to the Resident from the office of Bukshi) the subsequent reductions and Numbers of each description remaining with their present Expense.

Description of Troops.	No. of men.*	No. of Regular Battalions.	Najeeb's Battalions.	Armed Peons.	Annual expenses of each description.	
Horsemen ...	10,859	2342,101	
Regular Battalion...	...	38	1955,542	
Najeebs Battas.	22	...	1091,641	
Armed peons	10,346	397420	
Artillery	354,424	614,1138
Reductions Horsemen ...	1271	258,616	
Regular Batt.	23	1395,640	1056 540

Description of Troops.	No. of men.	No. of Regular Battalions.	Najeeb's Battalions.	Armed Peons.	Annual expenses of each description.	
Remain of each description ...	9,588	10	22	10,346	...	44,84,598
Service practicable reductions ...	5,425	1200000	
Horsemen Regular Batta.	2	104860	1420477
Remain include the whole of Almas Troops ary &c.	4,168	8	22	10,346	at the annual expence of...	3064121

December 5th 1800.

CHAPTER VII

THE TREATY OF 1801

1st. In 1800 the Vizier pleaded the inability of his resources to take such a responsibility as the payment of all these new troops quartered upon him without running the risk of a Breach of faith in their payment.

Wellesley doubts the capacity of Vizier to pay the increased subsidy.

2nd. It is difficult to discover either from the treaties or the position of affairs sufficient political reasons for the approaching assumption of nearly two third of the Vizier's territory but it may be said it was the decree of Providence by whatever means brought about that the greater portion of the Dominions and subjects of this Native Prince should pass from his hands and be delivered over to the sway and governance of the British Government, and the tide of events speedily accomplished this important end.

3rd. The Governor-General expressed to the Vizier the conviction that it was a positive duty to release him from the further progress of ruin to be anticipated from the misgovernment of Oude throughout which the Governor-General considered that there was an utter insecurity of life and property. The Governor-General proposed to the Vizier that he should deliver over the Kingdom to the British Government. This he naturally refused to do.

4th. The Governor-General attached a deep importance to the Vizier's doubts of ability to discharge the payment of all these new troops. There was no arrear of subsidy, but without waiting for arrears, the Governor-General determined to anticipate a possible deficiency of payment, and declared to the Vizier his fixed and unalterable determination to assume final possession of territory sufficient to pay the troops.

5th. The subsidy according to the last existing treaty of 1798 made by Lord Teignmouth amounted to 7600,000 Rupees. To this was added by Mornington the payment of 54,12,929 Rupees for the pay of the new British troops, the whole pay-

ments now amounting nearly to 13,012,929 Rupees or about one million three hundred thousand pounds sterling, and for this amount the Vizier was required to resign the sovereignty of nearly two thirds of his Kingdom in perpetuity to the British Government.

6th. The Brother of the Governor-General the Honorable Henry Wellesly was sent to negotiate with the Vizier one of the two measures—the abdication of his throne and Government, or (should this fail) the delivery of nearly two thirds of his Kingdom into the hands of the British. The Vizier revolted from both proposals but seeing that he could not resist the power of the Governor-General who had instructed the Resident that further reference was unnecessary and that with or without the consent of the Prince the British troops were to march and take possession of these Provinces, the reluctant Vizier, after strong protestations against the injustice of the measure, and earnest appeals to the good faith, yielded to his fate and in the celebrated Treaty of 1801 signed away for ever more than half of his Kingdom.¹

7th. The reasons which had so powerfully urged the Governor-General's mind to carry through this reduction of the Vizier's army and augmentation of the British troops at the expense of Oude and finally the appropriation of more than $\frac{1}{2}$ of that Prince's Kingdom are stated by His Lordship in his summary of advantages immediately forwarded to the Court of Directors and to which may be added his reasons stated so fully to the Vizier, namely the additional security afforded by these arrangements against invasion by Zemaun Shah, King of the Afghauns. The Governor-General thus detailed his reasons.

“The entire extinction of the Military power of the Nawab, the maintenance of a great part of the Bengal Army at the Nawab's expense, Deliverance of the subsidy from all the accidents with which it was liable to be effected by the corruption, imbecility and abuse of that vicious and incorrigible system of

1. For the details of these negotiations, see *Mss*, VI. pp. 196-212.

vexation and misrule which constitutes the Government of Oude. The power of becoming the instrument of restoring to affluence and prosperity one of the most fertile regions of the globe, now reduced to the most afflicting misery and desolation, by the depraved administration of the Native Government; deliverance from the stain on the reputation and honor of the British Nation in India, upholding by the terror of their name and the immediate force of their arms a system so disgraceful in its principles and ruinous in its effects."²

8th. In 1802 the supplementary paper of propositions by the Vizier and the answers by the Governor-General was mutually agreed to between the two states. It is explanatory of the treaty and more fully develops its meaning.

9th. Lord Wellesley received from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors the expression of their full approbation of his measures in reducing the Military Establishment of the Vizier. In their letter of 4th December 1800 the Secret Committee record their high sense of the service rendered by His Lordship in effecting "a measure (to use the words of the letter) not less contributing to the preservation of His Excellencies dominions than to the relief of the Company's finances by furnishing a large additional subsidy to the amount of fifty lacs per annum, (about) to reimburse the charges of the late augmentation of our troops in that quarter so necessary to be made with the view to the ultimate security of our possessions against the invasion of Zumaun Shah or any other hostile power to the British interests."³

10th. The Treaty of 1801 with the Vizier Saadut Allee Khan was equally applauded by the same authority though not until two years after its conclusion, an approval the more valuable from the Court of Directors having had abundant time to become acquainted with all the circumstances of the Treaty.

11th. That entire approval is contained in the letter of the

2. *Mill*, VI. pp. 213-4; Parliamentary Paper 1806.

3. *Malcolm*, pp. 327-8.

Secret Committee of the Court of Directors dated 19th November 1803 to the Governor-General, "having taken (they observe) into our consideration the treaty lately concluded between the Governor-General and the Nabob Vizier, and ratified by His Lordship on the 10th of November 1801 we have now to signify our approbation of the provisions of that treaty."

*

12th. The treaty by whatever means brought about being ratified and confirmed by the contracting parties, must from that date be considered as the basis of all future proceedings between the Governments, and from that day to this it has been the fruitful source of perplexity.

13th. By the Articles of the treaty the Vizier agrees in the affairs of his Government always to "advise with and act in conformity to the Council of the officers of the said Honorable Company" thus giving the Company power to direct and controul his Government at pleasure.

14th. To have made a treaty guaranteeing to any Ruler despotic power and protection against all foreign and domestic enemies without the means to controul and guide this Despotic power would have been an act of great injustice to the people by binding them hand and foot, prostrate before the Vizier helpless to resist, however iniquitous might be his Government.

15th. The treaty in effect guarantees to the Vizier his power *under the guidance of the British Government* and having by our Guarantee, *destroyed the balance of power between the Ruler and his subjects for whom alone all Governments should exist*, in justice to the people, we ought either from the beginning to have seen that our counsels were obeyed in the exercise of this power, or to have withdrawn from the field, leaving the inhabitants to redress their own grievances, but from the difficulty of devising a fair and equitable remedy nothing effectual has been done for these 35 years.

* Extracts from *Malcolm, Political History of India* pp. 328-30 have been omitted.

16th. The evils of this Guarantee against internal foes soon began to manifest itself. The Vizier by its stipulation claimed the use of British troops to coerce his subjects in the payment of their Revenue. Our troops were given and on the requisition of unprincipled farmers of Revenue detachments were ordered against the subjects of Oude. But these evils will be detailed more at large hereafter.

17th. The treaty of 1801 is still in force in 1836 and the final arrangement of 1802 will be found in the appendix.

... ..

CHAPTER VIII

THE INCONVENIENCES RESULTING FROM THE TREATY OF 1801

1st. The transactions and correspondence which follow are selected to illustrate the embarrassments and difficulty of placing British troops at the disposal of Native Governments.

2nd. In 1808 the Nawab Vizier continued to apply to Captain Baillie, the Resident, for the aid of English troops to subdue his rebellious Zemindars and subjects. A force and Battering train were accordingly ordered upon this unjustifiable service, namely of lending British aid to a despotic Prince in the chastisement of his subjects without feeling assured whether or not the British were not aiding the oppressor.¹ The Resident in his report to Government expressed his own confidence of the guilt of Zalim Singh Talookdar of Budree² against whom these warlike operations were undertaken though the Government had some doubt as will be seen from the Secretary's dispatch.

... .. 3.

1. Letter from Resident 22nd February 1808, Oude Papers, p 1.

2. Bhadri in Partabgarh district. Zalim Singh Taluqdar was imprisoned in 1810 by Jugul Kishore Nazim.

3. Letter from the Resident, 2nd May 1808, Oude Papers, p. 14.

4th. The first answer of Government to the Resident's dispatch regarding Military operations shews scruples of conscience upon this head.

5th. The Secretary observes to the Resident in April, 1808 (18th April 1808)⁴.

6th. The Officer Commanding the troops in the field proceeded to the fort of Pathur Surraee and to use the words of his dispatch "finding the breach practicable at one P. M., I ordered 3 companies to storm the place in which I have the pleasure to say I was completely successful, everyman found in the garrison was put to death and those that attempted to escape were cut up by the Cavalry."⁵

7th. Nothing but the fullest investigation as to the guilt or innocence of the Vizier's subjects who were thus put to death could justify their extermination by British Troops, and the Governor-General commenting upon these proceedings in the Secretary's letter, dated 28th November 1808 laments that "the degree of guilt on the part of the Rebels was so uncertain and undefined". The following is an extract from the letter.⁶

8th. The British Government though reluctantly sanctioning the aid of its arms to coerce the subjects of Oude on the requisition of the Vizier yet from the beginning shewed a repugnance to this duty. The Secretary to Government in his letter of the 28th December 1810 says.⁷

The aversion of the British Government to the employment of its troops without being enabled fully to judge of the justice of the cause.

"The interests of the British Government, however, are too deeply concerned in the reform of the present vicious system of administration in his Excellency's dominions to permit His

4. Letter from Secretary Government to the Resident, 18th April 1808 Oude Papers, p. 18. Text of the letter has been omitted.

5. Letter from Major O'Donnell, 1st November 1808, Oude Papers, p. 28.

6. Oude Papers, p. 26.

* The text of the letter has been omitted. Also O'Donnell's letters, dated 2nd and 5th November 1808, Oude Papers, pp. 24-25.

7. Oude Papers, pp. 127-130. Extracts.

Lordship in Council tacitly to acquiesce in its continuance. To the evils and abuses of that system, to the oppression and injustice which naturally flow from it, are principally to be ascribed those disorders which the British troops are so frequent employed to suppress. This Government has ever viewed with painful regret the employment of its troops in services of this nature, the general tendency of which has necessarily been to uphold and encourage those acts of violence, injustice and extortion which a system erroneous in its principle and oppressive in its operation cannot fail to engender.

"It concerns the reputation of the British Government, therefore, as well as its interest, to interpose the weight of its influence for the introduction of a reform which may relieve us from the imputation of being the instruments of oppression and injustice, of perpetuating the practical gradation of evils and abuses, which unsupported by the Military power of the Company, would speedily produce their natural consequences, successful resistance to the authority of the Vizier and general anarchy and confusion throughout His Excellency's dominions."

9th. And in the letter from the Governor-General to the Vizier himself of the same period, His Lordship expressed his decided aversion to the system of employing our troops without being enabled fully to judge of the justice of the cause.⁸ ,

"Since the conclusion of the treaty of November 1801, scarcely a year has elapsed in which the British troops have not been employed for the purpose of reducing to obedience the refractory Zemindars in your Excellency's territory or of enforcing the payment of balances of revenue from Aumils and others. who were unable to fulfil their engagements. In fact, it may almost be said that the Revenues of your Country are collected at the point of the sword. As the burthen of these measures of rigour necessarily falls upon the Company's Government, as the British troops are employed at the requisition of your Excellency or of your Aumils, for the suppression of every disorder in the interior of your dominions, from whatever cause it may have arisen, Your Excellency will certainly admit, that it is

8. Letter to Vizier, dated 28th December 1810, Oude Papers, pp. 181—4.

the duty of this Government to make some enquiry into the sources of this evil, and that we are entitled to expect the adoption of such a system of measures as, in the judgment of this Government, is calculated to counteract it without injury to the rights and authority of your Excellency, which we are bound by treaty to support."

"This right of interposing our advice, indeed, is derived not only from the very nature of the circumstances above described, but from the express terms of the sixth article of the treaty, by which your Excellency engaged to establish in your reserved dominions such a system of administration (to be carried into effect by your own officers) as should be conducive to the prosperity of your subjects, and calculated to secure the lives and property of the inhabitants; and your Excellency further engaged always to advise with, and act in conformity to the counsel of, the officers of the Honorable Company."

"With reference to this particular stipulation, the late Governor-General, Marquis Wellesely, in a paper which he delivered to your Excellency under his seal and signature, at the period of his visit to Lucknow in the year 1802, purporting to be a memorandum of the final result of the discussions between your Excellency and His Lordship, observed that your Excellency had engaged to advise with the British Government and to conform to its counsels in the establishment of an improved system of administration within the reserved dominions, and also in all affairs connected with the ordinary government of these dominions, and with the usual exercise of your Excellency's established authority.

"His Lordship in the same paper stated that the Governor-General, when the importance of the subject should require, and the nature of the occasion should admit his immediate intercourse with your Excellency, would offer the advice of the British Government to your Excellency, by a direct communication, either in person or by letter, although the British Resident at Lucknow was the constituted local representative of that Government, and the ordinary and established channel

of communication in all cases whatever, and his advice was to be received as proceeding immediately from the Governor-General."

10th. In the Resident's despatch to Government of the 8th April 1811 there is this passage further showing the determination of the British Government to be enabled to form a correct judgment of the guilt or innocence of the proceedings of the local authorities before British Troops are supplied to lend their aid in the odious work of coercing the Zumeendars.⁹

... ..
11th. In the Resident's despatch to Government of the 16th July 1811 he says Para: 7th. "In the paragraph above alluded to there are the following remarkable words, "I called upon His Excellency to acknowledge or disavow the obligation &c&c of the sixth article of the Treaty of cession with the Marquis Wellesley and now candidly to declare to me, whether or not, in his own judgment he had fulfilled or attempted to fulfil, the purpose of that obligation. If he had not, it was his obvious duty, I observed, to consider the present remonstrances of the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council as a solemn and serious demand for the fulfilment of a positive obligation on his part, by his adopting the plan of reform recommended to him by the British Government with whose counsels he had engaged to conform, or by suggesting or carrying into execution some other plan of his own, which should be equally calculated to answer the purposes of that obligation, namely, to provide for the security and happiness of his subjects, and to relieve the Honorable Company's Government from the extraordinary and disreputable burthen of supporting by force of arms an unjust and oppressive administration."¹⁰

"Indeed, the particular reference which the declaration in question contains to the concluding provision of the third article of the Treaty of cession, seems to me to be demonstrative of its limitation to the future refusal of the aid, or support of

9. Oude Papers, p. 162. The text of para 52 of this letter has been omitted.

10. Oude Papers, p. 242.

our Troops to the oppressive demands of the Aumils in the progress of their collection of the revenue, a peculiar description of support for which no article of the Treaty provides, and which, in fact, is expressly superseded by the provision above referred to, although the subsequent practice of the British Government proceeding on principles of liberality to His Excellency the Vizier, have certainly tended to establish a belief in His Excellency's mind that the British troops, like the armed Peons in his service, are the bounded slaves of his will, the necessary instruments of his oppression."¹¹

12th. In the orders of Government conveyed to the Resident, dated 2nd August 1811 the Vizier was to be informed that our Troops could only be lent to aid him against his subjects after a full investigation on our part into the justice of the Vizier's complaints and the insurance of the guilt of his subjects, a Salutory and equitable decision which the Sovereign of Oude however must have felt placed him as the plaintiff and his subjects as the defendants at the bar of British justice in all cases where coercion was demanded.¹²

CHAPTER IX

ACCESSION OF GHAZIUDDIN

1st. On the 11th of July 1814 Major Baillie the Resident reported to Government the death on that day of His Excellency the Nowab Vizier Saadat Ali Allee Khan who died in a sudden and unexpected manner.¹

2nd. He had accumulated an enormous mass of Treasure from the Revenues of the country said to amount to fourteen Crores of Rupees, or above fourteen millions sterling, of this

11. Para 11 of the letter from Resident dated 16 July 1811, Oude Papers p. 242.

12. Letter to Resident dated 2 August 1811, Oude Papers, pp. 244-6.

1. Letter from the Resident to the Vice-President dated 11 July 1814, Oude Papers, p. 614.

at various times nearly four crores of Rupees or four millions sterling have been given in Loans to the British Government and but for this immense hoard the state of Oude would long since have sunk into bankruptcy because for many years the expenditure has been greater than the income.

3rd. By the wasteful extravagance of the present King this hoard is fast approaching its end when speedy dissolution will probably be the fate of Oude.

4th. The son of Saadut Allee, Ghazeeoo Deen Hyder was Ghaziuddin immediately elevated to the throne and "assumed complies with British wishes. the reins of Government.

5th. All new Sovereigns of Oude are full of professions of good Government. The Resident's endeavours with the last Ruler to effect reform were fruitless, but the new reign dawned full of hope. The Resident in his dispatch to the Right Honorable the Earl of Moira Governor-General thus cheers his Lordship.²

6th. "In short (the Resident remarks) it appears to my judgment on the strongest and most satisfactory grounds, that the elevation of the Nowab Refautood Dowlah to the Musnud is destined by providence to prove a blessing to the hitherto greatly oppressed and unhappy people of Oude, and to every description of its inhabitants, as well as to facilitate in an extraordinary degree the accomplishment of Your Lordship's just views with a reference to the Vizier's Government and to the future administration of its affairs."³ And in a subsequent dispatch the prospects are yet more cheering. He writes, "His Highness seems desirous indeed, of making Your Lordship's representative at his court the organ as well as the adviser of all the public measures of his administration, and the medium of conveying his wishes and commands to his brothers, relations, and dependants, as well as to the servants of his Government, addressing me frequently

2 Letter to the Governor-General from the Resident dated 13 July 1814, Oude Papers, pp. 615-6.

3. *Ibid* para 8.

by the appellation of his Uncle and protector, and entreating my assistance as indispensable to the successful conduct of his affairs."⁴

7th. Advantage was taken of this happy disposition of the Vizier to carry many points which had been found impracticable with the deceased Vizier. In the letter of the Political Secretary of 1st August 1814 to the Resident these are acknowledged; Para 3rd:—"The Governor-General receives the early and willing compliance of His Excellency with the wishes of the British Government on several of the questions which were so long and fruitlessly agitated with the late Vizier, as a strong and gratifying proof of his friendship and regard for the Honorable Company."⁵

8th. In those days from a cautious policy great respect was still paid to the pensioned King of Delhi though utterly divested of all political power and possessed of no authority beyond his palace walls. Still he had once been Emperor of Hindoostan and the Ruler of Oude was once merely his Vizier, and until very lately it was thought expedient to keep up appearances. And in the instructions of the Governor-General to the Resident through the Political Secretary, Mr. Adams, dated 1st August 1814, he says,

Para 7. "It will be proper, nevertheless, as an act of courtesy for his Excellency the Vizier of Oude to address an Arzee (or petition) to the King of Delhi, announcing his elevation to the Musnud and honours of his ancestors, under the aid of the British Government, but carefully avoiding any expression which will bear the construction of seeking or acknowledging the necessity of His Majesty's confirmation of his title."

4. Resident, letter to Governor-General dated 15th July 1814, para 4, Oude Papers, p. 618.

5. Oude Papers, p. 620—Resident's letters dated 18th July and 15th July 1814 refer to those matters, which were of minor character, e.g., the pension of Husain Ali Khan.

8th. "It may be expected that the King of Delhi will proffer the grant of the title of Vizier in the usual forms, in which case it is not judged expedient that his Excellency should decline it."⁶

9th. To such an extent was this outward respect to the King of Delhi and even to his relations shown at the court of Oude, that the Vizier, though a prosperous and despotic Ruler, and guaranteed too in his power by the British Government when he met a member of the Royal house of Timour in the streets of his own Capital, though receiving a pension from the Vizier's bounty, the Vizier used to stop the procession of his own retinue and actually make his own elephant kneel down whilst the Royal pensioner passed. The Marquis of Hastings on one occasion witnessed a scene like this and had it communicated to the Vizier that such token of homage to the house of Delhi was entirely optional with himself, and as will be seen the sequel his Lordship elevated the Vizier himself to the dignity of King when all such homage necessarily ceased.

CHAPTER X

'HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF OUDH'

1st. In 1819 the title of the Ruler of Oude was changed by the Governor-General the Marquis of Hastings from Vizier to that of Royalty. He was made a King and crowned in due form and in great state as "His Majesty the King of Oude."

Assumption of
Royalty;
reasons for
the change.

2nd. The Governor-General's reasons for this increase of dignity were various, but chiefly to separate the interests of the two great Mohamedan courts in the quarter of Hindoostan, namely, the Imperial House of Dehli, and the court of Oude, for the descendant of Timour upon the Throne of Delhi, having nothing but the name of Royalty left, could not be expected to see with complacency his prosperous "Vizier" assume a

Crown and ascend the throne of Oude. The event was supposed by the Marquis of Hastings to be likely to create a division of interests, and an exigency can well be imagined when it would prove of the deepest advantage thus to lessen by one half any continuation of the leading members of the Moslim population unfavorable to British interest.

3rd. The extension of the British power in the East is quite wonderful. Not a century ago, the now "supreme Government of India" was but "a Company of Merchants trading to the East India", struggling at the extremity of the Mogul Empire to retain possession of their factory. Such has been the decree of Providence to give them sway over all these lands, and borne on the tide of Victory as the instruments of a higher Power, Ruler after Ruler has become their Tributary and besought their favor. Whilst the humbled Emperor of Delhi is a pensioner upon their bounty, the Sovereign of Oude is a King of their creation.

4th. The Coronation of the King of Oude had from the first institution of the ceremony been continued yearly repeated. yearly at Lucknow as one of its chief displays. Surrounded by all his nobles and by all the British officers from the Regiments at the capital the ceremony took place. At the foot of the throne the splendid crown sparkling with the most valuable Jewels has, in token of his protection by the British state, been yearly placed upon the King's head by the Representative of the British Government aided by the Brigadier General Commanding the English Troops,** whilst a salute of 101 Guns has proclaimed to His subjects this continuance to the Ruler of British support. The King then ascended his throne

NOTE**A mistaken idea is much believed abroad that the system of "noninterference" prevails in Oude, "noninterference indeed in behalf of the people is observed, except in as far as threatenings to the King operate, but "British interference" in support of the Oude Government whether oppressive or not, is both decisive and public "Noninterference" is therefore a term not applicable to Oude. Unhappily the interference is mainly thrown into the wrong scale. The Public coronation of the King may be taken as an instance. -

and received the obeysance of all the chief officers of his Kingdom conferring dresses of state &c.

5th. During periods of glaring misgovernment, however, this open display of support of abused power was considered by the Resident to be humiliating to the British Government and consequently the coronation ceremony did not take place either in 1822 or in 1833, the Resident having taken upon himself to decline attending. Last year in 1834, when the Resident would not have objected to attend the ceremony, it so happened that the King himself owing to his quarrel with the Padsha Begum (which had induced him to leave his Palace) did not wish to celebrate the anniversary of his Father's coronation.

CHAPTER XI

THE FORCED LOANS

First loan and
other aid in
the Nepal
War

1st. In the prosecution of the Nipaul War essential service was rendered by the Vizier. The following letter is a proof.¹.

To,

His Excellency the Honorable Sir George Nugent K. B. Vice president in Council &c., from the Right Honorable Earl of Moira Governor-General of India. (dated 11 November 1814.)

Honorable Sir,

His Excellency the Vizier having at a conference which I held with His Excellency on the 11th instant, tendered to me, as a proof of his friendship and of the cordial interest which he feels in the prosperity of the affairs of the Honorable Company, an accomodation of one Crore of Rupees (about one Million pounds Sterling) in the way of loan, I deemed it to be

my duty in consideration of the actual state of the public finances and the probable demands arising out of the prosecution of hostilities with the Nepaulese and the eventual necessity of supporting by Military preparations our political views with relation to Saugor and Bhopaul, to accept the offer with due acknowledgement of the cordial and friendly spirit in which it was made.

2nd. At a subsequent conference His Excellency solicited my acceptance of the sum as a free gift to the Honorable Company, but for reasons which will be obvious to your Excellency in Council, I declared with suitable expressions my sense of this additional proof of His Excellency's friendship, my inability to receive the accommodation except as a loan.

I have &ca.,
Sd./-MOIRA.

The Council in Calcutta were highly gratified by the tidings of such a splendid loan. They say in their letter to the Governor-General of the November 1814.² (11 November.)

MY LORD,

We have had the honor to receive your Excellency's despatch of the 29th ultimo and we beg to offer our cordial congratulation on the successful issue of your Lordship's negotiation with His Highness the Nawab Vizier for a loan of one hundred lacs of Rupees to the Honorable Company. We are strongly impressed with the importance of this arrangement at the present juncture and we entertain a very high sense of the very liberal conduct observed by His Highness on the occasion.

We have &ca.,
Sd./-G. NUGENT.
Sd./-N. B. EDMONSTONE.

2nd. Nor was this assistance of the Vizier confined to money, aid in Troops was also proffered and no less than 300 of his Elephants were dispatched by His Excellency to the scene

2. Oudh Papers, p. 711.

of action and rendered the most essential Service, for this species of conveyance, by such a host of elephants was quite unattainable elsewhere—and in a mountainous country for the transport of cannon and Tent's were invariable—the Vizier bore all the expence of their feeding during the War.

3rd. The following is the letter of the Governor-General to His Excellency dated 26th December 1814.*

*
4th. The financial prsssure caused by the protracted
The Second prosecution of the Nipaul war led the Governor-
loan. General to apply to the Vizier for another Loan.
His Lordship explains the negotiation of it in the following
letter of the 22nd March 1815.

Letter from the Governor-General¹ to the Honorable N. B. Edmonstone Esqre. Vice President in Council &ca. &ca. &ca., dated 22nd March 1815.³

Para 1st. "The heavy pressure of the war with Nepaul and the other Military preparations which I have deemed it to be my duty to adopt, as fully detailed in my dispatch to your Honorable Board of the 9th February induced me to turn my thoughts to the expediency and practicability of obtaining a further pecuniary aid from His Excellency the Nawaub Vizier whose interest in the success of our measures is closely interwoven with that of the British Government, whose attachment to the Honorable Company is undoubted and whose personal regard for myself, I was disposed to think would render him desirous of contributing to the alleviation of our financial embarrassments were he once apprized of them."

2nd. "A private communication was accordingly made under my orders, to the Resident at His Excellency's Court, directing him to ascertain as far as he might be able the practicability of obtaining a further loan to the extent of a crore of Rupees and to take advantage of any circumstance which might appear to him as affording a prospect of success to open the matter of His Excellency."

*Oudh Papers, p. 721. Text of the letter has been omitted.

3. Oudh Papers, pp. 728-9.

3rd. "Your Honorable Board will bear in recollection the offer which His Excellency the Vizier made through the Resident to raise for the service of the war some battalions of Najeebs to act with the British troops, and to be paid out of His Excellency's Treasury while the war should continue. An English copy of my letter to the Vizier declining with expressions of acknowledgement the proffered aid as not being required in the circumstances of the moment was transmitted to Fort William, in a letter from the Secretary in the Political Department under date the 26th December 1814."

4th. "In reply to my letter above referred to, I received one from the Vizier in which after adverting to my declining the offer to raise Nujeeb Battalions and to the information which he states that he had received from Major Baillie and other quarters of the expense to which the Company was exposed by raising troops, His Excellency concludes by offering a loan of fifty lacs of Rupees to the Honorable Company as a proof of his friendship."

5th. "Neither the amount of this offer, nor the manner in which it was made appeared to me to be so satisfactory as to make it advisable that I should accept it on the part of the Honorable Company. You will observe indeed, that it was only under an imperfect knowledge of the actual extent of our present and prospective difficulties."

6th. "I determined therefore to decline it, and at the same time to authorize Major Baillie to explain more fully to the Vizier the circumstances of pecuniary embarrassment in which we were placed, and thus afford His Excellency an opportunity of manifesting his friendship by an offer more adequate to the occasion."

7th. "According to my expectation the Vizier, on being made master of these circumstances, tendered in the most friendly manner the loan of a Crore of Rupees bearing interest at 6 per cent."

"I desire to offer to your Honorable Board my cordial congratulations on the accomplishment of an arrangement so

Beneficial to the finances of the Honorable Company at a period of great pressure."

I have &ca.,
Sd/-MOIRA.

5th The following is a copy of the Vizier's letter conveying this most liberal offer of another hundred lacs of Rupees, a million sterling.

†

7th. These loans without having seen the Secret springs of action appear a delightful proof of cordial cooperation with the British Government on the part of its Ally. It is proper however to exhibit the real state of the case as proved by subsequent light thrown upon it, shewing they were obtained not spontaneously but by painful and protracted urgency and negotiations.

8th. In the volume of Oude papers published by order of the Court of Directors in the statement of Lieutt. Colonel Baillie formerly Resident at Lucknow, there are these observations, (pp. 1023) "it is necessary in further vindication of my official character as Resident at the Court of Lucknow to advert to a most extraordinary statement in the summary of Lord Hasting's administration recently given to the public in which he refers to the relief of the financial embarrassments of the Country during the war against Nipaul by a spontaneous offer on the part of the Vizier of more than two Crores of Rupees as the price of his emancipation from a painful and degrading thralldom in which he and his father were held inconsistently with the Treaty. Now I venture to assert with perfect confidence and without fear of contradiction that the present sovereign of Oude so far from making a spontaneous offer of a Crore of Rupees or of any sum of money to Lord Moira was induced by my earnest entreaty at the express desire of His Lordship to offer with reluctance his first loan of a Crore of Rupees in terms which were anything but gracious as the

† The letters of the Vizier and the Governor-General have been omitted. See Oude Papers, pp. 7247- for the text of the letters.

words of his letter demonstrate. So true and so striking a picture of that first pecuniary transaction is given at the time of its occurrence in my letter of the 19th October to a member of Government in Calcutta, now my colleague in this court (the Court of Directors, that I have been induced to give an extract from that letter in the documents appended to this paper, (See page 1027)".

On the subject of the 2nd Loan from the Vizier Colonel Baillie in the same letter says, "it was the result of a protracted painful and vexatious negotiation on my part prescribed by the private instructions of Lord Moira which he has thought proper to withhold from the record."

9th. Colonel Baillie and his private letter of the 2nd March 1815 to the address of Mr. Adam, Secretary to Government. (See printed Oude papers page 1030) says, "Have you seen all my recent letters to Ricketts on the vexatious subject of extortion from the Vizier as vexatious almost to me as the preceding one? Have you proposed a gift to His Excellency of the district of Khyrghur⁴ which appears to be highly expedient for the purpose of qualifying our extortion—to both these important subjects I would earnestly entreat your attention at as early a period as may be practicable."

10th. Extract of a private letter from Colonel Baillie Resident at Lucknow to C. M. Ricketts Esqr., Secretary to Government, dated 10th January 1815⁵.

"I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter, dated the 2nd instant, and I shall take the first favorable opportunity of having it suggested to His Excellency the Vizier, that another crore of Rupees as a loan to the Honorable Company would be an acceptable offering to Lord Moira whose pleasure and convenience I am persuaded that His Excellency is disposed to consult to the utmost extent of his power."

4. Khairigarh, Pargana in District Kheri. It came into the possession of the British in 1801 and was handed over to the King of Oudh in 1816 *Gazetteer of Oudh*. Vol. II, 124-33.

5. *Oudh Papers*, p. 1082.

"Of the delicacy of a negotiation of this nature his Lordship and yourself must be aware and I shall therefore at present say no more than that my best and most zealous exertions shall be employed to insure its success and to accomplish His Lordship's purposes."

"By the way I have no recollection of the circumstance of His Excellency's former offer of a second crore of Rupees. It was certainly not made to me, nor to His Lordship distinctly in my presence. The Nowab made a general observation in the true oriental style that is "Jan Mal" (life and property) were at His Lordship's command and an expression to the same effect was contained in one of the papers of requests which he recalled. You told me, I also remember and so did Swinton and Adam that at a conference from which I was absent, His Excellency had offered the first crore as a gift instead of a loan and as much more as might be wanted but His Excellency's written offer to me of a Crore was expressed in by no means so liberal terms and as the paper is still by me I insert a translation of it here.

"You mentioned yesterday the necessity of a supply of cash for the extraordinary charges of the Company. As far as a crore of Rupees I shall certainly furnish by way of loan but beyond that sum is impossible and a voucher for the sum must be given."

Sd./ J. BAILLIE.

The following is the copy of a private letter from Coll. Baillie Resident to C. M. Ricketts Esqre. Secretary, to Government, dated 11th February 1816.⁶

DEAR RICKETTS,

"I have hitherto delayed to reply to your Note of the 19th ultimo in the hope of being enabled to report to you that some progress was made in the negotiation for a supply of cash from the Vizier.

"I have at length obtained from His Excellency a direct offer of fifty lacs of Rupees, in a letter addressed to Lord Moira, and I assure you with great truth that this offer has been obtained with a difficulty which induced me more than once to despair of the smallest success to my labours. His Excellency has been led to entertain notions of our Government very opposite to the professions of disinterestedness which I was in the habit of conveying to him about the time of his accession to the Musnud. Some miscreants have endeavoured to persuade him that the object of all our proceedings is to plunder him of his wealth by degrees and when he has no more money to take his country, and that his Minister is in league with us to this end. Intrigues upon intrigues against the Minister are daily repeated to me and the danger of my supporting the Minister is ever greater than the danger of those intrigues. The letter which I first received for Lord Moira conveying the offer for fifty Lacs was worded in such a manner as to exhibit the greatest reluctance in the donor instead of a voluntary gift and the purpose of my conference this morning was to obtain an alteration of the language. It was the first and only occasion of an explicit conversation on such a subject between His Excellency and me, for I had hitherto deemed it more delicate and proper to commit the negotiation to the Minister, and to his faithful and zealous observance of the instructions which I gave for his guidance I entirely ascribe my success. His Excellency agreed to my proposal of altering the terms of his letter which are now almost entirely to my mind but His Excellency's manner at the conference although it was friendly in the extreme convicted me that he would rather keep his fifty lacs of Rupees than have all the fine speeches which I made to him and now Dear Ricketts, pray inform me whether these fifty lacs will do your business or not. You may have them as a gift I conceive, or at all events you may repay them when you please, and the interest will be rejected if you wish it, but more money from His Excellency with his free will I despair of and therefore if more be required you must authorize a demand on the Begum and our subordinate dependants at Lucknow who will, I doubt not assist, as if they be called

on; and the demand on whom will at all events have one most salutary effect, that of demonstrating to His Excellency the Vizier that we are really in want of the money, and are not using false prettexts of necessity to deprive him of his treasure."

I am &ca.

11th Feby. 1815.

Sd./ J. BAILLIE.

12th. Mr. Ricketts Secretary to Government thus writes in a private letter to Coll. Baillie Resident, dated 18th February 1815.⁷

"Para : 2nd. His Lordship is of opinion therefore that it would be advisable to withhold the Vizier's offer from the records, and for you to communicate freely with him on the subject, for the purpose of clearing up any misunderstanding, and of inducing him to withdraw his letter and to substitute one couched in handsomer terms and embracing a more liberal offer."

13th. The difficulty of obtaining the 2nd crore will be further seen from this extract from Colonel Baillie's private letter to Mr. Ricketts Secretary, dated 25th February 1815.⁸

DEAR RICKETTS,

"On mature reflection it occurs to me to be expedient if not indispensable, that a letter from Lord Moira to the Vizier, in answer to that which I forwarded to Swinton conveying an offer of fifty Lacs of Rupees should be written and sent to me for the purpose of commencing the negotiation for a Crore This measure may be easily adopted without any necessity for according the first letter or the answer to it because I can manage in such a manner, that the Vizier's ultimate letter, if His Lordship desire it shall not be in the form of reply."

"It would shew His Excellency at once that the obligation which he has the means of conferring is to be conferred on the Governor-General and it would frustrate the mischievous

7. *Oudh papers*, p. 1034.

8. *Ibid*, pp. 1036-37.

designs of His Excellency's enemies and ours, who are strenuously labouring to convince him that it is the Minister who, supported by me, is gradually robbing him of his money, with the view of obtaining for himself the approbation and support of Lord Moira, and of exhausting His Excellency's sources of independence and power, which those miscreants represent to him as consisting exclusively in his wealth."

14th. Colonel Baillie again writes in a private letter to the Secretary on the 16th March 1815.⁹

"At length, my dear Adam, this most arduous and vexatious negotiation is brought to a happy conclusion. A complete crore instead of ninety one Lacs and a half is secured by the letter this instant received and to be forwarded immediately."

15th. Mr. Adam the Secretary thus replies to the Resident.¹⁰

My Dear Baillie,

"I have little time to write but I must congratulate you on the success of your efforts to get another Crore (about one Million of pounds sterling) from His Excellency. It must have been a most ungracious and difficult task and the Government should be proportionally obliged to you."

16th. In 1824 & 5 the British Government was called upon to put forth its utmost strength to maintain Further loans. at the same time a large Army in the field within its own territories in the capture of Bhurtpore and to support another army beyond seas to prosecute an arduous war against the Burmees Monarch into the very heart of his dominions. These mighty objects were achieved with more renown to the energies and arms of the British Government than benefit to her finances. The pressure upon her treasure was severely felt and to raise money became absolutely necessary. The King of Oude at this crisis lent valuable aid in lending a third crore to the Government, but to obtain it was no easy matter. The King was averse to it, but by the aid

9. *Ibid* p. 1088.

10. *Ibid*.

of his Minister Moatumudoodowlah the Resident managed to get the money though the terms on which it was obtained shewed how deeply the Minister was interested in obtaining it. The whole interest of the Crore at 5 per cent amounted to 41,606 Rs. monthly and of this no less than 25,000 per mensem was guaranteed by the British *to the Minister and his family* with the protection of his life, honor and property.¹¹

17th. It appears most extraordinary that the King could have been induced to give the Crore upon those terms so palpably disadvantageous to himself and barefacedly appropriated to such an extent by his Minister. It is true that the King's wives obtained, through it, the British guarantee of protection after his death and the payment of a portion of its interest to them, but this they might have had without bestowing 20,000 of monthly interest upon the Minister¹²

18th. It is more than probable that a document produced by the present King, is correct, purporting to be a bond from Moatumudoodowlah for One Crore of Rupees, promising to pay back the principal into His Majesty's treasury, but for which, and for all other demands, he got from the late King a writing of release.

11. For loans of 1825-26 see Political Proceedings, 16 September 1825 and Political Dept., Miscellaneous Vol 181, letters Ricketts to Swinton dated 19 August 1825; Amherst to Ricketts dated 19 June 1825 and 30 July 1825; Ricketts to Amherst dated 2 July 1825, 14 July 1825 and 11 August 1825. Also Governor General to Resident dated 6 May 1826 and Resident to Governor General dated 20 May 1826.

12. Agreement between King of Oudh and the Resident dated 17 August 1825 (See Appendix No 29 to Report from the Select Committee. Vol. VI Political, 1852, pp. 504-5. This loan was given in perpetuity and the interest was to be devoted to the expenses of the Imambara, and the support of his three Begams and the minister Motamaduddowlah, his wife, daughter and son (Rs. 25,000 in all.)

CHAPTER XII

THE FARMING OF REVENUES

1st. In order to judge of the expediency or otherwise of the measures which have been adopted by the British Government towards the state of Oude, it is necessary to know the *principles* and *system* of Government upon which the native state proceeds. The following view therefore of the favourite system of farming out the Government of the country is essential to just conceptions of the case.

2nd. Theoretically there seems so much simplicity in the organization of a native Government that we are very apt to fall into the mistake of supposing that it is *not for want of knowledge or perception of right and wrong* that the native Government errs—the perception of natives is often *exceedingly blunt and feeble* and quite inadequate to operate in the removal of the most glaring evils.

3rd. Habituated to see in practice the grossest abuses in Government, they become quite reconciled to them and though they can, and do point out the errors, and can suggest improvements, their *perception and knowledge* practically amounts merely to this that a better system might be introduced but, still notwithstanding the evident abuses, that the present system is quite good enough, and that it is not worthwhile to alter it.

4th. The great besetting sin of this native Government may be taken in proof of this, namely, the *shocking system of farming out the Government and revenues* of the districts to mercenary grasping contractors.

5th. The farming system in every ramification has the powerful tendency to corruption and ruin in its every core, and has perpetually called forth the remonstrances of the Governor-General in Council. It embraces firmly in its grasp almost every principle of misgovernment. If it were the object of a state to *insure misgovernment* it could devise no better

means than to farm out the Kingdom and the offices of Power to mercenary contractors.

6th. This bane of all good government, is as follows. The Kingdom is divided into provinces more or less extensive, some so large as to extend over a surface of 1600 hundred square Miles or even more, yielding an annual Revenue of from thirty to forty lacs of Rupees or from three to four hundred thousand pounds, and containing an abundant population in it's numerous villages and towns from four or six hundred thousand inhabitants.

7th. Surely it is of deep importance to the honor and reputation of the Native Government, and to the welfare of the people, to select as the Governors of such provinces, men of high character of integrity of experience on public business and who will be respected by the swarming population over whom they are sent to rule, I had almost said to reign, for complete authority in the civil criminal and fiscal Government of the province is entirely vested in their individual persons.

8th. But how melancholy is often the real state of the case. Instead of an upright and dignified person being selected as the local Governor, the farming system often produces the very reverse. This noble appointment embracing the contract for the Revenue is either put up to the highest bidders or the district is farmed to a banker for a certain time for the repayment of a debt which may be due to him by the state. The banker being allowed to select his own instruments fails not to depute creatures subservient to his purpose of making the most of his contract or more commonly a relation of some Court favourite obtains the prize, becomes contractor for the Revenue and is invested with the office of Aumil or Governor.

9th. It has frequently happened that low individuals as uneducated, as unprincipled, have been thus elevated as the Governors of districts to which they proceed in state dignified by a title from the Government seated upon a Royal Elephant with the Noubut or state drum of authority sounding before them, and backed by an army of some thousands of mercenary troops henceforth devoted to their bidding.

10th. Arrived within the sphere of their authority they find

themselves answerable as contractors to a despotic Government for an enormous revenue, besides which contract they have to pay the sums of money pledged to their patrons, for obtaining them their present posts and, goaded by fear of failure in realizing the amount of contracts to the Government, and thus in failure of payment, especially if the Ministry be changed since the appointments, and their friends be now out of power insuring almost certain disgrace and punishment, and spurred by the avaritious and unscrupulous desire of low unprincipled minds to make their own fortunes speedily while power and opportunity are theirs, the devoted districts are at their mercy.

11th. They (the self-interested farmers) make the Revenue assessments with the Zumeendars, and all that the farmer can screw from the unhappy people above his own contract *goes into his own pocket. He had nothing therefore in fixing what each Zumeendar shall pay to counteract his own avarice and cupidity* Breach of contract by the farmers with the people appears an universal complaint. The form is observed of drawing out a deed wherein the Zumeendar agrees to give and the "farmer" to receive, a certain sum but the "Farmer" has the power to force further payment and he generally uses it under the head of additional taxes. He is supported in his power to collect whatever he demands, by the full Magisterial and Judicial Authority of an absolute Governor. Large bodies, some times two or three Battalions of the Government troops with Artillery, are in his camp and under his controul, his willing slaves to inforce from the Zumeendars his demand be they just or unjust.

12th. This farmer again often subdivides his farm to subordinate contractors, who take the farm of pergunnas or lesser portions of territory—the Chief farmer however takes care to reserve in his own management the richest portions of the country because from them he can express their surplus wealth and enrich himself—but in those tracts where the agriculturists are in poverty (where the lenient and fostering hand of Government should step forward to relieve them and ease their burthens) these especially the reckless farmer abandons to underfarmers who again often sell the people out to other farmers, and as each

farmer must have his profit, the unhappy people once impoverished like a stone rolling down hill, become more and more oppressed untill the cultivators are ruined and become involved in debt, and then it is, that the Government is of necessity compelled to think of some relief but this merely arises from finding that no one will contract for the district of paupers. An "Amanee" aumil or native salaried collector as in the British territories is then sent to take charge of the impoverished district.

13th. The farmer is not restrained by the fear that a district drained this year to its last penny will greatly fall off in revenue the years following. The present moment only concerns him. He well knows that the moment his interest fails another contractor may be sent out to replace him, the future prospects of the district have no influence with him.

14th. The most difficult and important duty therefore of any Indian Government, namely the moderate and Judicious assessment and collection of the land tax, upon which the prosperity of the people and of the country so mainly depend, is thus by the farming system deliberately abandoned to the very individual who above all others ought not to be intrusted with it who whilst uncontroled at Court, because of his powerful interest there, is spurred by fear of failure and urged by hope of gain and armed with Military force to sacrifice the interest of the people to his own.

15th. He, too, has the appointment of all the public officers in his district. These he takes care shall be only such as are slaves to his will. Happy is it that the people of India are full of forbearance else would an indignant population rise against this infamous abandonment of the rights of Millions to the caprice of men often from the lowest grades of society, shamelessly sent not only to rule over them but to tax them at their pleasure and enforce their demands by Military force.

16th. In all good Governments there should be an appeal from abused power but to whom shall the oppressed Zemindar or Ryot appeal against the all powerful farmers? He has but one resource namely resistance and on some occasions, the Oude Zemeendars do resist successfully by force of arms the

oppression of the Aumils though the experiment is very dangerous seeing that the Aumil is backed by a powerful force. The corrupt influence at Court which obtained for him his present shameful elevation or if that influence be no longer in existence other influence which he takes care to purchase is deeply interested in hushing all complaints against him. Should the complaint arrive at the Capital a deaf ear is generally given to it or what is worse he is sent back to the farmer, who well knows how to make an example of one so dangerous or who has courage to appeal against his abused power. But it is well if there be only one farmer between the cultivator and the source of redress—the Government. Thousands of cultivators paying revenue to the state are hopelessly removed from the governing power by a succession of farmers to whom they have been sold out and as each of these was to make profit by his contract, the ryot is made to pay perhaps double what the Government received.

17th. It lately happened, and parallel cases must be numerous, that the son of the most influential man at Court obtained in 1833 the Government of a Province embracing the districts of Bainswarah¹, and Salone², Kurra Manikpore³ &c. An appeal against him was a Mockery of justice, his father's deep aim with whom the appeal finally rested, was carefully to conceal all causes of complaint. The result was that this uncontrolled farmer ruined a great portion of the districts and was removed in 1835.

18th. There are exceptions to every rule. There are some good farmers who do not oppress the people and under whom the country flourishes but he must be a man of wondrous virtue and innate kindness of heart who is proof against the powerful motives to exaction with which he has been saddled and it is so far honorable to human nature that such exceptions do occasionally appear.

1. Baiswara : A chakla under Oudh rulers, now in Rae Bareli District.

2. Salon : Tahsil in Rae Bareli district ; a chakhla under Oudh rulers.

3. Kara Manikpnr : Pargana in Tahsil Kunda, District Partabgarh ; a place of great antiquity.

19th. In consequence of the repeated urgency of the British Government the Oude Government has of late since 1831 been more careful in appointing its local officers and professes to have discontinued the farming system and to have adopted that of appointing respectable officers upon fixed salaries but it is to be feared that a great portion of the Kingdom is still openly farmed out.⁴

20th. To an inefficient Government farming has many inducements. It insures for the time the collection of the revenue without any trouble to the ministry. It provides splendid appointments and rapid fortunes for friends and relations, and is above all a mine of wealth in the enormous presents of lacks of Rupees which the farmers pay to the influential courtiers who obtained for them their posts, or preserve them there.

21st. Native Governments appear in practice scarcely at all to aim at the good of the people. This seems a principle of Government quite beyond their province, and there is a saying applied by a Faqueer who used to accompany his Camp to the celebrated leader of Pindarees Shaikh Doolah, which may with too much truth be applied to many Despotic Native Governments namely Dur Asman Ul-Ulah Bur Zumeen : Shaikh Doolah : Bakee Kheir Sullah :

22nd. It is a very melancholy fact that there are some amongst the highest and most talented British functionaries who have conscientiously arrived at the startling conclusion (and the almost universal poverty of our agricultural subjects give a colouring to the conclusion) that notwithstanding all the disadvantages of a native Government it is generally in practise found to be better and more easy for the people than our own.

23rd. If such be really the case how signal has been the failure of the British in the art of Government (with all their desire to rule with moderation and justice) how sad the proof

Abuses in the
British system
of adminis-
tration

4. See *Spoliation of Oudh*, p. 166.

of the melancholy effects of the ill judged and short-sighted efforts of British Collectors to increase the revenue.

24th. Were the British and not the Oude Government the subject of the present paper much could be said to shew how fatal to the prosperity of our own provinces and consequently to the interest of the Government has been the almost universal desire of Revenue Officers to raise the Revenue. The traveller cannot but observe in the upper provinces especially the signs of great poverty amongst the great mass of the people.

25th. Far be it from these pages however to prefer a native to the British Government which though it may hitherto have greatly erred in overtaxing the agricultural classes has ever brought in its train the invaluable blessing of tranquility and peace and of late years' it is hoped that a better and more liberal spirit toward the cultivators animates the British Revenue Office.

26th. But the errors of our own administration have no reference to the present question—the abuse of Power in farming out the Oude Revenues to contractors. If the land tax be too high in the British Government that will not in the slightest degree lessen the misgovernment in this nor should it make us look with less indignation upon the farming system which without ever professing to think of the prosperity of the people unfeelingly tramples upon the rights of millions in sending as their ruler and tax gatherer, low unprincipled individuals, who inheriting all the usual failings of human nature are placed in authority over them under circumstances powerfully calculated to insure oppression by shutting the avenues of appeal, whilst at the same time subsisting all the personal selfish feelings of a despotic ruler against the people.

27th. The same objections exist to the common plan of granting Jageers instead of money payments to the wives or relations of the King or to the Commanders of troops for the payment of their followers.

Abuses of the Jagir system.

28th. The assignment of a Jageer for a lack or two of Rupees annually embraces the entire controul of the Territory,

yielding that sum. The Judicial magisterial and fiscal authority over all the villages, towns and entire population is vested in the Jageerdar.

29th. She is often a woman of low Birth and a sad list of melancholy instances could be given where they have chosen as the Ruler of their little provinces (as might have been expected) persons or relations from the same rank in life as themselves, without the slightest reference to the high duties which should appertain to all who are placed in authority over the people.

30th. The urgency of the British Government against such abuses of power has led latterly to the resumption by the Oude Government of all its Jageers, reserving the management of the Country to the Government.

31st. Another of the many evils springing from the farming and Jageer system is that the farmers are generally found unjustly to secure to themselves and in their own names enormous landed estates. The reckless exactions of themselves or predecessors from the owners of estates reduce many to beggary, and for arrears of revenue many are incarcerated in the farmers' prisons.

32nd. Despairing of ever paying off the farmer's demands upon their estates and to obtain their liberty these unhappy landlords are induced to sell their estates at a reduced value to the very farmers whose exactions have ruined them. The title deeds are drawn out in the farmer's name or to screen the transaction in the name of some "Ism Furzee"⁵ or subervient middle man. Thus like bloated spiders having thrown out their webs and entangled their prey, victim after victim, estate after estate is added to the farmer's possession, so that often when turned out of office he retires as an enormous landed proprietor.

33rd. In short the system of farming is rotten to it's very core, and it is no wonder that the British Government should feel its own honor compromised by such a system and

5. False name.

shrink from supporting with its arms a native disposition when such is the favourite system of its Rulers.⁶

34th. In the next chapter follow the measures in 1831 of the Governor General Lord William Bentinck to effect a reform in the Oude administration.

CHAPTER XIII

LORD BENTINCK'S EFFORTS FOR REFORM

In 1831 the Governor-General visited Lucknow and in consequence of the disorganized state of the Oude Government and the absence of all confidence in its administration His Lordship most solemnly remonstrated with His Majesty upon the state of affairs. The following extract from the note of the conference will shew what took place.

Bentinck's visit to Oudh, its object and effects.

Extract from a note of the conference between the Governor-General and the King of Oude at the Lucknow Residency on the 20th January 1831.

2. After some preliminary observations, the Governor-General proceeds to say.

"He trusted His Majesty was sensible that the intentions of the Honorable Company towards himself were most friendly, earnestly desiring that he should enjoy his exalted station and that his true happiness and the prosperity of the people of his dominions should be promoted."

"In proof of his desire to preserve entire the independence and power of Native Princes the Governor-General adduced the very recent "voluntary transfer to the Raja of Nagpore more than two third of his Territory the perpetual administration of which had been vested in the British Government." It was therefore said the Governor-General with proportionate and

6. Compare memorandum on Oude Affairs, by Maddock, Abstract View of the State of Oude, Appendix 28, Select Committee 1832, Vol VI. pp. 416-419.

sincere regret he was compelled to declare to the King that the Revenue and Judicial administration of his Territories was reported to be shamefully defective."

"That the conduct of the King's revenue officers was every where denounced as oppressive and unjust, their rapacity being exercised with such baneful success as to have brought ruin upon many of his subjects, to have caused the general decline of agriculture, and to have exposed to danger the tranquillity of the country. The Governor-General said, he feared the current reports of great mismanagement in both financial and other concerns could not be refuted for they were confirmed by the complaints of actual sufferers, by the statements of all the British officers stationed in different parts of the Oude dominions, by the condition of the districts he had passed through and by the fact that in almost every direction might be heard the sound of cannon for the purpose of repressing the insurrections of Zumeendars or enforcing the payment of Revenue."

"In continuation the Governor-General said he considered it his duty to impress forcibly upon the King's mind that the British Government could not with any regard to the engagements contained in the Treaty of 1801, to Justice or policy, or to its own reputation longer allow a system of administration, a state of things which might eminently affect the national interests."

"The Governor General then adverted to the strength of the King's troops stating that he had reason to apprehend that the King maintained 50 or 60 thousand men, a much larger force than the stipulations of the Treaty of 1801 sanctioned. By that Treaty the head of the Oude Government agreed to retain in his pay only four Battalions of "Infantry, 200 Cavalry and 300 Artillery with such details of Sebundies in the Mofussul as the due realization of the revenue might require. The Oudh Territories, the Governor-General observed, being protected from external enemies, were its internal peace preserved by a system of beneficent administration, the force fixed by the Treaty of 1801 would be ample. He therefore expected the stipulations of the Treaty would in this respect be observed, and he pressed the early but gradual reduction of the force on the further

grounds of the mismanagement of the King's Financial concerns and the consequent irregularity which attended the payment of it."

"The Governor-General now exhorted the King to introduce into his dominions an improved system of administration in every respect especially in the Revenue department. On the King's promptly engaging to do so the Governor-General reminded him that for twenty years or more the British Government had endeavoured without success to improve the Judicial and Revenue management of Oude and that during that period repeated assurances of amendment had been given and that he might without so far derogating from His Majesty's character as to suppose him indifferent to the bringing about the reform recommended be allowed to distrust hasty promises. However he entertained hopes that under the orders of the King the Minister Mehndee Allee Khan¹ "would introduce a reform." The Governor-General with reference to the appointment of this Minister "begged the King to understand that the entire responsibility of the acts of the Oude Government must rest with His Majesty himself."

"The Governor-General again addressing the King said, that feeling as he did that the administration of Oude had reached the extremity which indispensably called for reform he deemed it his duty frankly to communicate to His Majesty his intention of offering to the Home Authorities his advice that if disregarding the present representation, His Majesty should still neglect to apply a remedy to the existing disorder and misrule, it would then become the bounden duty of the British Government to assume the direct management of the Oude dominions."

"The Governor-General urged the King seriously to reflect on the examples which the history of former neighbouring states presented. They shewed the consequences as affecting Rulers and their families, of regarding with indifference the vices of maladministration and the rapacity and oppression of unprincipled officers. On looking around he would perceive

1. Hakim Mehdi, Muntazimuddaulah Bahadur, Prime Minister of Oudh,

that the descendants of those who had persisted in a profligate course of misrule were mere pensioners divested of power and consequence. The Moorshedabad and Arcot families were adduced as instances. The Governor-General assured the King of the perfect reliance he might place in the good faith of the British Government and of the great repugnance that would be felt in adopting any measure interfering with his rights and privileges. But as his well wisher and friend he could not refrain from placing before his Majesty the very great advantages that would accrue to the Paramount authority by the exercise of this right of assumption and the extreme imprudence therefore of persevering in a course, which self-interest as well as justice might equally counsel. Were the British Government disposed to aggrandize itself the Oude Territories encircled by its own, possessing a soil climate and population unequalled perhaps in any other part of India, and the birth place of a great proportion of its army would form a most valuable acquisition. The British frontier districts would no longer be exposed to the excesses that have been so often and so long subject of complaint and the great revenues of this fine country would be collected without the cost of an additional soldier to its actual force. But His Majesty well knew that the British Government would listen to no such temptation in opposition to its engagements and the Governor-General in conclusion urged His Majesty that he would be no longer deceived by the forbearance already manifested towards him, but urgently and seriously following the advice now given he would immediately introduce a general system of reform of his administration which while it conducted to his own honor and advantage would at once satisfy every demand of the British Government."

From this period a decided change took place in the duties of the Governor-General's representative at the Court of Oude. The Resident became merely an observer of the measures of the Oude Government and of their effects. He was no longer to interfere or dictate or even to advise the Native Government unless his advice were asked. The Government was now to be thrown upon the King of Oude to follow his own plans

and select his own instruments. The experiment of noninterference in one sense was to be tried, that is, as to means and instruments of reform; though in another sense up to this period there had never been such a decided attitude of vital interference as this. It threatened the annihilation of the Government and the assumption of the Kingdom by the British if reform did not take place.

5th. This had a salutary effect upon the Oude administration, because the Prime Minister, the Nawab Muntizimood Dowlah Mehndee Allee Khan Bahadur, was not only a very able but a sensible man. He commenced though tardily upon a system of reform and having the confidence of, and entire authority from, his Royal Master and enjoying also the approval of the British Government and the favor and as far as was consistent with noninterference the co-operation of the Resident, his talent experience and praiseworthy zeal penetrated to almost every department of the State. He most vigorously and fearlessly applied the shears of retrenchment to the overgrown and overpaid establishments of the Government. He put the yoke of Authority and check upon the Aumils and officers of power in the interior who had become petty despots. He removed from their elevation many unworthy upstarts who had brought or intrigued themselves into stations of trust and importance and by the determined energy of his sweeping measures he overawed the turbulent Zumeendars and petty chieftains of the interior, many of whom by the weight of his commands alone, and trusting to his promises of good faith, instead of resisting as heretofore the officers of Government presented themselves at Court in person for the adjustment of their disputes with the local authorities and settlement of their affairs with the Government. He made great progress in the abolition of that wretched system of farming out the revenues which carries destruction in its core. In a word he was proving himself for Oude an active reformer on an extensive scale and by his labours was rendering himself a benefactor to the Kingdom.²

2. Iroin : *Garden of India*, p. 121.

6th. The Resident's dispatches instead of, as heretofore, relating a melancholy tale of misgovernment and complaint conveyed to the supreme Government of India the cheering tidings of amelioration and drew from the Governor-General in Council encouragement and applause.

7th. This grateful encouragement from the Paramount power of India wrought its effect on the mind of the Indefatigable Minister whose efforts were renewed, and his labours were crowned with the gratifying assurance that he had piloted the state of Oude safe beyond the rocks of destruction upon which it had been fast drifting, and where the British Government had declared its purpose to assume the charge.

8th. The Minister was naturally elated by the generous praise then bestowed upon himself by the paramount power of India for essential services rendered to the Kingdom, and was relieving the cares of Government by speaking and writing to his Royal Master of these welcome tidings conveying, instead of threats, as of old, the satisfaction of the British Government, when unhappily in return for these substantial benefits, the hitherto successful and elated Minister, suddenly found himself deprived of power and within a few days a prisoner under guards.

9th. Unfortunately the Minister did not combine the
 The dismissal of the Minister. suaviter in modo with the fortiter in re. His manners were authoritative and harsh? Amidst the thousands of enemies which his retrenchment created, he appeared to make no friends. The uncles and relations of His Majesty were treated with disrespect at the Court of Oude and found their situation even worse than before, under his stern administration. By his measures he proved himself the poorman's friend by controuling those in authority over the people, but as a minister, it is to be regretted that in creating fear he did not draw out regard.

10th. His reforms and retrenchments had been fearless and extensive and had even reached to the establishment of the Queen Mother and to the wives of His Majesty. These and others had poisoned the King's ear against the Minister, charges

were brought up against him that he had spoken disrespectfully of the Queen Mother, had usurped the power of the Government &c. In short as far as can be ascertained he fell a victim to his zeal and services, and to the intrigues which his fearless reforms had fomented against him in many quarters.

11th. The King went through the forms of asking the Resident's advice in the matter of retaining or discharging him and the Resident in the most powerful manner placed before His Majesty the extraordinary nature of his proceeding and the probable ruin of his Kingdom by reverting to its former sinking condition, but in vain. The infatuated prince was bent upon the removal of the best Minister the Kingdom had ever seen since its treaties with the British Government notwithstanding all his faults, and Muntuzumoodowlah Mehndee Allee Khan was set aside.

12th. The following extract from the unvarnished and affecting description by the Resident of the hoary headed Vizier upon his knees supplicating his unfeeling sovereign ought not to be omitted here.

13th. On the 4th of August 1834 after the King had virtually though not formally displaced the Minister, Colonel Low, the Resident, held a private conference with His Majesty at the Residency, the last at which the aged Minister was present. He had at first been excluded by the King, but at the suggestion of the Resident was sent for, and admitted. The Resident's dispatch thus describes the Extraordinary scene. The King in the course of conversation had said to the Resident, "I expect you to be my friend and not my servant's (the Minister) friend". The conversation thus proceeds (as extracted from the Resident's dispatch).

Major Low—"As for my being your friend and not that of your servant as you have now expressed yourself I do assure you on my solemn word of honor that I never shall have any friendship for the Minister unless he continues to do your business properly. If he or any servant of yours were not to obey your orders, or not to do your Kingdom good service, I should have no friendship for him

whatsoever. You are his Master and he must give you satisfaction in all things. I will tell him so before you if you choose."

The King—"Do so, I want him to be convinced that I am his master in all affairs great, and small".

Major Low—"Depend upon it that such are the minister's own feelings, and you shall be immediately convinced how true this is."

I then opened the door of the private apartment, and ordered a servant to call in the Minister who immediately came, and took his seat with us. I then told the Nawab that I had hitherto treated him kindly not on his own account, but merely because he was working hard and successfully for the King's advantage, that the King was his Master and that if he were not to give satisfaction to His Majesty my kindness would instantly cease, that I was the friend of the King or more properly speaking, said I, (turning round towards the King) I am a friend of this Government.

The Minister—"The King my Master and I his servant—that is not the way to state the case, I am his slave and he is my owner, my life is devoted to his service, my head and my hands and my old carcass are his property. I never wish to depart from his wishes even by a hairs breadth. He then continued addressing himself to His Majesty for Gods sake if I have ever done any thing wrong do but point out my faults, and they shall be instantly rectified."

"I looked round towards the King in hopes that he would at last act openly, and mention some faults, whether real or otherwise, but to my great disappointment he did not charge the Minister with any faults whatsoever. His only observation was, It is nothing, it is nothing and at last he said "all will yet be right."

Major Low—"I am delighted to hear your Majesty say so, but I wish you would deal openly with this old servant, tell him his faults, you are his Master, it is proper that a Master should point out the faults of his servants and order them to be atoned for."

"Here the King whispered to me, "don't tell him what I said of him to you, I cannot remain here if you do any thing of that Kind."

Major Low.—"Very well it shall be so as you please, your Majesty will doubtless tell him everything yourself."

"An embarrassing silence then occurred for some seconds, when I hit upon an expedient which seemed greatly to relieve the King, by addressing myself to the following effect to the Minister."

Major Low.—"The King is going to mention to you himself some points which have not given satisfaction and doubtless you will immediately rectify them, but I may here notice one point that I have heard from others lately as having been offensive to the King, namely that you are not sufficiently polite to the Kings' relatives, that you do not even always return their salaam such is the report."

The Minister.—"Is it so reported? I was not sensible of it, but if my master says so, it must be true. It shall be rectified instantly, if it ever happened it must have been by entire inadvertence on my part. I am short sighted now in my old age. I am often so deeply engaged in the King's business that I see no one who may be in the same room with me excepting the person that I may be speaking to. Sometimes if I am engaged in writing I don't see any body, I see nothing but the paper pen, and Ink. I have heard within the last few days that the King's uncles have been complaining to His Majesty about the smallness of their salaries, but they were reduced by the King's own orders. Was it not so my master? (Here the King nodded assent) His Majesty has only to give the orders and all the uncles can in half an hour hence get ten times the amount of salaries they ever got, it is the King's money, he disposes of it."

The King.—"All these matters shall be satisfactorily settled.

The Minister.—Thank God, Thank God, settle them all in any way your Majesty pleases, only know me to be your devoted slave."

Here scene ensued, which was very affecting and to me I confess somewhat disgusting. It was that of seeing an old and highly meritorious man humble himself to the dust before a young one who has neither capacity to appreciate his merits or feeling enough to sympathize with his distress of mind. The Minister suddenly came down from his chair, and taking off his turban placed his barehead between the King's feet laying hold of his legs with his hands and calling out pardon me, pardon me, if ever I erred, I did so unconsciously. I never will do so again, if I am only told of my fault."

"The King was a good deal ashamed to fall appearance and he placed his hands on the Minister's head, and then on his back and pronounced the words "I pardon you Nawab Sahib, get up and take your chair." The Minister got up under much agitation and with tears in his eyes."

14th. It is unnecessary to extract more from the Resident's dispatch. Sufficient to say, that the Minister's fate was sealed, his enemies continued to poison the King's mind respecting him, the tide of intrigue ran strong against him, and in a few days stranded the poor old man upon the shore where he was in imminent danger of evils yet greater than the loss of office. But the King had declared to the Resident that the now Ex-Minister should be allowed to depart the Kingdom "Balzut tamam", in a perfectly honorable manner, and in due time he was so allowed to depart.

15th. In reviewing his administration the success must be attributed not to any particular system followed by the British Government, because had it arisen from *noninterference* in the measures of Government the same good effects would be seen in the present unhappy administration of 1835 where the *noninterference* is equally complete. Neither will reform arise from the alarming threat held out of the assumption of the Kingdom by the British Government for that threat is now much stronger than then, without producing any good effect. The success arose from those circumstances which are important to be observed as almost always essential to the good Government of Oude,

Improvement
as a result of
the Minister's
efforts.

1st. From the selection of a fit man as Minister possessed of ability, experience in Government, energy and courage.

2nd. The holding out a motive and stimulant to his exertion combined with the knowledge of close inspection by the British Government and Resident, the certainty that in the event of misgovernment continuing the British Government will at length act with decision.

3rd. The courteous and generous treatment and encouragement of the Minister thereby giving to his administration the appearance of support and stability and the withdrawal of that odious dictatorial spirit in the Resident almost sure to mar the success of any measure however good where its accomplishment would have the appearance of obedience to an order and the credit of it go to the Resident instead of the Native Government.

16th. This [deposed Minister is now enjoying his retirement beyond the Ganges at Futtehgurh, a repose which, in all probability he owes to the interest taken in his fortunes, on account of his zealous services as Minister, by the Resident and the Governor-General of India, for, it is most likely that on being displaced he would have also been closely imprisoned and disgraced had it not been from the impression that such measures (though not provoking the interference) would have kindled the indignation of the British Ruler and his representative. But the events which followed, come next to be considered.

17th. The King chose as his Minister the Nowab Roshunooddowlah Bahadoor a most amiable and good tempered man of high family and pleasing manner, but as has been wisely said of him more suited to be a king than a laborious Minister.

Roshanud-
daulah as
Minister, and
misgovern-
ment again.

18th. Oude at this crisis requires in his Minister in addition to other qualifications, Experience, Zeal, indefatigable application to business, and a fearlessness of spirit which will surmount all oppositions, but unfortunately the Minister's disposition is the reverse of all these. His virtue of amiability kindness, and unsupported by that stern and firm mind, essential

in a despotic Vizier seem to unfit him, strenuously to contend for power, in the support of good Government amongst the factions of the court, and, as might have been expected when the reins of authority fell from the experienced and energetic hands which before had so successfully grasped them, much confusion arose.

19th. The Zumeendars became disobedient and ere long the Royal Troops began to assemble in various quarters of the Kingdom and Misgovernment and opposition was once more proclaimed far and near by the voice of cannon.

20th. The Resident's dispatches painted in Melancholy colours the disastrous state and prospect of the Government. He was summoned to Agra to meet the Governor-General who desired to learn more fully the history of events. The accounts which followed him of daily occurrence were not more favorable.

21st. The King in the most solemn and friendly language was cautioned of the brink towards which he was hastening, was told that all the world saw approaching ruin to himself and to his Kingdom if no amelioration took place.

22nd. The Governor-General himself on the 15th of August 1832 wrote in the most earnest strain, beseeching him not to suffer himself to be deceived into a false security and holding up the late assumption of the Mysore Territories to him as a warning and beacon to avoid hoping that a letter couched in terms so plain would have the effect of awakening him to reflection and reform.

23rd. But in order to shew how the eyes of the King are blinded by the Sycophants and flatterers around him it should be mentioned here that this letter instead of producing a salutary effect upon his mind was so misinterpreted to the deluded King by his ministers, the flowery expressions of the Persian language conveying kindness and good will being only dwelt upon, and the solemn tone of warning and allusion to the assumption of Mysore slurred over, that they actually presented to the King *presents of congratulation* upon

his receipt of letter so favorable and full of kindness. To have put on mourning would have been more suitable to the state of things but it is their business to blind the king and this they do with great success by saying "Peace Peace when there is no peace".

24th. Meantime the dispatches of the Governor-General reached home, and in 1835 the instructions of the home authorities arrived in India investing the Governor-General in Council with powers to assume entire possession of the Oude Dominions, should no amelioration have taken place.

The court of Directors authorise assuming entire possession of Oudh, but action postponed, and King warned

15th. On receipt of these important instructions the Resident was summoned to Calcutta. The question of assumption was debated in Council. It was agreed that since the date, the dispatches upon which these instructions were based, some amelioration had taken place and that the present state of Oude did not warrant the displacement of its Government or its annexation to the British Dominions, that a further period of probation should be given and that it's sovereign should be distinctly told the terms upon which he should be allowed to wear the Crown of Oude.

26th. The following is a copy of the Governor-General's letter which was then written to the King of Oude.

To,

The King of Oude, After Compliments.

"Your Majesty will remember that on the 15th August 1832 (since which period two years and a half elapsed) I addressed you in the most earnest tone on the subject of the misgovernment of your country, that I then reminded you of the repeated warnings which you had received and that I expressly beseeched you not to suffer yourself to be deceived into a false security, with reference to the consequence which would befall you if the abuses of your Government were not discontinued.

"It is now my painful duty to apprise you that the Mandate of the Home Authorities has been received authorizing me to

place the Oude Territories under the direct management of officers of the British Government.

"The grounds of this determination I shall state to you as concisely as possible, in the language of the Honorable the Court of Directors.

"The misgovernment of the Kingdom of Oude has been a subject of frequent and earnest remonstrance on the part of the British Government during nearly the whole of the thirty two years which has now elapsed since the conclusion of the subsidiary Treaty and that the evils of the system have been gradually becoming of greater magnitude and frequency.

"The entire and systematic neglect by the sovereigns of Oude of those Provisions of the Treaty which bind them to establish such a system of administration as shall be conducive to the prosperity of their subjects and be calculated to secure the lives and prosperity of the Inhabitants and to advise with and act in conformity to the Counsel of the officers of the Honorable Company.

"The total absence of justice and the gross oppressions practised in the collection of the Revenues and the extreme insecurity of our own adjoining territories in consequence of the disorders which prevail in Oude and which are owing to its misgovernment.

"These are some of the principal reasons assigned by the Honorable Court for the measure which they have sanctioned. They have deliberately considered the question in all its bearings and they have come to the conclusion that any more modified system of interference, while it would probably be no less unpalatable to your Majesty, would be utterly inefficacious for the sole object contemplated by the British Government, namely the restoration of order and the establishing an efficient system of administration.

"At the same time that the Hon rable the Court of Directors have furnished me with authority to assume the management of your Majesty's Country they have with that considerate attention to the interests of their allies, by which they have been uniformly distinguished, furnished me with discretion to

suspend the execution of their mandate if any real and satisfactory improvement shall have taken place in the administration of your Country.

"I have myself resolved to put the most favorable construction upon this authority, and to avoid if possible the painful necessity of being the instrument of depriving your Majesty of the Government of your Dominions.

"With this view I consulted the Resident at Lucknow who is now at the Presidency and he has intimated to me his opinion that the inhabitants of Oude, generally speaking, have not during the last 16 months been subject to such extreme oppression as they were at many former periods, and that the most solemn assurances have been made to him that reform in every department of the State is about to be extensively and immediately introduced, but candour has compelled him to add, that he places little faith in these promises, and that he sees no reason for ascribing the degree of improvement which has recently appeared to any satisfactory or permanent cause.

"Still I am desirous of affording you one more opportunity of retrieving the character of your administration and of saving from the pains, and yourself from the disgrace which must attend the assumption of your Country. I shall not attempt to point out to you the particular course which you should pursue for the future. The right path is obvious, and if you have only the inclination, you will always possess the power of following it.

"I shall not for the present put in force the mandate which has arrived for depriving you of that authority for the exercise of which you have hitherto proved yourself so utterly unfit. I shall *fervently* hope that this warning may not be without its effect and that you will in future conduct your country in a manner better suited to the high and sacred trust conferred upon you by providence. You may rely upon it that this warning will be last.

I am &c.,

Fort William
5th February 1853.

Sd/- W. C. BENTINCK.

True Copy.

Sd/- W. H. MACNAGHTEN.

Secy. to the Government of India.

CHAPTER XIV

INTERFERENCE ON BEHALF OF THE SEPOYS

1st. Nearly two thirds of the vast Bengal Army are Oude subjects their families, villages and lands are in the Oude Dominions and they are most of them cultivators of the soil either holding small leases in their own names or shares in Zemindary farms paying revenue to Government and their affairs are thus under the constant influence and orders of the local Authorities of the Oude Government.

The Resident interferes with the Oudh Government in the interest of the Sepoys of the Bengal Army : its evil effects.

2nd. In a foreign state like Oude (although bound by treaty to be guided by the Councils of the British Government) it would appear to have been proper to leave the adjustment of these minor questions of revenue and petty disputes to the local authorities, and to have made no invidious distinctions between the rest of its subjects and those who happened to have taken service in the ranks of our army, but unhappily from the earliest period of our intercourse with Oude the complaints of Sepoys whether against the local authorities or their neighbours have been preferred, not as would have been proper, direct to the Oude Government, but to the British representative at that Court. Perhaps, this and the guarantees are almost the only instances upon record, exhibiting the subject of a state appealing for the redress of grievances not to the ruler, but to a foreign representative at his court. This system of sepoy interference has naturally ever been very offensive to the Vizier's and King's of Oude, and it's effects are most injurious and partaking much of the Guarantee inconveniences.

3rd. At various periods arising from different circumstances, such as the energy of a minister, and his desire to oblige the Resident, or from a Resident's zeal in behalf of our sepoy, our interference on their account has, occasionally for a time, been most pointed and effectual in advancing their interests. This has led to most erroneous ideas of the Resident's duty and power in such matters and to secure this interference the falsehood and intrigue resorted to is quite beyond scrutiny.

For instance a sepoy sends from the very extremity of India a petition to the Resident in his own name stating that the local Authority has unjustly demanded a higher revenue than he agreed to pay &c. The Resident perhaps taking up the case which may repeatedly have been forwarded in vain remonstrate with and writes to the Oude Government, thus creating heart burning between him and the Durbar. On investigation however it often proves that the sepoy has *nothing personally at stake in the matter*, that his uncle, cousin or some distant relations has written and induced the sepoy to represent the case as his own ! The sepoy on being charged with such falsehoods, plead that though they are not down on the Government revenue books as sharers in the village, yet that they do hold private shares. Oude Zemindars who cannot get justice from their own Government, again and again, manage thus to get the British Resident to fight their battles with the Durbar through the falsehood of some bribed sepoy a distant relation of their own, who states in his petition that he is suffering injury. The investigation of the complaints being in the hands of the Oude Government these vexatious falsehoods rarely come to light for the aumils seldom make any report of their proceedings.

4th. When the Governor-General Lord William Bentinck was approaching Lucknow the Resident wrote to the Oude Government urging that the unadjusted file of sepoy complaints should be cleared off that His Lordship might not see a mass of arrears. The consequence was that the King sent out pointed orders for a *clearance* and there is every reason to believe that great injustice was done by putting sepoys in possession of lands and otherwise leaning towards them to the prejudice of those who had to defend themselves against their assertions. Because for some time after His Lordship's departure when decisions given in favor of sepoys were reversed by the Oude Authorities the excuses were made that the decisions in favor of the sepoys were before merely given for the time to clear the file for the Governor-General's approach. In some respects so powerful is the Minister or Aumil's wish to oblige the Resident or avert his displeasure that when he writes

and remonstrates in behalf of a sepoy and urges that instant Justice may be done him, regardless of the rights of the case, the sepoy's affairs are unjustly settled as the sepoy wishes. Bloodshed and oppression may fairly be said often to have resulted from the Resident's interference in the dark in Zumeendare disputes in behalf of sepoys.

5th. There is one case in point, that of Reotee Ram sepoy of the 9th Regt. 1st Compy. where at the urgency of the Governor-General in Council, as directed by the Court of Directors, the affairs of this Sepoy were taken up. A detachment of the Troops of Oude were turned out to fight the sepoy's battle and after all it proved by his own written statement that the sepoy was only the hired tool of a Zumindar, who through the sepoy and his petition managed to involve the British Indian Government and the Court of Directors in the dispute. The King of Oude in his letter upon the subject does not fail to remark that this falsehood of the Sepoy is only one instance of many. His Majesty in being obliged to defend his Government against such intrigues by British Sepoys has good cause to be grieved and even to feel that such interference with his affairs is ungenerous on the part of the British Government.

6th. It has frequently happened that the same degree of interference which has been improperly and in the dark exerted in behalf of an intriguing sepoy, had it been judiciously exerted in behalf of the people would have done much to improve the condition of thousands, by the removal or appointment of Aumils, or in carrying through efficient measures of general benefits to the Kingdom.

7th. The occasional successes of a few sepoy (as in the case of Raotee Ram who was supported even by the Court of Directors) in having his desires accomplished by British interference mislead many to the belief of the supremacy of the power in Oude and there prevails in consequence amongst the inhabitants of our own provinces and especially amongst our sepoys an erroneous belief that the Resident at Lucknow is invested with full powers, and that it is his duty to interfere in the affairs of the Oude Government, especially on behalf of

sepoys. They often claim his assistance as a right and are ready to ask for what is the Resident at Lucknow if not to see justice done to us and all?

8th. It cannot be wondered at that the sepoys should have this idea of the Resident's power seeing that by a general order (which cannot be too soon repeated) they are instructed to appeal to him for justice in the villages and revenue affairs in Oude and instances of the signal success of a few of their Brother sepoys through appeals to the Resident, are in their minds and these they are ever ready to quote. They naturally expect justice from the authority to which they are directed to appeal. The sepoys therefore arrive at the British Residency or forward to the Resident their petitions formally signed by the Officer Commanding their Company and countersigned by the Officer Commanding the Regiment full of mistaken ideas as to the real source of redress, for the Resident is now merely the channel of forwarding the petition to the Oude Government by whose local officers it must be heard and decided. But the sepoys finding that by general orders their petitions go through those high British channels naturally expect British interference on their behalf and very frequently do their interests in Oude, serious injury by proceeding to the local officers who are to decide their cause, and trusting to the effects of their English uniforms and the Resident's support demeaning themselves in a disrespectful manner. In their petitions to the Resident they frequently indulge in vituperative complaints against these very local officers who are to decide their suits, who, finding themselves thus accused by the sepoys, discover many opportunities of retaliating upon them and instead of redressing their grievances it is not to be wondered at, if the sepoys find ever after in the local officers thus accused, foes to their interests.

9th. In an inefficient native Government, these officers are almost despotic in their spheres and it is not surprising when the sepoys have been using the Resident's name to those Despots that they (the sepoys) should frequently return with the complaint that the Aumils instead of obedience had asked "Who is the Resident? My master is the King of Oude!"

10th. Independently therefore of these petitions to the Resident being offensive and disrespectful to the King of Oude, they are calculated to mislead and often to be injurious to the sepoys themselves as creating an enmity towards them in the minds of the Aumils and local authorities who are to decide their causes.

11th. A partial remedy for this would be to direct the sepoys to address their petition *to the King or Prime Minister of Oude*. This would remove the *slight* of petitioning the Resident and insure their complaints a more courteous reception at the Durbar. It would also open the eyes of the sepoys and teach them that in their village affairs they must look, not to the Resident but to the Native Government. These petitions could still be forwarded to the Oude Government by the Resident and practically the same degree of interference could be used for them as now.

Remedies suggested.

12th. Altogether abruptly to discontinue receiving the petitions of sepoys might have the effect of creating dissatisfaction in the Army but the change of petition being still handed on through the Resident, would satisfactorily be explained to them as a measure conducive to their own interests.

13th. And to prevent as much as possible the present pernicious system of falsehood and intrigue by sepoys mixing themselves up in the affairs of their distant relations and giving in petitions as if they themselves were aggrieved, (for with provoking success they falsely write from their corps all over India that their own Zumeendaree interests are suffering, whereas they have frequently no share and the real owner an Oude Zumeendar appears before the Resident or his Assistant as Agent cunningly appointed to conduct the sepoy's business !) it would be good if in every corps a *permanent Committee of the most intelligent Native officers* were to sit and if their recorded opinion were attached to every sepoy's petition, that so far as they could ascertain, it related to his own affairs. A vast proportion of vexatious intrigues would be thus avoided, for the village history of every sepoy is known in his Regiment and when his petition had to pass the scrutiny of this Com-

mittee, he would no longer be able to write the glaring falshood now so prevalent when petitioning the Resident of Lucknow for his interference. In fact this would be a most useful committee and would perhaps diminish the number of petitions by one half.

14th. The rule might also be adopted that all sepoys when enlisted should be informed that no petitions from them regarding their Oude affairs would be forwarded through the Resident. This pernicious system of interference in behalf of sepoys, appears worthy of the consideration of the British Government.

CHAPTER XV

THE GUARANTEES

1st. In most native states there are some of it's subjects guaranteed by us. The Lucknow guarantees teach political and instructive lessons, and may form a beacon to warn us against entering into further engagements of this kind, the numerous families and individuals whose protection has been guaranteed by the British Government, having proved a constant source of vexation and dispute between the ruler of Oude and the British representative at his court.

2nd. In order to secure to their queens, their relations, and favourites their families and establishments, the protection of the British Government the Viziers of Oude have successively, had treaties executed binding our Government after their death to protect those individuals and to pay the salaries which he may have then settled upon them. These Guarantees have not been disinterested ones on the part of the British Government, but on the contrary have usually arisen out of the loans from the Viziers of Oude to the British Government, the interest having generally been appropriated to the payment of pensions to those guaranteed families.¹

1. As in 1825 when a loan of 1 Crore was given to the Company.

3rd. The consequence of these arrangements has been the establishment of a most mischievous and separate jurisdiction under the Resident as all the above persons claim the privilege of having their affairs decided at the Residency, and are shocked at the idea of being subject to a native tribunal. They are usually of the highest families in Oude, the queens of the late King and Viziers, others, the first nobles of the land, and it has ever been a source of heart burning to the Viziers and King of Oude to see their own legitimate authority disregarded by those individuals and their establishments (many of them their own relations) and appeals and complaints carried to the Resident.

4th. Indeed the British Resident at Lucknow until lately held a separate Durbar of his own every Saturday, where amidst the pomp of Eastern state the Vakeels of these Oude Princesses, the guaranteed nobles, and other individuals assembled and were all consecutively ushered by families into the Resident's presence, to pay their respects and withdraw. To them this periodical Levee or Durbar was satisfactory, as the privilege of attending there and thus being known to have the protection of the Resident was deeply valued. But the effect of this pompous and senseless exhibition and Durbar was most pernicious for those individuals, who, setting aside the supremacy of the Vizier attended the Durbar of the Resident. At such times when the Resident was obliged to be at issue with the native Government on some Political measure they were apt to become marked men at the Vizier's court and in all their difficulties could scarcely expect to receive much consideration there. This obliged them to appeal to the Resident and it generally happened that during these unwise Durbars or Levees the Resident received a file of complaints in petty but troublesome disputes the adjustment of which could only be effected through the Oude Government, which ever felt disposed to receive with indifference, if not with displeasure, these complaints against its own subjects by individuals thus slighting its authority, and appealing through the Minister of a foreign state. Many a bitter dispute has arisen between the Oude Government and the Resident on account of

these guaranteed persons, and those only who have experienced them know the cares and anxieties of a Resident, when thus brought into direct opposition to a Native Government and obliged to carry points revolting to their pride. Often has his influence which was urgently required in effecting great measures in the administration of the Government thus been expended or completely counteracted in an insignificant irritating contest in some trifling guarantee dispute, for to such an extent had this kind of intermeddling gone that those individuals claimed as their right their exemption from obedience to the local Authorities and courts and demanded the interference of the British in the adjustment of all their disputes with their neighbours. Whereas their guarantees only secure to them protection against oppression and not until they had appealed in vain to the local authorities should their case be taken up.

5th. In 1831 this pernicious system of guarantee Durbars was first discontinued but not until the arrival of Major Low's Reforms Major Low, the Resident, was the whole system of guarantee interference put upon its proper footing. Not only were the Durbars discontinued but those individuals were most properly taught to look to the Oude Government and the tribunals of the Country of which they are the legitimate subjects. Appeals to the Residency by them, unless in special cases, are not now received unless where they have themselves appealed in vain to the Oude Government, and disputes amongst themselves are also, unless amicably settled, handed up to their own Government. By thus weaning them from appeals to the Minister of a foreign Government many of them are beginning to make for themselves friends in their own Government and by shewing greater respect to the local authorities the latter are becoming less jealous of them. They are gradually gliding into their proper and natural position. Indeed so far from their being any reason why such civil and Criminal cases should be decided and enforced by the Resident such proceedings are clearly overstepping his proper jurisdiction. He is bound by the guarantee to protect them against oppression but not to take upon himself the powers of a civil and criminal Court in the adjustment of all their affairs. Some of

the guaranteed families (such for example as that of the Bhow Begum of Fyzabad) are however so much estranged from the Durbar and the latter is so hostile to the guaranteed parties that many troublesome and undefined duties still fall to the lot of the Resident at this Court, but generally speaking it may be safely said that by the changes introduced by Colonel Low the duties of the Residency have been much simplified and many of those heart burnings avoided between the Resident and the Durbar so powerful hitherto in destroying his influence in the weightier affairs of the Kingdom at large.

6th. The guarantee of the late Nawab Moatamudoodowlah², the late Prime Minister of the present and late Moatmuddaulah's Guarantee King, may be instanced as the most troublesome of all. When the British Government borrowed from the late King a Croze of Rupees, 25,000 Rupees monthly of the interest of the loan was guaranteed to the Prime Minister and his life, honor, and property taken under the protection of the Resident. When the present King put him out of Office, it was necessary to protect him from vengeance and the operation of the guarantee commenced. The King demanded his life and the confiscation of all of his enormous perperty and heaped against him charges innumerable.³

7th. The British representative at the Court of Oude was ever after placed in the most disagreeable position, that of an Authoritative judge between an exasperated King at whose court he was accredited and his deposed Minister who till then had virtually ruled the Kingdom. Some Companies of British sepoys were employed to protect the person and property of the Ex-Minister who possessed besides extensive Gardens several buildings which might be called Palaces in the city and whole streets or Bazars also belonged to him. In the protection of these and

2. Agha Ali Khan, Prime Minister from 1817 to 1827.

3. Miscellaneous Vol. 182. Maddock to Swinton 12 Oct. 1830. Reports the departure of Moatamuddaulah and Resident's proceedings for the settlement of the claims of private individuals against him.

Also Maddock to Pinsep, 11 Nov. 1830. Reports King's claims agent Moatamad and solicits instructions.

of their inmates it was necessary to set aside the King's Authority, nay at one time there was well grounded and serious apprehension that Collision would take place between the British Sepoys and the King's guards placed over his property, for the latter held good their position over the property nor were withdrawn till the Resident went and told the King and his Minister in person that he would hold them responsible if collision occurred, for by the orders of the British Government he was about to take possession of the property and that His Majesty's guards must withdraw.

8th. The residence of the British representative became a Civil Court in which the sovereign himself was a suitor, and in which he preferred his enormous claims amounting to one Crore and seventy six lacs of Rupees (about one Million seven hundred and sixty thousand pounds). It would have been a difficult task for any Resident to have carried through the orders of the British Government in the release of this Ex-Minister and his immense property in hundreds of Cart loads, to have stood in the gap between him and his exasperated enemies, the King and his energetic Minister, and still to have retained their good will. They complained that the Resident leant too much towards the Ex-Minister and in a strain which the high mind of the Resident could not pass over, he felt himself obliged to support the dignity of his Office and for some time an estrangement took place between him and the Court, thus involving embarrassing references to the British Government. All these circumstances may serve to shew the evils of guarantee.

9th. In addition to the King's demands there were upwards of 996 claims of private individuals against the Ex-Minister amounting to many lacs of Rupees. The investigation of these occupied several years and to this day the ramifications of this guarantee are daily causing trouble.

10th. In Oude guarantees generally have in prospect the death of the party applying for them and the support of a tomb and its readers of the Coran will often be found on the lists of the guarantee and it is to be feared that compliance has often involved the

Guarantees for
charitable pur-
poses.

singular anomaly of a christian Government guaranteeing in perpetuity the public reading and consequent study of the Coran.

11th. A case of this kind occurs in the guarantee of the late King of Oude's tomb, when British Government engaged to pay in perpetuity the sum of 1137 Rs. 10 As, monthly for the support of the Nujuf Ashruf Emambara,⁴ one of the chief religious Buildings in Lucknow, where the Koran is regularly read by an Establishment kept up by the sum, thus paid by the English Government.⁵ Had not this payment been undertaken by our Government the Mohomedan worship there kept up would probably have ceased so long for want of funds.

12th. It would be endless to enter into all the evils arising from guarantees and it is to be hoped that no more will be granted by the British Government.

13th. There is however one class of guarantees which may be given with perfect safety, such for instance as one now in operation where the present King endowed a noble charity by bestowing the magnificent sum of three lacs of Rupees upon the poor of his Capital. This sum he lodged in the Residency Treasury and had the interest of it guaranteed by the British Government to be paid in perpetuity to the poor. The payment of a fixed sum to the poor at the discretion of the Resident can lead to no disputes with the court of Oude.⁶

14th. There are however cases where it may be thought the interest of our Government to grant guarantees for a pecuniary gain, for instance when the Oude Government proposed (as in the case of the late Queen Koodseea Begum) to deposit in our Treasury a large sum of money, twenty or thirty lacs of Rupees, the interest at four per cent. to be as usual guaranteed to some of his Majesty's favourites. In this case our Govern-

4. Shah Najaf, built by Ghaziuddin Hyder in Lucknow where his remains lie.

5. See Agreement dated 17th August 1825 Select Committee 1832, Political Appendix 29, pp. 504-5.

6. Spoliation of Oudh, p. 79.

ment receiving so large a sum at four per cent would be enabled to pay off so much of the 5 per cent loan and for this gain be willing to incur the inconvenience of a guarantee but then great care should be taken in wording the guarantee and this clause always inserted "that to prevent disputes hereafter where difference of opinion arose between the Oude and British Government as to the extent of the guarantee, and interference, the British Government was to be the sole judge of that extent". This would in a great measure put a stop to that endless contention arising from the doubtful extent of jurisdiction. The Resident in future being sole judge.

15th. The Guarantee should also distinctly state that protection will be given only to certain persons actually named in the deed, and not to the indefinite term the household or to the family or relations, for this leads to endless trouble, as may be imagined when the local authorities, perhaps the King himself, takes some measure against an individual of the "household" and instantly the guaranteed person runs to the Resident with his guarantee claiming protection to all the members of his family. The Resident is puzzled to discover whether from the wording of the deed he can legitimately interfere. At length he determines half doubting to do so, and takes up the cause, perhaps to stir up against himself in the Durbar a host of irritable feelings arising from what they may justly deem his meddling and unjustifiable interference with the proper authority of the King's Government, and whilst these feelings continue to be stirred up, the Resident cannot expect to retain his influence in matters of moment to the Kingdom at large. The caution cannot be too often repeated—Beware of entering into fresh guarantees.

CHAPTER XVI

EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY JURISDICTION

1st. A most unpleasant portion of the duties of the Resident is the exercise of an undefined and uncertain jurisdiction over Europeans and Indo-Britains residing in Lucknow. These are every day becoming more numerous and individuals having complaints against them very frequently appeal to the Resident.

2nd. By the treaty no European is allowed to reside in Oude without the sanction of the British Government.¹ This leaves with the Resident as the Representative of the British Government the power ultimately, subject to the decision of the Governor-General in Council, of sending out of Oude any European who may justly subject himself to such a penalty.

3rd. But in addition to this power of transmission it has been customary for the Resident to take up the complaints against them by individuals. They are summoned to the Residency and an imperfect and unsatisfactory jurisdiction exercised over them.

4th. It is highly expedient that in a state like Oude where their sanction to reside depends upon their behaviour, the Resident should have the power to enquire into their conduct and through the Oude Government, the means when thought necessary of punishing where punishment is necessary but to extend the powers of the British representative at the Court of Oude to that of a Civil and Criminal Judge over the Europeans or Indo-Britains who have taken up their abode in this foreign state, appears to be illegal and contrary to the law of nations. Yet the Resident's jurisdiction is undefined by the British Government and most embarrassing cases in con-

1. Treaty 21 February 1798 Cl. 15 Article 15, (Aitchison Vol. 1 p. 118 Knighton. The private Life of an Eastern King p. 13. No European can be taken into the King's service without the sanction—really the permission of the Resident.

sequence occur, for, individuals constantly appeal to him for Justice or protection. But to administer justice with efficiency there should be full judicial power to enforce obedience to decisions, and this in Oude cannot be given.

5th. In Oude claimants sometimes take the law into their own hands against Europeans or Indo-Britains and thus obtain a rude Kind of Justice, but when the European or Indo-Britain appeals to the Resident and when his power interposes between the contending parties the measures which would otherwise be taken by the parties themselves to enforce justice are suspended and thus the Resident in a manner becomes responsible to give that redress which would most probably have been obtained by other means. His power however does not extend so far, and in the mean time the European or Indo-Britain in the absence of all legal proceedings or Judicial securities, may suddenly make his escape into the Company's territories. where there is impunity to Oude defaulters and leave the Resident responsible to the complaints for that justice and redress which his ineffecient interference had prevented.

6th. An instance of this may be given. An European some years ago appealed to the Resident against the violent proceedings of his creditors, natives and others, who had prevented his leaving Lucknow by seizing his loaded carts. The Resident referred the case to his Assistant for adjustment, the assistant called the creditors telling them that the case would be decided by him and that they must release the property of the European who should be made to do them justice. The European was called upon to lodge a certain sum of money in the Residency Treasury to prevent its being made away with, that it might be available to pay his creditors. The European refused to do this. The Assistant reported this refusal to the Resident, who not feeling authorized to enforce obedience as would have been done by any Civil Court, the matter there rested. The European ere long went to the Company's provinces where the courts cannot investigate complaints having their origin in a foreign state. The Oude creditors then came to the Assistant saying, "We had the European's Carts and property in our

possession and would have ourselves enforced payment, but you to protect him ordered us to release his carts and promised us justice. He has now left Oude. We look to you for payment." The plea was just and the Assistant paid them some 200 Rupees from his own funds and has ever since kept in mind the unsatisfactory nature of the Resident's jurisdiction. In like manner the present Resident has more than once from attempting to adjust complaints against Europeans been obliged himself to pay money to the Complainants from the European having left Oude without settling his affairs.

7th. An instance could be given where in the prosecution of this unsatisfactory and doubtful jurisdiction a Resident on his own responsibility has put into confinement an European, taken possession of property to a large amount and without any legal powers exercised a Civil and criminal Authority.

8th. It is a question whether the Supreme Court at Calcutta has criminal jurisdiction over Europeans in the Oude Dominions? But in the absence of any such provision in the treaty the Law of Nations must hold good in Oude to the exclusion of any foreign jurisdiction.

9th. Europeans or Indo-Britains who settle in a foreign state must naturally expect to be subject to the laws and authority of that state, and as it is presumed the British Government cannot legally give the Resident full judicial power over them, it would appear that he cannot too speedily be released from hearing and attempting to adjust complaints against them.

10th. Europeans as in the case of the late Mr. Middleton occasionally engage in extensive mercantile transactions with the natives of the country and to adjust the litigations arising out of these nothing short of full judicial powers vested by Government in the Resident would suffice. Many of these transactions also are dealings with the Oude Government itself and direct interference in such affairs would lead to endless embarrassments, and a respectable native sovereign feeling

equal to the administration of his own laws, would have just cause to complain were the representative from a foreign Government at his court to set up an independent tribunal in his capital.

11th. But if it is expected that the Resident at this court is to protect and controul Europeans who settle here either in the service of the King or out of it full civil and criminal powers should be vested in the Resident by the British Government for it frequently happens that in violent disputes prompt judicial and Magisterial measures are absolutely necessary.

12th. As a salutary check upon Europeans, power might be given to the Resident by the British Government to receive complaints against them but distinctly with this understanding that he has not himself to exercise jurisdiction, but merely in the event of justice not being done to the complainants he was to hand on the complaint to the King of Oude, with his recommendation that the Native Government should see justice done. This would throw the responsibility of all legal proceedings upon the legitimate authorities, the Native Government, and to avoid the harsh proceedings of the Native Government European and Indo-Britains will often be found willing to follow the advice which the Resident may give them, and the Oude Government will generally be glad to follow the judgment of the Resident so that the influence and even Power of the Resident over Europeans will always remain great but exercised through the legitimate and legal instruments, the local authorities.

13th. It will be satisfactory to all parties to Europeans, Indo Britains and to the Native Government that the Resident should have much influence in proceedings wherein they are concerned because it insures a degree of protection to the former classes which they would not otherwise enjoy and the Native Government is generally glad if by the advice or interposition of the Resident the perplexing disputes of Europeans or Indo Britains are settled without trouble.

14th. In a word it would seem expedient that the Resident should receive instructions that except in the power of trans-

mitting Europeans it was no part of his duty to exercise jurisdiction over them or Indo-Britains (the latter not in the Company's service strictly speaking appear to be entirely under the jurisdiction of the Native state) but that in complaints against them, or in cases where they required protection he should at his discretion hand up the case to the Oude Government with such recommendation as he deemed proper to be dealt with on its responsibility.

15th. The extent of jurisdiction over European officers or soldiers on the pension list who come to reside in Lucknow is also a point requiring to be laid down. They will invariably apply for protection but are they to be liable to the Resident's jurisdiction in all Civil and Criminal Suits brought against them? The law of Nations would seem to say that as they chose to reside in a foreign state, they too must be amenable to the laws of that state.

Note. September 8th 1835 since writing the above the instructions of the Honourable the Court of Directors have arrived ordering that Europeans not in the Company's service, residing in Oude, are in future, in pecuniary transactions to be put on a footing with the natives of the Country, but the orders of Government still leave in the same uncertainty as before the jurisdiction of the Resident, in criminal and other matters.

CHAPTER XVII

COMMERCIAL TREATY DISREGARDED

1st. The commercial treaty between the Oude and British Government was executed in 1788 during the reign of Assuphood Dowlah. It provides for the protection of trade in both states but it is almost a dead letter. Trade is left to take its chance in Oude and suffers most serious injury:*

1. Treaty concluded on 1 September 1788. See *A Collection of treaties and engagements with Native Princes and States of Assia from the earliest period upto the year 1809*, printed in 1812, p. 416.

2nd. For drawing out this paper, the instructions of Government are that it should point out the good or bad consequences of our measures. The following humble and respectful observations therefore seem to be called for.

3rd. This treaty differs from all the rest in this respect that by the neglect of the others the subjects of Oude only suffer whereas by the neglect of the commercial treaty, our own merchants and trade suffer as well as those of Oude.

4th. The river Goomtee offers a beautiful conveyance for all the trade between the capital of Oude and the British provinces below Benares but from the utter neglect and indifference of the Oude Government to these important interests that river, as respects commerce, notwithstanding the frequent remonstrances of the Resident may now be said to flow in vain.* It is blocked up against trade by the most barefaced oppression of the Zemindars on its banks, who at no less than 110 villages or places stop every Boat that attempts to pass, and with the most shameful violation of every right levy an arbitrary tax on boats. If a merchant resists this iniquitous demand his boat is detained by force with

Disregard of its stipulations

* 1st June 1836—since these remarks were written It is very gratifying to find that the Oude Government has at length put a stop to the exactions on the Goomtee by detaching parties of troops to various points along the River and Boats can now navigate the stream unmolested. It seems a duty however to allow the remarks in the text still to remain, as they exhibit a state of things of very long continuance, which, unless the present satisfactory measures of protection be kept in force, like shoals of old standing in the way of trade covered for the time are too liable to reappear. F.L.P.S August 15, 1836 Since the above note of 1st June was written, the prediction has proved too true, the exactions on the Goomtee have already recommenced ! three different individuals, manjees in charge of boats, which arrived last month have deposed on the 19th August 1835, that their progress has been stopped, they further say that the sepoy themselves (who were sent to prevent exaction) have joined with the Zemindars, in demanding money.

One Majee states, he left his boat, and travelled overland 60 Koss (120 Miles) to obtain protecting guard, that he may reach Lucknow without further molestation

insolence and threats until his suffering interests induce him to pay, but no merchant of any respectability now is so rash as to venture into Oude by that route. There is no respect or fear of the Government on the banks of the Goomtee as is proved by the circumstance that very lately a boat containing goods for the Prime Minister of Oude himself and for the Residency suffered the same fate as all the rest. It had to pay its way up and was at length obliged to appeal from a station down the river to the Residency for assistance against the Zemindars to enable it to reach Lucknow. And an officer of rank in the British service when passing up lately on being stopped by Zemindars was told by them (of course merely in bravado) that 'if the Resident himself passed they would stop him for tax!'

5th. The Oude Government is fully aware of this stoppage of the river. They have been told again and again of the bad name which it brings upon their Government; they have been urged on their own account, and by the direction and in the name of the Governor-General in Council, by virtue of the treaty to remove these barriers to trade, but hitherto all in vain. Promises are made, but nothing is done. Investigations are now going on by the Oude Government, but there is no calculating upon its measures until they are really carried into effect.

6th. The remedy appears to be truly simple. There is surely not a Zemindar amongst the 110 places of stoppage who for the trifling gain that each derives would deem it worth his while, or dare to violate a positive order of the Oude Government that such iniquity should cease, did they see that their Government really wished and were determined that boats should pass up and down the river free; but no question being asked, it is natural there, as at the Capital, to draw the conclusion that the administration will take no measures whether boats are stopped or not.

7th. It appears in the British Government a duty to its own subjects, as well as to the people of Oude and an act of friendship towards the King to urge the opening of the trade

upon the Goomtee. The treaty warrants our urgency to neglect it is to neglect the interests of British subjects and those of Oude. It is shocking to hear of the oppression on the Goomtee.

8th. These remarks are written with kind feelings towards the Oude administration but its' best and most intimate friends know that almost all points requiring consecutive attention, to be carried through the native Government, are so, not by once writing or speaking but by dint of perseverance. Seeing therefore that ordinary requests and friendly remonstrances had failed, were a periodical report upon the subject by the Resident to the Governor General of India in Council to be prepared and to continue until the remedy was applied, a duplicate of it being given personally to the King himself, the trade upon the Goomtee would in all probability flow uninterruptedly from that moment. And the reason is this, that the extreme indifference of the Oude administration is generally to be overcome only by its fears of consequences. Such a periodical memorandum would prove to the Durbar that the Governor-General in Council had the interests of the mercantile community, as provided for by the Treaty, at heart, and the knowledge by the Ministry that their neglect would thus be laid before the King and probably cause his anger would most likely insure the remedy of the abuse and all this might be done in the spirit of perfect friendship. The Ministry here would also be ashamed periodically to vex the Resident whom they most justly respect and esteem by obliging him to write to the Governor-General monthly that the Goomtee was still a scene of oppression.

9th. The subject has already engaged the deliberations of the British Government and the following extract taken from the instructions of Government is important to be inserted here.

From,

C. E. Trevelian, Esqr. Deputy Secy. to Govt.

To,

Captn. Paton, in charge of the Residency Lucknow.

13th February 1834.

Sir,

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of

the 24th and 29th ultimo, on the subject of obstructions offered to British Commerce, in the Oude dominions in contravention of the Commercial treaty between the two Governments.

His Honor in Council agrees with you in opinion, that a question, in which British interests are so much conceived as the trade between our Provinces and the Dominions of the King of Oude, is deserving of the serious attention of Government and the existence of a regularly formed commercial treaty, offers an appropriate ground for bringing the subject to the notice of the Oude authorities.

It is accordingly desired that you will call His Majesty's attention to the imperfect manner in which the stipulations of the commercial treaty are fulfilled by his officers and, generally speaking, you are authorized to hold such a tone on the subject, as will be calculated to impress on the mind of His Majesty, and of his ministers, that the British Government has the interests of the mutual commerce carried on between the two countries sincerely at heart.

4th. As His Majesty has it, at any time in his power, to put a stop to the extortions, said to be practised, at the Lucknow Custom House, it is hoped that after the subject has been properly represented to him, no room will be left for further complaint on this score. The opening of the Navigation of the Goomtee, which is said to be closed at present from unauthorized exactions of the Zemindars will probably be a task of difficulty, and if the present minister succeed in accomplishing this object, the circumstance will be highly to his credit.

10th. It is proper to mention that the Vice President in Council did not then approve of the proposed monthly Report, thinking that a representation to the King would suffice, but unhappily the evil still continues in full force. From that day to this, though nearly two years have elapsed, no effectual steps have been taken.*

**Note :* Sept. 8th 1835. The Ghat Manjey at Lucknow having this morning been called upon to supply a Country Boat, for an officer, to go down the River, declared his inability, and plainly stated that in consequence of the oppression of the Zemindars, no boats came to Lucknow, that he had in vain presented his

11th. The benefit of a periodical Report upon the protection of trade, would be equally felt in the city of Lucknow as the abuses of the custom house require reform. But the Chief obstacle to British trade and manufacture is a powerful favourite** about the person of His Majesty, whose Chuprassees attend at the custom house and in violation of every law of justice and to the destruction of Security and confidence, seize every Bale of valuable goods and carry it to the house of this person, who is the King's Chief Tailor, and who under pretence of His Majesty's authority, opens the bales and in perfect disregard of the owner's wishes and against his will takes possession of the best articles (if they happen to suit his fancy) as for the supply of the King and Palaces, and fixing his own arbitrary price and unauthorized tax upon them, leaves the poor ill used merchant, to get possession of the money as he best can from the tardy officers of Government. In addition to the mortification of having his goods unlawfully seized, by a minion of the Court, and to his loss in this arbitrary valuation, the merchant is often obliged to waste his valuable time in vexatious and anxious attendance at the threshold of the King's tailor, before he can recover the rest of his property. This is no exaggeration, the Minister of the Oude Government will also admit its truth, but all are afraid to touch the cause of all this oppression, because he is a favourite with the King, and constantly has the Royal Ear, and were he threatened with punishment, might shake the very ministry by his influence. The Merchants importing British goods upon which his hands most heavily fall, complain most bitterly of him. The 14th article of the commercial treaty entitles them to British protection, and on two, or more occasions, his name has been handed up from the Residency to the King. Being able

petition praying for protection to the Boats. The Resident having repeatedly drawn the attention of the Durbar to the subject, some sepoy's have lately been detached from Lucknow to be stationed on the Banks of the River.

** June 1st 1836. Since writing these remarks, this evil has also ceased, and the favourite no longer practises the exactions complained of. It seems still a duty to let the observations in the text stand as they are, for the cessation as on two former occasions, may be only temporary. An improvement is also said to have taken place in the Custom House.

to use the Resident's name, the Ministry have on two occasions (nobody, not even himself attempts to justify his atrocities!) had his chuprassees ordered to be withdrawn from the Custom House and for a season the evil ceased, but he has in both cases watched his opportunity, knowing his power, and gradually resumed his exactions.

12th. Here as on the Goomtee, it would seem good, until the evil be removed to apply a consecutive check to an inveterate abuse, by opposing to it a periodical report of the state of the British trade to be drawn out for the Governor-General, and for the King, as the Tailor would probably cease to risk His Majesty's displeasure, by having his name thus periodically brought forward.

13th. It may seem as if the supplies of the King thus seized, through this Agent would be a mere trifle, but the wants and the profusion of His Majesty for presents to enormous establishments, and for furnishing his numerous palaces in the most expensive and luxurious way are immense, and the demand for supplies constant. The Chief Tailor is the favourite Agent for most of these supplies, the extent of them may be imagined, when it is considered that the expense of His Majesty's wardrobe, including presents and clothing of household establishment, is estimated at about 8 Laos of Rupees a year. Since this was written, the Court of Directors in their general letter of 16th March 1836 No. 7 have directed that the cessation of hindrances to British trade should be peremptorily insisted upon, at least to such an extent, as the orders of the Oude Government, in its present state, may be effected to be obeyed.

14th. Fear only would prevent the whole of the Merchants of the city who trade in such goods, presenting in a body a petition (as provided for by the 14th article and this commercial treaty) to the Resident, praying for the protection of trade with the British Provinces.

15th. And it is the circumstance of having observed every where the desire of the British Government to open a free and uninterrupted trade for its subjects, with other nations (from

the embassy to Siam, for this express purpose, from the opening of the Indus, and from revision of the Custom Laws)* that has led. to the length of this paper for, here in this very centre of our Dominions, is the Kingdom of Oude, with a most luxurious court, a rich and populous Capital, where especially British manufactures are valued, and the merchandise of our Provinces would find not only an ample market, but a mart from whence to supply the great towns of the Kingdom.

16th. And did the subject appear of sufficient importance to the British Government to draw forth the necessary measures, the Rivers and the trades would be effectually opened to the merchants of both Kingdoms.

17th. The following simple and unexpensive arrangement would appear calculated to accomplish so desirable an end, namely by stationing an agent at the Capital and another at the boundary of the Kingdom with orders to supply each boat with a printed proclamation, and where the Boatman were willing to pay his salary, a chuprassee of the Oude Government as a witness to the fact forbidding all persons to stop its progress, or demand a tax, upon penalty of being immediately summoned to Lucknow, and directing the boat owner, to record upon the face of the proclamation the names of all villages, where tax was demanded, and the amount paid and ordering that this record should in passing the border, or on arrival at the Capital, be given to the Agent who, in the paper itself should be enjoined to forward it to some efficient native officer in authority at Court, to whom this important duty should be entrusted. This officer should immediately summon the offending Zemindars who, it is presumed, are mere petty farmers, to answer for their crimes. The mere knowledge that these orders were to be sternly acted upon, would probably throw open at once the River and the commerce between the Oude and British dominions, for it might be expected that no villages would run the risk of a certain journey to the Capital And should it be alledged that the summons of offenders to

* June, 1st 1836. The whole of the transit duties in the British territories have recently been abolished.

the capital would make enemies to the Minister, and tend to shake his power, this would be a melancholy proof of the inefficacy of an administration where the Chief Magistrate was obliged to contemplate such glaring evils without possessing the power to remedy them.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE RESIDENT AND THE KING

1st. As the instructions of the Government for the preparing of this narrative of British intercourse with Oude directs that the effects of our measures may be pointed out, it is necessary to offer some observations upon a main cause of many effects good and evil, the Department of the Resident.

2nd. It may at first appear superfluous to say any thing upon a subject so trite as the conduct of the Resident at this Court, but experience has taught that grievous political errors have arisen from a misunderstanding of the Resident's duties. His influence is immense and every step he takes is important.

3rd. The supremacy of the British Government throughout India gives deep importance to the acts of its representatives at native Courts, they being the sole medium through which all measures of the supreme Government towards the Kingdom of Oude, especially, have from the beginning, been decided. And overpowering, at one time dethroning the Ruler Vizier Ally whom, but two months before they had set up, and bestowing the Kingdom upon another, and having done so, regardless of the new Sovereign's remonstrances, the people have seen the British Government by its feat compel him to reduce his Army, and to take into his pay large bodies of British troops over which he was to have no controul, more than half his dominions having then been taken possession of by the British Govern-

ment against his will¹. And very recently the people of Oude saw the Prime Minister of the Kingdom, The Nowaub Moatumudoodowlah, though at the desire of the King, yet by the instrumentality of the Representative of the British Government, suddenly reduced from the lofty position of virtual ruler of the state to the condition of a close prisoner under British Guards². And yet more recently in 1830 they have seen another of Oude's Prime Ministers Ram Dial from enjoying the confidence of his sovereign and the almost unlimited power of sovereignty suddenly at the desire of the British representative, stripped of his power, and in a day reduced from his elevation to imprisonment! And even as respects the sovereign himself, his subjects have again and again seen the British representative at his court properly decline association with him at festive parties when misgovernment characterized his administration.

4th. The inhabitants of Oude therefore are impressed with the belief that the Oude Government exists merely at the pleasure of the British power, and are prepared, from past experience, to expect that overwhelming Power to act as its pleasure may dictate either in the imprisonment or removal of its Minister, the dethronement of the sovereign or the assumption of the Kingdom.

5th. Now the Resident is the sole organ of this stupendous power which has from time to time wrought such changes in Oude. The eyes of the people are ever upon him expecting, especially during periods of misgovernment, some great event. It behoves him therefore to act with wisdom as his slightest indications are powerful to produce great effects, good or evil, affecting thousands in the Native Government, as will be shewn.

6th. For instance, the turbulent body of Oude Zumeen-dars, who like chieftains of old, reside within their fortresses

1. Lord Wellesley's arrangement in 1801.

2. A brief account of this episode is to be found in 'Tarikh Badshah Begam' translated by Taqi Ahmad. pp. 56-58. Also Irwine: Garden of India p. 111 and p. 117.

and mount cannon on their walls, and are surrounded by large bodies of armed men, hold very light the authority of a weak native Government and often despise its orders when opposed to their will. They have their spies or Agents at Court and suit their obedience to the temper of the times. Under an energetic Minister (for such a Minister is always the ruling power in Oude) enjoying the confidence of his Sovereign and the favor of the British Resident, these petty chieftains of the interior are found to pay their revenue, to yield obedience to the Firmauns of the King and even to attend at Court when summoned, but when their Agents inform them that the Minister's power is tottering, his continuance in office doubtful, and his favor with the King declining, and especially that the British Resident looks coldly towards him, or perhaps has quarrelled with him, in vain are his orders sent to the interior. The revenue is withheld and orders disobeyed, in the hope that the King or Resident will in a short period (as they have seen to be the fate of others) remove the Minister and then the orders he may have issued are considered null and void.

7th. This disobedience leads to coercion. Battalions and Artillery are sent out, the poor people are plundered in all directions, villages are fired and the fortress of the rebel besieged and taken and many lives are lost on both sides. Now under a Minister known to have at least the countenance of the Resident much of this might be avoided.

8th. No Minister in Oude can expect to rule the state with efficiency unless he is supposed to have the good will of the Resident, and especially when the Oude Government, is as now under probation, it is essential for a fair trial that the Resident should be on good terms with the King and Minister.

9th. When Ramdial was Minister or acting as such in 1829 the Resident would not speak to him or admit him within the gates of the Residency! And this decision was supported by the British Government. In a Government already weak and tottering with a class of turbulent petty chieftains in the interior, the disownment by the British Government of the only

feeble existing organ of the power, almost insured its being held in contempt. Well might the King of Oude have said "It may be true that the Minister of my choice is naturally inefficient but your conduct towards him insures his being so."

10th. Again when the next Minister the Nowaub Muntiz-moodowlah Mehdee Ally Khan Bubadoor, the most efficient that Oude ever saw, was placed in power in 1830 it unfortunately happened that disagreements arose between the Minister and even between the King and Resident. The cause was the enforcement of one of those pernicious guarantees. The Resident being obliged in the painful execution of his duty to set at liberty and to guard in safety beyond the Ganges the Ex-Minister and his enormous wealth in positive opposition to the wishes of the King and Minister, but the cause of the quarrel is unimportant here the effects of such disagreements being only under consideration. The whole City and indeed those in contact with the Native Government throughout the Kingdom were observant of this serious misunderstanding. The Resident had already but a few months before by his own Authority obliged the King to remove from Office the last Minister and it must have generally been expected that this Minister also would speedily follow.

11th. The tendency and effect of this feeling in the interior amongst unruly Zemindars must have been opposition to all plans of reform contrary to their will or interests emanating from an authority (the Ministers) who must have been considered as tottering and about to fall, as the last two Ministers had fallen through the instrumentality of the Resident.

12th. In short, especially in a crisis of probation where the Oude Government is left itself to work out a good Government, courtesy on the part of the British representative shewn both to the King and to the Minister should be an essential part of the trial.* And it is much to be regretted when the

* Note :—It is worthy of remark as illustrative of the relative positions of British representative at Lucknow and the Prime Minister of the State who virtually exercised sovereign

deportment either of the King, or of his Minister, is such as to suspend the interchange of the most friendly intercourse, tho' this will sometimes happen, and be necessary as a check even with a Resident earnestly desirous to uphold the Native Government.

13th. It is most salutary for the Oude Government when its proceedings are influenced by a respect for the wishes of the British Government. In Oude they have a saying that "the Governor-General sees with the eyes of the Resident, hears with his ears, and speaks with his tongue"; and as a talented Resident observed "it is proper that the Resident should be respected, it is salutary that he should be feared," and it should be added it is most desirable that he should be esteemed. To combine these, should be the aim of every Resident—Respected from his high character, esteemed from his constant friendly and courteous deportment, and the real pleasure he ever feels in bestowing praise where it can possibly be given, and feared by the King and his executive Ministers by his constant conscientious habit of bringing when necessary their misgovernment to view both to their own sovereign and to the British Government. To the Ministers of Oude this latter habit is one of fearful importance and to avert an unfavorable report of their administration to their own sovereign they will be found generally ready to make efforts to remove the cause of censure that the Resident may praise and not dispraise them to the King.

14th. With a good Minister the Resident's influence is extensive. However, under the present administration all prospects of real amelioration appear hopeless. It does not Authority over the whole Kingdom, that until 1830 the Resident at Lucknow never allowed the Prime Minister to smoke a hooka in their presence! The youngest 'Ensign in the British Army, or indeed any person however humble admitted to the Resident's table and wearing an English dress, though perhaps a Servant of the Oude Government, might smoke the Hooka but the Prime Minister might not smoke before the Resident! The writer of this paper was the first officer, performing the duties of Resident at Lucknow, before whom the Minister had a Hooka.

seem to be in the constitution of the Durbar composed as it is of the King and Ministry to effect a good Government.⁸

15th. It will often be the painful duty of a Resident to place himself in direct opposition to the Oude Government, warmly to oppose its wishes and to bring to the notice of the Supreme Government acts of gross misgovernment and neglect, a duty the more painful as in all his association with the Durbar, he is ever experiencing the greatest civility and marks of personal courtesy from the King and Minister. No attempt is left untried to heap favors upon him, and lacs of Rupees, if he would take them, are ever ready to be lavished upon him, and lucrative appointments in the King's service are offered to his friends and relations, in short it is the anxious wish of the King and Minister to have a Resident under obligations that they may thus obtain his favor, and he cannot be too much upon his guard, to stand aloof, from every such favor. His duties require him to occupy the high station of perfect independence unshackled in the performance of disagreeable duties by the powerful restraints of gratitude for favors received, or anticipated. Especially ought he to refrain from using influence to place individuals in the King's service. The indication of a wish on his part is often enough to obtain a situation for almost any person. The applications by individuals for his influence are numerous, but when once hampered by seeing around the person of the King on high salaries his friends and relations, farewell to independence in the execution of painful duties.

16th. It need scarcely be said here that much of the Resident's influence to effect good will depend upon the courtesy and consideration shewn to him by the Supreme Government. If he is supposed not to possess the confidence and support of his own Government or not to be in favor, he will lose much weight. As the organ of the Supreme Government his power in critical times of directing the machinery of the native Government is immense. It seems therefore of great importance

8. King Nasiruddin Hyder and Minister Roshanuddulah.

that the British Government should have not only the cold and lifeless performance of duty from its representatives at Native Courts, but by a generous and considerate treatment of its accredited Agents to secure their hearty and zealous endeavours with the Native rulers to accomplish all the wishes of the Government.

17th. The Oude Government is bound by treaty to be guided in its measures by the advice of the British Government. In administering this advice it has been much the custom to do so in the manner most calculated to ensure its rejection by recording it in a formal manner in the shape of a letter from the Resident to the King of Oude, and that not always couched in the most conciliatory tone.

18th. It is in human nature that the pride of a King should rise against the performance of duties however excellent thus publicly dictated to him by the Minister of a foreign power at his Court. The Sovereign must feel that such measures so far from redounding to his credit would only yield to his nobles, courtiers, and subjects, the humiliating proof that he was the humble servant of a foreign Minister obeying his behests. The whole pride of the Native Court must be set in array against obedience to "advice" so conveyed. A judicious Resident will ever studiously avoid this formidable barrier to success, he will feel that whenever possible the surest path to the accomplishment of an object is by keeping himself in the background as the originator, and by every means to get the King and Minister insensibly to adopt it as their own he can then in private conversation urge it as redounding to their honor and express the friendly desire for its accomplishment that he may have the gratification of communicating it to the British Government. In proportion as the Resident attempts to exalt himself by a dictatorial or forward spirit so will it be the desire of the Native Government to resist his influence. There are of course exceptional cases where all other methods failing, it will become his duty to dictate to the Durbar the views of the British Government or failing to produce any good effect from other modes of procedure it may often be a duty to place on record his views and advice,

19th. A Resident to have influence at this Court should if possible draw out esteem whilst he commands respect by combining with a modest Kind and conciliatory spirit towards the Native Government a known firm zealous and unflinching purpose to perform all his delegated duties towards the British Government and towards the people of Oude.

CHAPTER XIX

POSITION IN 1835

1st. It is proper here briefly to enumerate the plans which have been proposed to remedy the misgovernment in Oude and to remove from the British Government the stigma of longer supporting, by a treaty and by the presence of its representative and troops, a disreputable Government.

2nd. The treaty-binds the British Government to support the King upon his throne in the full exercise of his power and to defend him against external and internal foes. But the terms of the support are distinct, that the King shall maintain a good government and be guided by the Counsels of the British Government in the administration of his Kingdom, and that he shall maintain only a certain number of Troops. The King has broken this treaty. His Government is unequivocally bad. Depending more upon accident than upon any satisfactory cause he has not followed British advice, and his army far exceeds the stipulated number. The British Government is therefore absolved from adhering to the treaty as it originally stood.

3rd. Remedies which have been proposed are :—

1st. To revert to the terms and letter of the treaty, to advise the King in all matters and see if he will follow good Counsel and Govern well. It would be delightful release from the present embarrassed position of the British Government, in supporting with its troops such a Government, but the experience for 34 years since the treaty was made has shewn

that British advice (unbacked by any penalty) administered to a Native Government, swayed by caprice, intrigue, and faction, and subject to no fixed principles or check, has proved weak and quite inefficient to produce an impression upon such incongruous elements and especially under the present Ruler of Oude is this system of giving him good advice quite hopeless, for he never acts for himself but is always guided by favourites or individuals whose deep interests are strictly opposed to his following a good system of Government which would naturally curtail their power and emoluments.

4th. The Prime Minister has acknowledged his inability to grasp and guide the helm of the state or oppose the powerful influence of favourites. He may be said instead of directing the studious current of events to be merely swimming with the stream studious chiefly to make no enemies and to keep his place. The real power of the Kingdom being wielded by irresponsible unsalaried individuals.

5th. The next plan is that the British should quit the scene altogether and leave the King to defend himself against his own subjects, for the moment the King ceases to Govern well and follow British advice from that moment are the British at perfect liberty to withdraw the Resident and Troops beyond his Kingdom—nay, under such a treaty to remain and quietly witness a misgovernment which their power is supporting is justly to incur obloquy.

6th. But then comes the difficulty. We took more than one half of the Kingdom to support the expense of those very troops for the protection of the Country and the Ruler. When we withdraw from this support of the Ruler are we bound to restore any of this Territory? The answer to this might be, "that the British Government having made a treaty with the Ancestor of the present King advantageous to itself it could not be expected that that Government would forego any one of those advantages or give back territory merely because the present King chose to break treaty, that protection to him against his own subjects by British troops was ready if he would adhere to the treaty and follow advice, that the British Government

earnestly wished to adhere to the treaty but his disregard of a chief stipulation obliged them to supply the remedy, for as he disregarded advice and misgoverned, not a British soldier could be allowed to support misgovernment by remaining within his Kingdom. He must be left to his fate to answer to his people for his measures and those British troops all be withdrawn and reassembled on his frontier to defend him from foreign foes alone."

7th. To this measure of withdrawal there is another obstacle. Might it not lead to rebellion and bloodshed in the Country? or might it not lead to the further enslavement of the people by the Native Government through an increased army? But to this it may be answered that the effects of withdrawal are quite uncertain, and as far as human foresight can discern having acted for the best, and fairly withdrawn, the responsibility moral or political would no longer rest upon the British. The matter would rest between the Governor and the Governed.

8th. It is possible that the unalterable determination of the British Government to withdraw and leave the King to his fate might so work upon his fears as to lead him to purchase their stay by a new treaty and that would of course be made to supply the deficiencies of the present one and bind him, upon pain of dethronement, really to follow advise and govern well.

9th. And as regards the future consequences of withdrawal, it is possible that the Government might improve on our withdrawal from the necessity that would then be felt by the King and his Ministers of remembering that there were some Six Millions of inhabitants to be affected by, or to resent their measures. It is possible also that anarchy might arise in the interior, and that the King's personal fears would induce him to beseech the return of the British and this would only be under a new and effectual treaty to secure good Government.

10th. Another objection to withdrawal is what would become of the numerous guaranteed families, who would be left behind and who are entitled to the protection of the Resident against oppression? This might be met in part by the deter-

mination in cases where British interference was necessary to depute for a time to Lucknow an Assistant to investigate particular cases, or the Resident might if necessary occasionally come himself. All that the guaranteed families have any right to claim is his protection in cases of oppression, and this might surely be given without the necessity of the Resident being on the spot. He would otherwise reside upon the frontier station and carry on by letter the duties between the two Governments.

11th. The next remedy proposed, is, that of removing the Ruler from the throne and raising another who could be bound down to good Government under a new treaty that he should strictly follow British Counsel, that his sway should assuredly cease whenever he ceased to Govern well and give satisfaction to the power which had raised him to the throne and held him there.

12th. This mode of procedure would have this difficulty, there is no provision in the Treaty for the dethronement of the Ruling Prince. But when compared with the more decisive and sweeping measure, not only of dethroning the King but annexing the Kingdom for a time to the British Territories to manage it for a succession, the mere dethronement of the King and at once setting up another, the next heir to the throne, as regards right would be a most simple measure, for even granting that there is not the legal right by the treaty, the injustice would extend only to one man, the Ruler, and for the good of millions, the disinterested removal of one individual from a momentous station which (with unfeigned regret must it be recorded) it is too well known he is utterly incompetent to fill and he would only be removed to another station, though not of power of liberty, comfort and abundant wealth. The treaty it is true would be infringed but disinterestedly so, under a pressure of difficulties for the good of millions, and to secure to the state and to the legal heirs the revenues and treasures of the Kingdom now being squandered away whilst heavy debts remain to be paid and with which the next Government will be saddled. The question however in whatever point viewed is full of embarrassment.

13th. The next proposal is the assumption of the Kingdom.

by the British Government for a period of years to be managed for the next legal heir to the throne and ultimately given over to him. The difficulty attending this arises from their being no provision for it in the Treaty.

14th. The Decision has been passed by the Home Authorities that the only effectual remedy for the management of Oude is the administration for a period of its Government by British Officers. The Indian Government having been vested with full authority to act upon this principle when such a crisis of misgovernment shall arrive as renders such a measure necessary and at the time of assumption the declarations made that the British had no selfish motives but intended to manage the Kingdom for a successor until such time as abuses were corrected. The assumption might perhaps be made even to all the native Rulers and population to appear honorable and disinterested, but without the declaration on the part of the British, that they meant not to appropriate a rupee of its revenues except to defray the expences of the Government, the measure would to all classes wear the appearance of an unjust usurpation of the Kingdom of an Ally.

15th. This is certain that whatever ultimate measures may be taken, the British Government is morally and Politically bound and owes it to its own reputation and to the people of Oude to act with decision and to cease from upholding despotic power when it oppresses the inhabitants.

16th. As far as can be forseen the machine of the Government is running down. It is the common and reasonable belief, grounded upon the reckless extravagance and absence of any settled or good Government, that Oude under the present system is rapidly hastening to bankruptcy for its expences have long exceeded and now greatly exceed its revenue. Its establishments are at this moment, November 1835, forty lacs of rupees in arrears (see the Resident's dispatch dated November 1835) and were it not for the old treasures* of the state it would long since have

Extravagance
and impending
insolvency.

*P. S. July 1836 they are now all exhausted.

been a bankrupt Government, continued and heavy sums being drained from the old hoards, to meet the daily emergencies to pay up the heavy arrears of troops and immense establishments and to cover the lavish extravagance and outlays of the King in building Palaces &c

17th. As specimens of extravagance the allowed salary of the Minister may be mentioned. Exclusive of enormous presents or Nuzurs from the various officers of Government he receives upwards of one hundred thousand rupees a Month or five times as much as the Governor-General of British India!¹ The items of the Minister's salary are 5 per cent both upon the receipts and disbursements of the Kingdom besides one thousand Rupees a day in cash. Another item of extravagance may be given, namely the expense of His Majesty's wardrobe including the clothing of Palace establishments, presents &c is estimated at eight hundred thousand Rupees a year!

18th. It has been found that the King has spent yearly since his coronation about sixty six Lacks of rupees over and above the annual income of his Kingdom. The troops and establishment are often 18 months in arrears. If he continues thus to squander his treasure it is supposed the hoard will be all expended in two or three years. In such case the Company's bonds of which the King holds many,* His Jewels of which he has a splendid collection handed down from his ancestors will next come into the Market and support extravagances for some time longer and when all is gone speedy ruin may be expected to await Oude. Unless the protecting British Government, as would be its duty, comes forward to avert from the people so much misery for under such an administration as the present to raise a loan would be quite impracticable and as no Minister need expect to hold his place

**July 1836* P. S. he had 33 Lacs in company's bonds—but they and the old hoard are all now expended or at least ordered to be disbursed to pay arrear.

¹ *Ursula Low* : Fifty years with John Company. p. 142.

Salary of the Prime Minister was Rs. 3,00,000 while his perquisites brought him an additional 1,700,000 yearly, making a total of Rs. 2,000,000. *Irwin* : The Garden of India p. 120

who could not supply the King profusely with money it must then be raised from the people by farming out the revenues of the various districts to the highest bidders. Rapacious unprincipled renters backed as usual by the troops and Artillery of the State may be expected to screw the people to the last farthing and poverty and ruin would be the fate of thousands until goaded by wretchedness they rose into rebellion.

19th. This Melancholy picture however the Ruler of Oude does not foresee. He may be said to know nothing of the state of his Kingdom, of the people entrusted to his care. The appeals of the oppressed when personally made to the King are quite futile. The only opportunity of such appeals is when he appears in public, but often when driven to despair a poor man has ventured to raise his humble voice, or proffer his petition to the King for justice the lash of the whip has been the only answer to his prayer, for all who ventured to approach the Royal Sowary with complaint were thus driven away. The powerful individual by whose commands supplicants were whipped away has since himself been imprisoned and placed in irons by the King's orders without investigation or trial.

20th. To blind the King's eyes to the real state of affairs is the especial interest and business of the interested flatterers about him. There is enough to meet present wants and as for the rebellion of his subjects it is one of the evils of the treaty to free the sovereign's mind from salutary apprehension on that score because of the British guarantee against internal foes.

21st. In the appendix¹ will be found the minutes of the late Governor-General of India Lord William Bentinck and of the present Governor-General Sir Charles Metcalf embracing the views and recommendations of those high authorities upon the measures to be followed in the future Government of Oude.

22nd. It is good to look forward and to anticipate as far as possible coming events, but time alone can lift up the veil of futurity. Our all wise Providence "in whose hands are the hearts of Kings and

The future
prospect.

¹ These Minutes have been omitted as they are published in the Parliamentary Papers.

Governors", will assuredly direct events and ultimately effect for the people of this Kingdom such dispensation as accords with his will whether in placing them under the British Government or in leaving them under the sway of their present Rulers.

23rd. Should the British Government as authorized by the Home authorities when an extreme crisis shall arise, assume for a time the entire administration of the Kingdom—if this period be postponed, until the latest moment, till after all the old treasures have been expended.** It is important to consider the probability that it will have to commence upon this arduous duty of a new Government under the embarrassment of a considerable debt from the period of assumption for in addition to the usual arrears of the enormous establishments commonly amounting to forty or fifty lacs, other claims and especially old claims upon the Government unadjusted from the time of the Nowab Vizier Asuphoddowlah to the amount of a Crore of Rupees may certainly be expected. Because though the Oude Government has hitherto turned a deaf ear to those claims the British Government might find itself bound in honor to pay many of them to a Heavy amount. The claim of the Benares Bankers alone now amounts to nearly a Crore of Rupees.

After writing so much upon Oude affairs the pages would be most incomplete were no mention made of a recent event of momentous importance to this Kingdom detailed in the Resident's despatch of the 26th of August 1836 namely the exhaustion of the old hoard of treasure which has hitherto been the mainstay of the Government in its career of extravagance and was supposed until this disclosure to contain about One hundred and seventy lacs of Rupees (One million seven hundred thousand pounds sterling). This treasury was found on the 22nd of June last to contain only the small sum of about 16 lacs of Rupees and is now empty !

2nd. The cause which led to this important discovery are these. The Government was involved in heavy arrears to the

**June 24, 1836 since this was written, the old treasures have been expended ! the old hoards are now no more.

army and establishments to the amount of seventy five laos of Rupees (about £750,000) the payment of which was essential to carry on the affairs of the State. The Minister obtained the King's order for the payment of seventy five lacks from old hoard (the current revenue of the Kingdoms always forestalled long before it is collected) when sixteen lacks had been taken from the treasury, the discovery was made that it contained no more!

3rd. The treasurer declared that he himself had always been ignorant of the amount in the hoard as he had received it in an uncounted mass from the former Nowab Vizier Saadut Allee Khan when ruler of Oude and had never counted it. His Books shew a disbursement of about ten Crores, four of these having been expended in the last reign and six crores in this reign. The present King's expenditure, over and above the revenue, being six hundred lacks in nine years; being an annual outlay of about sixty six Lacks or about £ 666,000 above the Revenues.

4th. The important discovery that the hoard is at an end places the Kingdom of Oude in a new position; for though under a good Government it's income would much more than cover its disbursement, its Government as now conducted having been based upon these imaginary treasures, it cannot nearly support itself upon its revenues. It remains therefore to balance the accounts and to ascertain what remains from other sources to carry on the Government.

Rs.

5th. Its immediate and pressing wants to discharge clamorous arrears are as has been seen by the King's late order upon the treasury ... 75,00,000

To meet this there is a private store in the King's own hand, of which however he will probably expend the greater part in some new and separate outlay unconnected with the exigencies of the Government ... 44,00,000

(Remained) from the old treasure ... 16,00,000

The King had in Company's paper and has made over to the Minister for expenditure ... 33,00,000

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Due to the King by the British Government
and to be paid by order of the Governor-General in
Council being the repayment of part of the 1st
loan about 10,00 000

Total available	...	10,300,000
Balance of cash now in hand	...	28,00,000

But the private treasure in the King's own
apartments may not at all be calculated upon for the
public purposes of his Government therefore from the
above sum namely 10,300,000
Deduct the amount of the Private treasure ... 44,00,000

There will remain only in cash	...	59,00,000
Whereas the present arrears are	...	75,00,000

Leaving a debt of about Rupees	...	16,00,000
--------------------------------	-----	-----------

6th. Hitherto as has been shewn the King has expended annually about sixty six lacs of Rupees above his income and from his extravagant habits, and the inability of the Minister to check the onward torrent of expense, there seems no ground for the hope that at the eleventh hour rigid economy will succeed to profuse extravagance, but on the contrary it is natural to conclude from past experience that large debts must speedily be inevitable for the pay of a vast army and for the immense establishments of every kind partial reductions are now taking place but sweeping and efficient curtailments in every department can alone save the state.

7th. It will therefore become a question of deep importance painfully forcing itself upon the attention of the British Government whether it can any longer observe the attitude of non-interference which it so earnestly desires to preserve towards a state which has ever been one of its most faithful allies. When this state is commencing it's downward career of debt, a career which if unchecked must undoubtedly bring new burthens upon the people, as far as human foresight can penetrate, it seems inevitable that the British Government, if matters go on as now, must be compelled ere long to interpose when it

will perhaps be too late to avert evils of accumulated debt, because should the British Government itself assume the administration as provided for by the Home authorities, it would probably find the state of Oude at this moment burthened with a debt of nearly one Crore of Rupees (leaving out of the calculation the King's private store of 44 Lacs never likely to be used for public purposes) for though the Oude Government has hitherto thrown out and rejected the payment of just debts of old standing contracted by its former Ruler, the Vizier Asuphoodowlah, such as that of the Benares Bankers and others amounting now if the interest be calculated to nearly a Crore of Rupees, the British Government in taking upon itself the administration of Oude might find itself compelled in justice to liquidate those claims.

8th. The present therefore is a crisis of the deepest importance to the Oude and to the British Governments both of which states are so intimately linked by treaty that financial embarrassments or misgovernment cannot injure the Native State without involving in the responsibility the paramount and guaranteeing power.

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